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USB issue - Libusb_interrupt_transfer #79

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DAFlippers opened this issue Aug 11, 2012 · 22 comments
Closed

USB issue - Libusb_interrupt_transfer #79

DAFlippers opened this issue Aug 11, 2012 · 22 comments
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@DAFlippers
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If USB_CTRL_TIMEOUT set to <50ms then first tx transfer usually returns 0 bytes transferred and timeout but data is actually sent out on USB.

During Read the data can be seen on the USB but is sometimes not returned by libusb_interrupt_transfer - see second read below.

Debug below from program and corresponding USB analyser. You can see first tx return 0 and timeout but data is sent out on USB.

More detail can be provided if required.

Libusb-1.0 is latest version. Program works flawlessly on other platforms running ubuntu/suse.

David

DEBUG FROM PROGRAM RUNNING ON RPi

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 00 00 00 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Write returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=0 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 04 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0
WS is 4

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 00 00 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 1 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 2 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 3 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 4 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 5 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 6 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 7 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 8 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 9 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 10 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 11 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 12 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 13 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 14 returned -7
RX Interrupt transfer returned -7 and transferred 0
Read 5 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 00 buf[1] 00 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 15 returned -7
Read returned -1

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 3c 00 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 78 00 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 b4 00 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 f0 00 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 2c 01 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 68 01 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 48 buf [3] 03 buf[4] 0d loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 a4 01 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 e0 01 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 1c 02 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 58 02 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 94 02 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 d0 02 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

Calling usb_interrupt_transfer with weydev->udev: 0x1921cc0 ,ep 0x0003, buffer 03 01 0c 03 00 00h ..., Len 0040h Timeout 10ms
TX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Write returned 0
RX Interrupt transfer returned 0 and transferred 64
Read 4 expect buf[1]=1 buf[0] 03 buf[1] 01 buf[2] 00 buf [3] 00 buf[4] 00 loop 0
Read returned 0

ELLISYS USB ANALYSER OUTPUT - FILTERED FOR ENDPOINT 3

Item Device Endpoint Interface Speed Payload Time
Start of Frame (8,467) FS 1,670 -> 1,944 0.000 871 383
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.466 503 700
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF BD A3) 8.466 875 483
Start of Frame (11) FS 1,945 -> 1,955 8.467 500 250
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.477 875 017
Start of Frame (337) FS 1,956 -> 244 8.478 499 767
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 3C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.814 860 233
Start of Frame (6) FS 245 -> 250 8.815 485 000
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 8.820 610 000
Start of Frame (11) FS 251 -> 261 8.821 484 733
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.831 609 500
Start of Frame (7) FS 262 -> 268 8.832 484 250
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 8.838 609 200
Start of Frame (11) FS 269 -> 279 8.839 483 950
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 B4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.849 608 717
Start of Frame (7) FS 280 -> 286 8.850 483 450
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 8.856 608 417
Start of Frame (11) FS 287 -> 297 8.857 483 150
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.868 232 900
Start of Frame (7) FS 298 -> 304 8.868 482 667
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 48 03 0D 02 01 00 48 03 0D 02 02 00 80 07 1C 02 03 00 48 03 0D 02 03 00 48 03 0D 02 04 00 80 02 00 02 04 00 80 02 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 8.874 607 617
Start of Frame (11) FS 305 -> 315 8.875 482 367
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 2C 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.885 732 117
Start of Frame (7) FS 316 -> 322 8.886 481 883
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 48 03 0D 02 01 00 48 03 0D 02 02 00 80 07 1C 02 03 00 BD A3) 8.892 606 833
Start of Frame (11) FS 323 -> 333 8.893 481 567
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 68 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.903 731 350
Start of Frame (7) FS 334 -> 340 8.904 481 100
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 48 03 0D 02 03 00 48 03 0D 02 04 00 80 02 00 02 04 00 80 02 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 8.910 606 033
Start of Frame (11) FS 341 -> 351 8.911 480 783
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 A4 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.921 730 567
Start of Frame (7) FS 352 -> 358 8.922 480 317
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 8.928 605 250
Start of Frame (11) FS 359 -> 369 8.929 480 000
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 E0 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.939 729 767
Start of Frame (7) FS 370 -> 376 8.940 479 517
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 8.946 604 450
Start of Frame (11) FS 377 -> 387 8.947 479 200
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 1C 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.957 728 983
Start of Frame (8) FS 388 -> 395 8.958 478 733
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 8.965 603 600
Start of Frame (11) FS 396 -> 406 8.966 478 367
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 58 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.976 728 150
Start of Frame (6) FS 407 -> 412 8.977 477 900
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 8.982 602 883
Start of Frame (11) FS 413 -> 423 8.983 477 633
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 94 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 8.993 727 400
Start of Frame (7) FS 424 -> 430 8.994 477 150
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 9.000 602 100
Start of Frame (11) FS 431 -> 441 9.001 476 850
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 D0 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 9.011 726 600
Start of Frame (7) FS 442 -> 448 9.012 476 350
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BD A3) 9.018 601 317
Start of Frame (17) FS 449 -> 465 9.019 476 050
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 0C 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 9.036 350 533
Start of Frame (7) FS 466 -> 472 9.036 475 300
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 01 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF BD A3) 9.042 600 267
Start of Frame (8,411) FS 473 -> 691 9.043 475 000
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 02 02 2B 00 C8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 17.453 109 717
Start of Frame FS 692 17.454 106 250
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 02 02 2B 00 C8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 17.454 231 467
Start of Frame (124) FS 693 -> 816 17.455 106 200
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 02 03 2C 00 C8 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF BD A3) 17.578 976 000
Start of Frame (7) FS 817 -> 823 17.579 100 767
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 03 02 2B 00 C8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 17.585 103 933
Start of Frame FS 824 17.586 100 467
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 03 02 2B 00 C8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 17.586 225 683
Start of Frame (2,392) FS 825 -> 1,168 17.587 100 433
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 02 02 2B 80 8B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 19.978 745 767
Start of Frame (4) FS 1,169 -> 1,172 19.978 995 550
IN transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 02 03 2C 80 8B FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF BD A3) 19.982 120 633
Start of Frame (4) FS 1,173 -> 1,176 19.982 995 367
OUT transaction 4 3 ACK FS 64 bytes (03 03 02 2B 80 8B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) 19.986 245 433
Start of Frame (10,194) FS 1,177 -> 1,130 19.986 995 183

@DAFlippers
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Just to add that i have checked this on more than one RPi.

David

@DAFlippers
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I have repeated testing following update to Linux version 3.2.27+ #24 PREEMPT and I still see the same problem with libusb_interrupt_transfer calls so this issue is not resolved.

My setup is very simple: RPi, Wired Ethernet connection, HDMI -> DVI connection to monitor and single USB connection to a USB 1:4 deskswitch - HID combined keyboard/mouse that my program 'talks' to on endpoint 3.

Note that I can add debug to my program and I have an external USB analyser (ellisys USB explorer) to capture the USB traffic should any testing/further information be required - just let me know what you require and I can do it.

David

@popcornmix
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I'm afraid I don't know enough to usefully comment. I'll try and get naren/gsh to look at this.

I don't know if it's related to this issue:
#72

I have found sdcard driver disabling interrupts for >100ms. You can avoid this with command line options:
sdhci-bcm2708.missing_status=0 sdhci-bcm2708.sync_after_dma=0
but it does cause problems with some sdcards. You could also try the patch in the pull request, but I don't think that is safe either.

@DAFlippers
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I should have added that my cmdline.txt file wasupdated to:

dwc_otg.microframe_schedule=1, sdhci-bcm2708.missing_status=0, sdhci-bcm2708.sync_after_dma=0 dwc_otg.lpm_enable=0 rpitestmode=1 console=ttyAMA0,115200 kgdboc=ttyAMA0,115200 console=tty1 root=/dev/mmcblk0p2 rootfstype=ext4 rootwait

so this is not the fix.

David

@raspberrypi
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Could you tell us a bit about the device you're talking to?

On 20/08/2012, DAFlippers [email protected] wrote:

I should have added that my cmdline.txt file wasupdated to:

dwc_otg.microframe_schedule=1, sdhci-bcm2708.missing_status=0,
sdhci-bcm2708.sync_after_dma=0 dwc_otg.lpm_enable=0 rpitestmode=1
console=ttyAMA0,115200 kgdboc=ttyAMA0,115200 console=tty1
root=/dev/mmcblk0p2 rootfstype=ext4 rootwait

so this is not the fix.

David


Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
#79 (comment)

Sent from my mobile device

@DAFlippers
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It is a 4 port KVM switch that has USB keyboard and Mouse input and 4 USB ports that can be connected to 4 different computers http://www.weytec.com/en/products/wey-keyboards/usb-deskswitch-ii-14/overview/.

I am using endpoint 3 to communicate with the device. Libusb_control_transfer() calls have never failed on RPi but libusb_interrupt_transfer have a very high failure rate so much so I have rarely successfully completed the 15 or so calls used to get configuration from the device at startup.

I have just installed the software on a pico ITX Atom based board running Fedora and it runs without issue. The only platform so far to have an issue is RPi.

David

@popcornmix
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gsh thinks you might be seeing an instance of his split transactions getting lost issue:

"Yeah I still think it's just the OUT case of the split interrupts...

Only useful information would be them putting an external hub in and then capturing the data between the pi and the hub, this should then show the failing splits"

@DAFlippers
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I placed a powered hub between RPi and USB switch and captured USB data between RPi and hub twice. I then removed the hub and captured data once.

Program log and USB logs posted in https://github.com/DAFlippers/RPi-data - forgive me if not posted correctly - I'm just learning the ropes.

You'll need the ellisys software http://www.ellisys.com/products/usbex200/download.php to view the .ufo files.

David

@grigorig
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DAFlippers, have you really added these commas into cmdline.txt? This might be harmful.

@DAFlippers
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D'oh!

The perils of copy paste and not checking...

Unfortunately stil the same result when commas removed.

David

@ghollingworth
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Not sure the traces are particularly useful... The captures need to be at the same time and preferably interleaved! I've got a LeCroy analyser for this, its quite useful!

There are clearly failing SPLIT IN transactions recorded but I didn't find any SPLIT OUT transactions

Doesn't help that the GUI is a bit difficult to navigate and very very slow to do anything!

Will assume for the moment it's the same problem as already being seen and will have to try again when we have a fix

@DAFlippers
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Thanks for input.

I guess I could edit the program debug and USB trace together but I find if I filter ep 3 it is relatively easy to cross reference. Note the debug and trace should be for the same transactions, i.e. the files numbered 01 were logged at the same time but it looks like I screwed up on the nohub :(. The program is writing and reading 64 bytes per message so it isn't massive but it just doesn't see the read data although I can see the data on the bus so RPi is instigating the read but the call isn't returning it.

I'll rpi-update and repeat making sure logs tie up.

David

@ghollingworth
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David,

Thanks, I think one of the main problems is driving the software, can
you give me instructions in how to just filter out those packets? I
was trying to get it to ignore all the incomplete in packets but
couldn't find anything useful

Also which device/endpoint is it that the errors are occuring on?

Thanks

Gordon (back from two weeks in Spain which is why the slow response!)

Gordon

On 26/08/2012, DAFlippers [email protected] wrote:

Thanks for input.

I guess I could edit the program debug and USB trace together but I find if
I filter ep 3 it is relatively easy to cross reference. Note the debug and
trace should be for the same transactions, i.e. the files numbered 01 were
logged at the same time but it looks like I screwed up on the nohub :(. The
program is writing and reading 64 bytes per message so it isn't massive but
it just doesn't see the read data although I can see the data on the bus so
RPi is instigating the read but the call isn't returning it.

I'll rpi-update and repeat making sure logs tie up.

David


Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
#79 (comment)

Sent from my mobile device

@DAFlippers
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Author

Hi Gordon,

I've had to fight but I have loaded log files to https://github.com/DAFlippers/27Aug. RPi running 3.2.27+ #66 PREEMPT and cmdline.txt is in the zip.

NoHub Device 4 ep 3 and Hub Device 6 ep 3. You can filter endpoints by putting 3 in box under column heading and similarly 4 or 6 in device filter box.

No hub transactions start at 3.316 214 133 and Hub at 5.952 894 533.

I hope you had a great holiday.

David

@ghollingworth
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Yes the problem is just SPLIT transactions being dropped exactly the same as we've already seen...

I'd suggest trying the latest kernel updates from Dom since the low latency changes are now set as default, it'd be interesting to see how much of a difference this makes for you...

Gordon

@DAFlippers
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Author

Hi Gordon,

Running 3.2.27+ #114 PREEMPT Tue Sep 4 00:15:33.

The first run looked promising however more thorough testing shows little, if any, improvement. Simple interrupt_transfer write calls do not return success even when data was transmitted on USB and USB data read from bus is not returned on read call.

Any suggestions?

David

@msmeissn
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msmeissn commented Sep 6, 2012

The problem is not with interrupt transfers per-se

Its that we can only do one camera session ... we exchange multiple bulk transfers back and forth which work fine
and wrap it up with a PTP closesession in the end.

A new session then does not open anymore, nbulk transfers timeout.

@DAFlippers
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It depends how the code handles errors. I have found libusb_interrupt_transfer reads on other hardware can return a timeout but actually has transferred the data so a timeout might not 'really' be a timeout. On RPi however the returned data is simply missing some of the time.

David

@piotr-e
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piotr-e commented Oct 18, 2012

When can we expect fix USB driver?

@piotr-e
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piotr-e commented Oct 19, 2012

I see blinking SD card led during easycap working. Why does SD card working during easycap working? I don't write any data to SD in this moment.

@ghollingworth
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Can you test this again with the latest updated kernel (using sudo rpi-update) be interesting to see if it is still a problem

@DAFlippers
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Hi Gordon,

I tested before rpi-update and then after.

Before the reads were sometimes successful and writes were mostly successful.

Following the update and woohoo it looks like it's working.

Was this a recent update as I had updated the firmware a fortnight or so ago?

David

popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 4, 2016
When using a 5G-capable device with VHT (802.11ac) rates enabled was not
working (packets were not delivered) and the following mac80211 warning
was printed:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2253 at net/mac80211/rate.c:625 ieee80211_get_tx_rates+0x22e/0x620 [mac80211]()
Modules linked in: rtl8821ae btcoexist rtl_pci rtlwifi fuse drbg ansi_cprng ctr ccm bnep bluetooth af_packet nfs fscache vboxpci(O) vboxnetadp(O) vboxne
tflt(O) vboxdrv(O) arc4 snd_hda_codec_generic x86_pkg_temp_thermal rtsx_pci_sdmmc mmc_core rtsx_pci_ms kvm_intel memstick iwlmvm kvm mac80211 snd_hda_intel snd_hda_cod
ec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core irqbypass snd_pcm iwlwifi crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 snd_timer lrw gf128mul glue_h
elper ablk_helper cryptd snd cfg80211 pcspkr serio_raw e1000e rtsx_pci lpc_ich ptp xhci_pci mfd_core pps_core xhci_hcd soundcore toshiba_acpi thermal sparse_keymap wmi
 toshiba_bluetooth rfkill acpi_cpufreq battery ac processor dm_mod i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops
drm sr_mod cdrom video button sg autofs4 [last unloaded: rtlwifi]
CPU: 3 PID: 2253 Comm: Timer Tainted: G        W  O    4.5.0-rc1-wl+ #79
Hardware name: TOSHIBA TECRA A50-A/TECRA A50-A, BIOS Version 4.20   04/17/2014
  ffffffffa05c4be6 ffff8802262036d8 ffffffff813d7912 0000000000000000
  ffff880226203710 ffffffff8106bcb6 ffff8800c6831300 ffff8800c6831330
  0000000000000000 ffff8800c683133c ffff880065923638 ffff880226203720
Call Trace:
  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff813d7912>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x79
  [<ffffffff8106bcb6>] warn_slowpath_common+0x86/0xc0
  [<ffffffff8106bdaa>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
  [<ffffffffa05511ee>] ieee80211_get_tx_rates+0x22e/0x620 [mac80211]
  [<ffffffffa0782232>] ? rtl_is_special_data+0x32/0x240 [rtlwifi]
  [<ffffffffa055209e>] ? rate_control_get_rate+0xce/0x150 [mac80211]
  [<ffffffff810bfc7d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
  [<ffffffff81071cc5>] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x65/0xd0

Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 9, 2017
__skb_flow_dissect can be called with a skb or a data packet, either
can be NULL. All calls seems to have been moved to __skb_header_pointer
except the pptp handling which is still calling skb_header_pointer.

skb_header_pointer will use skb->data and thus:
[  109.556866] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080
[  109.557102] IP: [<ffffffff88dc02f8>] __skb_flow_dissect+0xa88/0xce0
[  109.557263] PGD 0
[  109.557338]
[  109.557484] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  109.557562] Modules linked in: chaoskey
[  109.557783] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 4.9.0 #79
[  109.557867] Hardware name: Supermicro A1SRM-LN7F/LN5F/A1SRM-LN7F-2758, BIOS 1.0c 11/04/2015
[  109.557957] task: ffff94085c27bc00 task.stack: ffffb745c0068000
[  109.558041] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff88dc02f8>]  [<ffffffff88dc02f8>] __skb_flow_dissect+0xa88/0xce0
[  109.558203] RSP: 0018:ffff94087fc83d40  EFLAGS: 00010206
[  109.558286] RAX: 0000000000000130 RBX: ffffffff8975bf80 RCX: ffff94084fab6800
[  109.558373] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000000000
[  109.558460] RBP: 0000000000000b88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000022
[  109.558547] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: ffff94087fc83e04 R12: 0000000000000000
[  109.558763] R13: ffff94084fab6800 R14: ffff94087fc83e04 R15: 000000000000002f
[  109.558979] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94087fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  109.559326] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  109.559539] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 0000000281809000 CR4: 00000000001026e0
[  109.559753] Stack:
[  109.559957]  000000000000000c ffff94084fab6822 0000000000000001 ffff94085c2b5fc0
[  109.560578]  0000000000000001 0000000000002000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[  109.561200]  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[  109.561820] Call Trace:
[  109.562027]  <IRQ>
[  109.562108]  [<ffffffff88dfb4fa>] ? eth_get_headlen+0x7a/0xf0
[  109.562522]  [<ffffffff88c5a35a>] ? igb_poll+0x96a/0xe80
[  109.562737]  [<ffffffff88dc912b>] ? net_rx_action+0x20b/0x350
[  109.562953]  [<ffffffff88546d68>] ? __do_softirq+0xe8/0x280
[  109.563169]  [<ffffffff8854704a>] ? irq_exit+0xaa/0xb0
[  109.563382]  [<ffffffff8847229b>] ? do_IRQ+0x4b/0xc0
[  109.563597]  [<ffffffff8902d4ff>] ? common_interrupt+0x7f/0x7f
[  109.563810]  <EOI>
[  109.563890]  [<ffffffff88d57530>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x130/0x2c0
[  109.564304]  [<ffffffff88d57520>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x120/0x2c0
[  109.564520]  [<ffffffff8857eacf>] ? cpu_startup_entry+0x19f/0x1f0
[  109.564737]  [<ffffffff8848d55a>] ? start_secondary+0x12a/0x140
[  109.564950] Code: 83 e2 20 a8 80 0f 84 60 01 00 00 c7 04 24 08 00
00 00 66 85 d2 0f 84 be fe ff ff e9 69 fe ff ff 8b 34 24 89 f2 83 c2
04 66 85 c0 <41> 8b 84 24 80 00 00 00 0f 49 d6 41 8d 31 01 d6 41 2b 84
24 84
[  109.569959] RIP  [<ffffffff88dc02f8>] __skb_flow_dissect+0xa88/0xce0
[  109.570245]  RSP <ffff94087fc83d40>
[  109.570453] CR2: 0000000000000080

Fixes: ab10dcc ("rps: Inspect PPTP encapsulated by GRE to get flow hash")
Signed-off-by: Ian Kumlien <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 16, 2017
[ Upstream commit d0af683 ]

__skb_flow_dissect can be called with a skb or a data packet, either
can be NULL. All calls seems to have been moved to __skb_header_pointer
except the pptp handling which is still calling skb_header_pointer.

skb_header_pointer will use skb->data and thus:
[  109.556866] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080
[  109.557102] IP: [<ffffffff88dc02f8>] __skb_flow_dissect+0xa88/0xce0
[  109.557263] PGD 0
[  109.557338]
[  109.557484] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  109.557562] Modules linked in: chaoskey
[  109.557783] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 4.9.0 #79
[  109.557867] Hardware name: Supermicro A1SRM-LN7F/LN5F/A1SRM-LN7F-2758, BIOS 1.0c 11/04/2015
[  109.557957] task: ffff94085c27bc00 task.stack: ffffb745c0068000
[  109.558041] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff88dc02f8>]  [<ffffffff88dc02f8>] __skb_flow_dissect+0xa88/0xce0
[  109.558203] RSP: 0018:ffff94087fc83d40  EFLAGS: 00010206
[  109.558286] RAX: 0000000000000130 RBX: ffffffff8975bf80 RCX: ffff94084fab6800
[  109.558373] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000000000
[  109.558460] RBP: 0000000000000b88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000022
[  109.558547] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: ffff94087fc83e04 R12: 0000000000000000
[  109.558763] R13: ffff94084fab6800 R14: ffff94087fc83e04 R15: 000000000000002f
[  109.558979] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94087fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  109.559326] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  109.559539] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 0000000281809000 CR4: 00000000001026e0
[  109.559753] Stack:
[  109.559957]  000000000000000c ffff94084fab6822 0000000000000001 ffff94085c2b5fc0
[  109.560578]  0000000000000001 0000000000002000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[  109.561200]  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[  109.561820] Call Trace:
[  109.562027]  <IRQ>
[  109.562108]  [<ffffffff88dfb4fa>] ? eth_get_headlen+0x7a/0xf0
[  109.562522]  [<ffffffff88c5a35a>] ? igb_poll+0x96a/0xe80
[  109.562737]  [<ffffffff88dc912b>] ? net_rx_action+0x20b/0x350
[  109.562953]  [<ffffffff88546d68>] ? __do_softirq+0xe8/0x280
[  109.563169]  [<ffffffff8854704a>] ? irq_exit+0xaa/0xb0
[  109.563382]  [<ffffffff8847229b>] ? do_IRQ+0x4b/0xc0
[  109.563597]  [<ffffffff8902d4ff>] ? common_interrupt+0x7f/0x7f
[  109.563810]  <EOI>
[  109.563890]  [<ffffffff88d57530>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x130/0x2c0
[  109.564304]  [<ffffffff88d57520>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x120/0x2c0
[  109.564520]  [<ffffffff8857eacf>] ? cpu_startup_entry+0x19f/0x1f0
[  109.564737]  [<ffffffff8848d55a>] ? start_secondary+0x12a/0x140
[  109.564950] Code: 83 e2 20 a8 80 0f 84 60 01 00 00 c7 04 24 08 00
00 00 66 85 d2 0f 84 be fe ff ff e9 69 fe ff ff 8b 34 24 89 f2 83 c2
04 66 85 c0 <41> 8b 84 24 80 00 00 00 0f 49 d6 41 8d 31 01 d6 41 2b 84
24 84
[  109.569959] RIP  [<ffffffff88dc02f8>] __skb_flow_dissect+0xa88/0xce0
[  109.570245]  RSP <ffff94087fc83d40>
[  109.570453] CR2: 0000000000000080

Fixes: ab10dcc ("rps: Inspect PPTP encapsulated by GRE to get flow hash")
Signed-off-by: Ian Kumlien <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 8, 2019
[ Upstream commit ac92985 ]

When setting /sys/fs/f2fs/<DEV>/iostat_enable with non-bool value, UBSAN
reports the following warning.

[ 7562.295484] ================================================================================
[ 7562.296531] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2776:10
[ 7562.297651] load of value 64 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
[ 7562.298642] CPU: 1 PID: 7487 Comm: dd Not tainted 4.20.0-rc4+ #79
[ 7562.298653] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 7562.298662] Call Trace:
[ 7562.298760]  dump_stack+0x46/0x5b
[ 7562.298811]  ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x40
[ 7562.298830]  __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x72/0x90
[ 7562.298863]  f2fs_file_write_iter+0x29f/0x3f0
[ 7562.298905]  __vfs_write+0x115/0x160
[ 7562.298922]  vfs_write+0xa7/0x190
[ 7562.298934]  ksys_write+0x50/0xc0
[ 7562.298973]  do_syscall_64+0x4a/0xe0
[ 7562.298992]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 7562.299001] RIP: 0033:0x7fa45ec19c00
[ 7562.299004] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 88 92 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d dd eb 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ce 8f 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 7562.299044] RSP: 002b:00007ffca52b49e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 7562.299052] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fa45ec19c00
[ 7562.299059] RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 000000000093f000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 7562.299065] RBP: 000000000093f000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 7562.299071] R10: 00007ffca52b47b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000400
[ 7562.299077] R13: 000000000093f000 R14: 000000000093f400 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 7562.299091] ================================================================================

So, if iostat_enable is enabled, set its value as true.

Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 8, 2019
[ Upstream commit ac92985 ]

When setting /sys/fs/f2fs/<DEV>/iostat_enable with non-bool value, UBSAN
reports the following warning.

[ 7562.295484] ================================================================================
[ 7562.296531] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2776:10
[ 7562.297651] load of value 64 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
[ 7562.298642] CPU: 1 PID: 7487 Comm: dd Not tainted 4.20.0-rc4+ #79
[ 7562.298653] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 7562.298662] Call Trace:
[ 7562.298760]  dump_stack+0x46/0x5b
[ 7562.298811]  ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x40
[ 7562.298830]  __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x72/0x90
[ 7562.298863]  f2fs_file_write_iter+0x29f/0x3f0
[ 7562.298905]  __vfs_write+0x115/0x160
[ 7562.298922]  vfs_write+0xa7/0x190
[ 7562.298934]  ksys_write+0x50/0xc0
[ 7562.298973]  do_syscall_64+0x4a/0xe0
[ 7562.298992]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 7562.299001] RIP: 0033:0x7fa45ec19c00
[ 7562.299004] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 88 92 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d dd eb 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ce 8f 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 7562.299044] RSP: 002b:00007ffca52b49e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 7562.299052] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fa45ec19c00
[ 7562.299059] RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 000000000093f000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 7562.299065] RBP: 000000000093f000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 7562.299071] R10: 00007ffca52b47b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000400
[ 7562.299077] R13: 000000000093f000 R14: 000000000093f400 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 7562.299091] ================================================================================

So, if iostat_enable is enabled, set its value as true.

Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 30, 2019
After commit 5271953 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook"),
rxrpc_input_packet() is directly called from lockless UDP receive
path, under rcu_read_lock() protection.

It must therefore use RCU rules :

- udp_sk->sk_user_data can be cleared at any point in this function.
  rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() is what we need here.

- Also, since sk_user_data might have been set in rxrpc_open_socket()
  we must observe a proper RCU grace period before kfree(local) in
  rxrpc_lookup_local()

v4: @Local can be NULL in xrpc_lookup_local() as reported by kbuild test robot <[email protected]>
        and Julia Lawall <[email protected]>, thanks !

v3,v2 : addressed David Howells feedback, thanks !

syzbot reported :

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 19236 Comm: syz-executor703 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc6 #79
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0xbef/0x3fb0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 a5 1f 00 00 48 81 c4 10 01 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4a 21 00 00 49 81 7d 00 20 54 9c 89 0f 84 cf f4
RSP: 0018:ffff88809d7aef58 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000026 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88809d7af090 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffed1015d05bc7 R11: ffff888089428600 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000130 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f059044d700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004b6040 CR3: 00000000955ca000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
Call Trace:
 lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x95/0xcd kernel/locking/spinlock.c:152
 skb_queue_tail+0x26/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:2972
 rxrpc_reject_packet net/rxrpc/input.c:1126 [inline]
 rxrpc_input_packet+0x4a0/0x5536 net/rxrpc/input.c:1414
 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xaf2/0x1780 net/ipv4/udp.c:2011
 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x128/0x730 net/ipv4/udp.c:2085
 udp_unicast_rcv_skb.isra.0+0xb9/0x360 net/ipv4/udp.c:2245
 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x701/0x2ca0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2301
 udp_rcv+0x22/0x30 net/ipv4/udp.c:2482
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x60/0x8f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:208
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x23b/0x390 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:283 [inline]
 ip_local_deliver+0x1e9/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:255
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
 ip_rcv_finish+0x1e1/0x300 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:413
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:283 [inline]
 ip_rcv+0xe8/0x3f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:523
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x115/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:4987
 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:5099
 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x117/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5202
 napi_frags_finish net/core/dev.c:5769 [inline]
 napi_gro_frags+0xade/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5843
 tun_get_user+0x2f24/0x3fb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981
 tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2027
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline]
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e1/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:681
 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:957 [inline]
 do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:938
 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1002
 do_writev+0x15e/0x370 fs/read_write.c:1037
 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1110 [inline]
 __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1107 [inline]
 __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1107
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: 5271953 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 7, 2019
commit 032be5f upstream.

After commit 5271953 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook"),
rxrpc_input_packet() is directly called from lockless UDP receive
path, under rcu_read_lock() protection.

It must therefore use RCU rules :

- udp_sk->sk_user_data can be cleared at any point in this function.
  rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() is what we need here.

- Also, since sk_user_data might have been set in rxrpc_open_socket()
  we must observe a proper RCU grace period before kfree(local) in
  rxrpc_lookup_local()

v4: @Local can be NULL in xrpc_lookup_local() as reported by kbuild test robot <[email protected]>
        and Julia Lawall <[email protected]>, thanks !

v3,v2 : addressed David Howells feedback, thanks !

syzbot reported :

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 19236 Comm: syz-executor703 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc6 #79
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0xbef/0x3fb0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 a5 1f 00 00 48 81 c4 10 01 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4a 21 00 00 49 81 7d 00 20 54 9c 89 0f 84 cf f4
RSP: 0018:ffff88809d7aef58 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000026 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88809d7af090 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffed1015d05bc7 R11: ffff888089428600 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000130 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f059044d700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004b6040 CR3: 00000000955ca000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
Call Trace:
 lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x95/0xcd kernel/locking/spinlock.c:152
 skb_queue_tail+0x26/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:2972
 rxrpc_reject_packet net/rxrpc/input.c:1126 [inline]
 rxrpc_input_packet+0x4a0/0x5536 net/rxrpc/input.c:1414
 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xaf2/0x1780 net/ipv4/udp.c:2011
 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x128/0x730 net/ipv4/udp.c:2085
 udp_unicast_rcv_skb.isra.0+0xb9/0x360 net/ipv4/udp.c:2245
 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x701/0x2ca0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2301
 udp_rcv+0x22/0x30 net/ipv4/udp.c:2482
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x60/0x8f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:208
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x23b/0x390 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:283 [inline]
 ip_local_deliver+0x1e9/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:255
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
 ip_rcv_finish+0x1e1/0x300 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:413
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:283 [inline]
 ip_rcv+0xe8/0x3f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:523
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x115/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:4987
 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:5099
 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x117/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5202
 napi_frags_finish net/core/dev.c:5769 [inline]
 napi_gro_frags+0xade/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5843
 tun_get_user+0x2f24/0x3fb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981
 tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2027
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline]
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e1/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:681
 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:957 [inline]
 do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:938
 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1002
 do_writev+0x15e/0x370 fs/read_write.c:1037
 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1110 [inline]
 __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1107 [inline]
 __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1107
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: 5271953 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 7, 2019
commit 032be5f upstream.

After commit 5271953 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook"),
rxrpc_input_packet() is directly called from lockless UDP receive
path, under rcu_read_lock() protection.

It must therefore use RCU rules :

- udp_sk->sk_user_data can be cleared at any point in this function.
  rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() is what we need here.

- Also, since sk_user_data might have been set in rxrpc_open_socket()
  we must observe a proper RCU grace period before kfree(local) in
  rxrpc_lookup_local()

v4: @Local can be NULL in xrpc_lookup_local() as reported by kbuild test robot <[email protected]>
        and Julia Lawall <[email protected]>, thanks !

v3,v2 : addressed David Howells feedback, thanks !

syzbot reported :

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 19236 Comm: syz-executor703 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc6 #79
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0xbef/0x3fb0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 a5 1f 00 00 48 81 c4 10 01 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4a 21 00 00 49 81 7d 00 20 54 9c 89 0f 84 cf f4
RSP: 0018:ffff88809d7aef58 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000026 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88809d7af090 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffed1015d05bc7 R11: ffff888089428600 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000130 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f059044d700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004b6040 CR3: 00000000955ca000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
Call Trace:
 lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x95/0xcd kernel/locking/spinlock.c:152
 skb_queue_tail+0x26/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:2972
 rxrpc_reject_packet net/rxrpc/input.c:1126 [inline]
 rxrpc_input_packet+0x4a0/0x5536 net/rxrpc/input.c:1414
 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xaf2/0x1780 net/ipv4/udp.c:2011
 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x128/0x730 net/ipv4/udp.c:2085
 udp_unicast_rcv_skb.isra.0+0xb9/0x360 net/ipv4/udp.c:2245
 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x701/0x2ca0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2301
 udp_rcv+0x22/0x30 net/ipv4/udp.c:2482
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x60/0x8f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:208
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x23b/0x390 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:283 [inline]
 ip_local_deliver+0x1e9/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:255
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
 ip_rcv_finish+0x1e1/0x300 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:413
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:283 [inline]
 ip_rcv+0xe8/0x3f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:523
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x115/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:4987
 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:5099
 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x117/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5202
 napi_frags_finish net/core/dev.c:5769 [inline]
 napi_gro_frags+0xade/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5843
 tun_get_user+0x2f24/0x3fb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981
 tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2027
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline]
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e1/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:681
 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:957 [inline]
 do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:938
 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1002
 do_writev+0x15e/0x370 fs/read_write.c:1037
 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1110 [inline]
 __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1107 [inline]
 __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1107
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: 5271953 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ED6E0F17 pushed a commit to ED6E0F17/linux that referenced this issue Aug 6, 2019
When setting /sys/fs/f2fs/<DEV>/iostat_enable with non-bool value, UBSAN
reports the following warning.

[ 7562.295484] ================================================================================
[ 7562.296531] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2776:10
[ 7562.297651] load of value 64 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
[ 7562.298642] CPU: 1 PID: 7487 Comm: dd Not tainted 4.20.0-rc4+ raspberrypi#79
[ 7562.298653] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 7562.298662] Call Trace:
[ 7562.298760]  dump_stack+0x46/0x5b
[ 7562.298811]  ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x40
[ 7562.298830]  __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x72/0x90
[ 7562.298863]  f2fs_file_write_iter+0x29f/0x3f0
[ 7562.298905]  __vfs_write+0x115/0x160
[ 7562.298922]  vfs_write+0xa7/0x190
[ 7562.298934]  ksys_write+0x50/0xc0
[ 7562.298973]  do_syscall_64+0x4a/0xe0
[ 7562.298992]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 7562.299001] RIP: 0033:0x7fa45ec19c00
[ 7562.299004] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 88 92 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d dd eb 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ce 8f 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 7562.299044] RSP: 002b:00007ffca52b49e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 7562.299052] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fa45ec19c00
[ 7562.299059] RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 000000000093f000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 7562.299065] RBP: 000000000093f000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 7562.299071] R10: 00007ffca52b47b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000400
[ 7562.299077] R13: 000000000093f000 R14: 000000000093f400 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 7562.299091] ================================================================================

So, if iostat_enable is enabled, set its value as true.

Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 11, 2019
[ Upstream commit 00452ba ]

There are 2 problems with the old iosf PMIC I2C bus arbritration code which
need to be addressed:

1. The lockdep code complains about a possible deadlock in the
iosf_mbi_[un]block_punit_i2c_access code:

[    6.712662] ======================================================
[    6.712673] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[    6.712685] 5.3.0-rc2+ #79 Not tainted
[    6.712692] ------------------------------------------------------
[    6.712702] kworker/0:1/7 is trying to acquire lock:
[    6.712712] 00000000df1c5681 (iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count_mutex){+.+.}, at: iosf_mbi_unblock_punit_i2c_access+0x13/0x90
[    6.712739]
               but task is already holding lock:
[    6.712749] 0000000067cb23e7 (iosf_mbi_punit_mutex){+.+.}, at: iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access+0x97/0x186
[    6.712768]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[    6.712780]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[    6.712792]
               -> #1 (iosf_mbi_punit_mutex){+.+.}:
[    6.712808]        __mutex_lock+0xa8/0x9a0
[    6.712818]        iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access+0x97/0x186
[    6.712831]        i2c_dw_acquire_lock+0x20/0x30
[    6.712841]        i2c_dw_set_reg_access+0x15/0xb0
[    6.712851]        i2c_dw_probe+0x57/0x473
[    6.712861]        dw_i2c_plat_probe+0x33e/0x640
[    6.712874]        platform_drv_probe+0x38/0x80
[    6.712884]        really_probe+0xf3/0x380
[    6.712894]        driver_probe_device+0x59/0xd0
[    6.712905]        bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd0
[    6.712915]        __device_attach+0xe4/0x170
[    6.712925]        bus_probe_device+0x9f/0xb0
[    6.712935]        deferred_probe_work_func+0x79/0xd0
[    6.712946]        process_one_work+0x234/0x560
[    6.712957]        worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[    6.712967]        kthread+0x10a/0x140
[    6.712977]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[    6.712986]
               -> #0 (iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count_mutex){+.+.}:
[    6.713004]        __lock_acquire+0xe07/0x1930
[    6.713015]        lock_acquire+0x9d/0x1a0
[    6.713025]        __mutex_lock+0xa8/0x9a0
[    6.713035]        iosf_mbi_unblock_punit_i2c_access+0x13/0x90
[    6.713047]        i2c_dw_set_reg_access+0x4d/0xb0
[    6.713058]        i2c_dw_probe+0x57/0x473
[    6.713068]        dw_i2c_plat_probe+0x33e/0x640
[    6.713079]        platform_drv_probe+0x38/0x80
[    6.713089]        really_probe+0xf3/0x380
[    6.713099]        driver_probe_device+0x59/0xd0
[    6.713109]        bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd0
[    6.713119]        __device_attach+0xe4/0x170
[    6.713129]        bus_probe_device+0x9f/0xb0
[    6.713140]        deferred_probe_work_func+0x79/0xd0
[    6.713150]        process_one_work+0x234/0x560
[    6.713160]        worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[    6.713170]        kthread+0x10a/0x140
[    6.713180]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[    6.713189]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[    6.713202]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[    6.713212]        CPU0                    CPU1
[    6.713221]        ----                    ----
[    6.713229]   lock(iosf_mbi_punit_mutex);
[    6.713239]                                lock(iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count_mutex);
[    6.713253]                                lock(iosf_mbi_punit_mutex);
[    6.713265]   lock(iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count_mutex);
[    6.713276]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

In practice can never happen because only the first caller which
increments iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count will also take
iosf_mbi_punit_mutex, that is the whole purpose of the counter, which
itself is protected by iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count_mutex.

But there is no way to tell the lockdep code about this and we really
want to be able to run a kernel with lockdep enabled without these
warnings being triggered.

2. The lockdep warning also points out another real problem, if 2 threads
both are in a block of code protected by iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access
and the first thread to acquire the block exits before the second thread
then the second thread will call mutex_unlock on iosf_mbi_punit_mutex,
but it is not the thread which took the mutex and unlocking by another
thread is not allowed.

Fix this by getting rid of the notion of holding a mutex for the entire
duration of the PMIC accesses, be it either from the PUnit side, or from an
in kernel I2C driver. In general holding a mutex after exiting a function
is a bad idea and the above problems show this case is no different.

Instead 2 counters are now used, one for PMIC accesses from the PUnit
and one for accesses from in kernel I2C code. When access is requested
now the code will wait (using a waitqueue) for the counter of the other
type of access to reach 0 and on release, if the counter reaches 0 the
wakequeue is woken.

Note that the counter approach is necessary to allow nested calls.
The main reason for this is so that a series of i2c transfers can be done
with the punit blocked from accessing the bus the whole time. This is
necessary to be able to safely read/modify/write a PMIC register without
racing with the PUNIT doing the same thing.

Allowing nested iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access() calls also is desirable
from a performance pov since the whole dance necessary to block the PUnit
from accessing the PMIC I2C bus is somewhat expensive.

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 11, 2019
[ Upstream commit 00452ba ]

There are 2 problems with the old iosf PMIC I2C bus arbritration code which
need to be addressed:

1. The lockdep code complains about a possible deadlock in the
iosf_mbi_[un]block_punit_i2c_access code:

[    6.712662] ======================================================
[    6.712673] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[    6.712685] 5.3.0-rc2+ #79 Not tainted
[    6.712692] ------------------------------------------------------
[    6.712702] kworker/0:1/7 is trying to acquire lock:
[    6.712712] 00000000df1c5681 (iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count_mutex){+.+.}, at: iosf_mbi_unblock_punit_i2c_access+0x13/0x90
[    6.712739]
               but task is already holding lock:
[    6.712749] 0000000067cb23e7 (iosf_mbi_punit_mutex){+.+.}, at: iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access+0x97/0x186
[    6.712768]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[    6.712780]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[    6.712792]
               -> #1 (iosf_mbi_punit_mutex){+.+.}:
[    6.712808]        __mutex_lock+0xa8/0x9a0
[    6.712818]        iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access+0x97/0x186
[    6.712831]        i2c_dw_acquire_lock+0x20/0x30
[    6.712841]        i2c_dw_set_reg_access+0x15/0xb0
[    6.712851]        i2c_dw_probe+0x57/0x473
[    6.712861]        dw_i2c_plat_probe+0x33e/0x640
[    6.712874]        platform_drv_probe+0x38/0x80
[    6.712884]        really_probe+0xf3/0x380
[    6.712894]        driver_probe_device+0x59/0xd0
[    6.712905]        bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd0
[    6.712915]        __device_attach+0xe4/0x170
[    6.712925]        bus_probe_device+0x9f/0xb0
[    6.712935]        deferred_probe_work_func+0x79/0xd0
[    6.712946]        process_one_work+0x234/0x560
[    6.712957]        worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[    6.712967]        kthread+0x10a/0x140
[    6.712977]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[    6.712986]
               -> #0 (iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count_mutex){+.+.}:
[    6.713004]        __lock_acquire+0xe07/0x1930
[    6.713015]        lock_acquire+0x9d/0x1a0
[    6.713025]        __mutex_lock+0xa8/0x9a0
[    6.713035]        iosf_mbi_unblock_punit_i2c_access+0x13/0x90
[    6.713047]        i2c_dw_set_reg_access+0x4d/0xb0
[    6.713058]        i2c_dw_probe+0x57/0x473
[    6.713068]        dw_i2c_plat_probe+0x33e/0x640
[    6.713079]        platform_drv_probe+0x38/0x80
[    6.713089]        really_probe+0xf3/0x380
[    6.713099]        driver_probe_device+0x59/0xd0
[    6.713109]        bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd0
[    6.713119]        __device_attach+0xe4/0x170
[    6.713129]        bus_probe_device+0x9f/0xb0
[    6.713140]        deferred_probe_work_func+0x79/0xd0
[    6.713150]        process_one_work+0x234/0x560
[    6.713160]        worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
[    6.713170]        kthread+0x10a/0x140
[    6.713180]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[    6.713189]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[    6.713202]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[    6.713212]        CPU0                    CPU1
[    6.713221]        ----                    ----
[    6.713229]   lock(iosf_mbi_punit_mutex);
[    6.713239]                                lock(iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count_mutex);
[    6.713253]                                lock(iosf_mbi_punit_mutex);
[    6.713265]   lock(iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count_mutex);
[    6.713276]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

In practice can never happen because only the first caller which
increments iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count will also take
iosf_mbi_punit_mutex, that is the whole purpose of the counter, which
itself is protected by iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access_count_mutex.

But there is no way to tell the lockdep code about this and we really
want to be able to run a kernel with lockdep enabled without these
warnings being triggered.

2. The lockdep warning also points out another real problem, if 2 threads
both are in a block of code protected by iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access
and the first thread to acquire the block exits before the second thread
then the second thread will call mutex_unlock on iosf_mbi_punit_mutex,
but it is not the thread which took the mutex and unlocking by another
thread is not allowed.

Fix this by getting rid of the notion of holding a mutex for the entire
duration of the PMIC accesses, be it either from the PUnit side, or from an
in kernel I2C driver. In general holding a mutex after exiting a function
is a bad idea and the above problems show this case is no different.

Instead 2 counters are now used, one for PMIC accesses from the PUnit
and one for accesses from in kernel I2C code. When access is requested
now the code will wait (using a waitqueue) for the counter of the other
type of access to reach 0 and on release, if the counter reaches 0 the
wakequeue is woken.

Note that the counter approach is necessary to allow nested calls.
The main reason for this is so that a series of i2c transfers can be done
with the punit blocked from accessing the bus the whole time. This is
necessary to be able to safely read/modify/write a PMIC register without
racing with the PUNIT doing the same thing.

Allowing nested iosf_mbi_block_punit_i2c_access() calls also is desirable
from a performance pov since the whole dance necessary to block the PUnit
from accessing the PMIC I2C bus is somewhat expensive.

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 10, 2020
Stefan reported a strange kernel fault which turned out to be due to a
missing KUAP disable in flush_coherent_icache() called from
flush_icache_range().

The fault looks like:

  Kernel attempted to access user page (7fffc30d9c00) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1009)
  BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x7fffc30d9c00
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000007232c
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
  CPU: 35 PID: 5886 Comm: sigtramp Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-00003-gfc37a1632d40 #79
  NIP:  c00000000007232c LR: c00000000003b7fc CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c000001e11093940 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (5.6.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-00003-gfc37a1632d40)
  MSR:  900000000280b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 28000884  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c0000000000722fc DAR: 00007fffc30d9c00 DSISR: 08000000 IRQMASK: 0
  GPR00: c00000000003b7fc c000001e11093bd0 c0000000023ac200 00007fffc30d9c00
  GPR04: 00007fffc30d9c18 0000000000000000 c000001e11093bd4 0000000000000000
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c000001e1104ed80
  GPR12: 0000000000000000 c000001fff6ab380 c0000000016be2d0 4000000000000000
  GPR16: c000000000000000 bfffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR20: 00007fffc30d9c00 00007fffc30d8f58 00007fffc30d9c18 00007fffc30d9c20
  GPR24: 00007fffc30d9c18 0000000000000000 c000001e11093d90 c000001e1104ed80
  GPR28: c000001e11093e90 0000000000000000 c0000000023d9d18 00007fffc30d9c00
  NIP flush_icache_range+0x5c/0x80
  LR  handle_rt_signal64+0x95c/0xc2c
  Call Trace:
    0xc000001e11093d90 (unreliable)
    handle_rt_signal64+0x93c/0xc2c
    do_notify_resume+0x310/0x430
    ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74
  Instruction dump:
  409e002c 7c0802a6 3c62ff31 3863f6a0 f8010080 48195fed 60000000 48fe4c8d
  60000000 e8010080 7c0803a6 7c0004ac <7c00ffac> 7c0004ac 4c00012c 38210070

This path through handle_rt_signal64() to setup_trampoline() and
flush_icache_range() is only triggered by 64-bit processes that have
unmapped their VDSO, which is rare.

flush_icache_range() takes a range of addresses to flush. In
flush_coherent_icache() we implement an optimisation for CPUs where we
know we don't actually have to flush the whole range, we just need to
do a single icbi.

However we still execute the icbi on the user address of the start of
the range we're flushing. On CPUs that also implement KUAP (Power9)
that leads to the spurious fault above.

We should be able to pass any address, including a kernel address, to
the icbi on these CPUs, which would avoid any interaction with KUAP.
But I don't want to make that change in a bug fix, just in case it
surfaces some strange behaviour on some CPU.

So for now just disable KUAP around the icbi. Note the icbi is treated
as a load, so we allow read access, not write as you'd expect.

Fixes: 890274c ("powerpc/64s: Implement KUAP for Radix MMU")
Cc: [email protected] # v5.2+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 23, 2020
[ Upstream commit 59bee45 ]

Stefan reported a strange kernel fault which turned out to be due to a
missing KUAP disable in flush_coherent_icache() called from
flush_icache_range().

The fault looks like:

  Kernel attempted to access user page (7fffc30d9c00) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1009)
  BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x7fffc30d9c00
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000007232c
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
  CPU: 35 PID: 5886 Comm: sigtramp Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-00003-gfc37a1632d40 #79
  NIP:  c00000000007232c LR: c00000000003b7fc CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c000001e11093940 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (5.6.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-00003-gfc37a1632d40)
  MSR:  900000000280b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 28000884  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c0000000000722fc DAR: 00007fffc30d9c00 DSISR: 08000000 IRQMASK: 0
  GPR00: c00000000003b7fc c000001e11093bd0 c0000000023ac200 00007fffc30d9c00
  GPR04: 00007fffc30d9c18 0000000000000000 c000001e11093bd4 0000000000000000
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c000001e1104ed80
  GPR12: 0000000000000000 c000001fff6ab380 c0000000016be2d0 4000000000000000
  GPR16: c000000000000000 bfffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR20: 00007fffc30d9c00 00007fffc30d8f58 00007fffc30d9c18 00007fffc30d9c20
  GPR24: 00007fffc30d9c18 0000000000000000 c000001e11093d90 c000001e1104ed80
  GPR28: c000001e11093e90 0000000000000000 c0000000023d9d18 00007fffc30d9c00
  NIP flush_icache_range+0x5c/0x80
  LR  handle_rt_signal64+0x95c/0xc2c
  Call Trace:
    0xc000001e11093d90 (unreliable)
    handle_rt_signal64+0x93c/0xc2c
    do_notify_resume+0x310/0x430
    ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74
  Instruction dump:
  409e002c 7c0802a6 3c62ff31 3863f6a0 f8010080 48195fed 60000000 48fe4c8d
  60000000 e8010080 7c0803a6 7c0004ac <7c00ffac> 7c0004ac 4c00012c 38210070

This path through handle_rt_signal64() to setup_trampoline() and
flush_icache_range() is only triggered by 64-bit processes that have
unmapped their VDSO, which is rare.

flush_icache_range() takes a range of addresses to flush. In
flush_coherent_icache() we implement an optimisation for CPUs where we
know we don't actually have to flush the whole range, we just need to
do a single icbi.

However we still execute the icbi on the user address of the start of
the range we're flushing. On CPUs that also implement KUAP (Power9)
that leads to the spurious fault above.

We should be able to pass any address, including a kernel address, to
the icbi on these CPUs, which would avoid any interaction with KUAP.
But I don't want to make that change in a bug fix, just in case it
surfaces some strange behaviour on some CPU.

So for now just disable KUAP around the icbi. Note the icbi is treated
as a load, so we allow read access, not write as you'd expect.

Fixes: 890274c ("powerpc/64s: Implement KUAP for Radix MMU")
Cc: [email protected] # v5.2+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 23, 2020
commit 59bee45 upstream.

Stefan reported a strange kernel fault which turned out to be due to a
missing KUAP disable in flush_coherent_icache() called from
flush_icache_range().

The fault looks like:

  Kernel attempted to access user page (7fffc30d9c00) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1009)
  BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x7fffc30d9c00
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000007232c
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
  CPU: 35 PID: 5886 Comm: sigtramp Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-00003-gfc37a1632d40 #79
  NIP:  c00000000007232c LR: c00000000003b7fc CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c000001e11093940 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (5.6.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-00003-gfc37a1632d40)
  MSR:  900000000280b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 28000884  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c0000000000722fc DAR: 00007fffc30d9c00 DSISR: 08000000 IRQMASK: 0
  GPR00: c00000000003b7fc c000001e11093bd0 c0000000023ac200 00007fffc30d9c00
  GPR04: 00007fffc30d9c18 0000000000000000 c000001e11093bd4 0000000000000000
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c000001e1104ed80
  GPR12: 0000000000000000 c000001fff6ab380 c0000000016be2d0 4000000000000000
  GPR16: c000000000000000 bfffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR20: 00007fffc30d9c00 00007fffc30d8f58 00007fffc30d9c18 00007fffc30d9c20
  GPR24: 00007fffc30d9c18 0000000000000000 c000001e11093d90 c000001e1104ed80
  GPR28: c000001e11093e90 0000000000000000 c0000000023d9d18 00007fffc30d9c00
  NIP flush_icache_range+0x5c/0x80
  LR  handle_rt_signal64+0x95c/0xc2c
  Call Trace:
    0xc000001e11093d90 (unreliable)
    handle_rt_signal64+0x93c/0xc2c
    do_notify_resume+0x310/0x430
    ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74
  Instruction dump:
  409e002c 7c0802a6 3c62ff31 3863f6a0 f8010080 48195fed 60000000 48fe4c8d
  60000000 e8010080 7c0803a6 7c0004ac <7c00ffac> 7c0004ac 4c00012c 38210070

This path through handle_rt_signal64() to setup_trampoline() and
flush_icache_range() is only triggered by 64-bit processes that have
unmapped their VDSO, which is rare.

flush_icache_range() takes a range of addresses to flush. In
flush_coherent_icache() we implement an optimisation for CPUs where we
know we don't actually have to flush the whole range, we just need to
do a single icbi.

However we still execute the icbi on the user address of the start of
the range we're flushing. On CPUs that also implement KUAP (Power9)
that leads to the spurious fault above.

We should be able to pass any address, including a kernel address, to
the icbi on these CPUs, which would avoid any interaction with KUAP.
But I don't want to make that change in a bug fix, just in case it
surfaces some strange behaviour on some CPU.

So for now just disable KUAP around the icbi. Note the icbi is treated
as a load, so we allow read access, not write as you'd expect.

Fixes: 890274c ("powerpc/64s: Implement KUAP for Radix MMU")
Cc: [email protected] # v5.2+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
herrnst pushed a commit to herrnst/linux-raspberrypi that referenced this issue Apr 6, 2022
…e_zone

btrfs_can_activate_zone() can be called with the device_list_mutex already
held, which will lead to a deadlock:

insert_dev_extents() // Takes device_list_mutex
`-> insert_dev_extent()
 `-> btrfs_insert_empty_item()
  `-> btrfs_insert_empty_items()
   `-> btrfs_search_slot()
    `-> btrfs_cow_block()
     `-> __btrfs_cow_block()
      `-> btrfs_alloc_tree_block()
       `-> btrfs_reserve_extent()
        `-> find_free_extent()
         `-> find_free_extent_update_loop()
          `-> can_allocate_chunk()
           `-> btrfs_can_activate_zone() // Takes device_list_mutex again

Instead of using the RCU on fs_devices->device_list we
can use fs_devices->alloc_list, protected by the chunk_mutex to traverse
the list of active devices.

We are in the chunk allocation thread. The newer chunk allocation
happens from the devices in the fs_device->alloc_list protected by the
chunk_mutex.

  btrfs_create_chunk()
    lockdep_assert_held(&info->chunk_mutex);
    gather_device_info
      list_for_each_entry(device, &fs_devices->alloc_list, dev_alloc_list)

Also, a device that reappears after the mount won't join the alloc_list
yet and, it will be in the dev_list, which we don't want to consider in
the context of the chunk alloc.

  [15.166572] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  [15.167117] 5.17.0-rc6-dennis raspberrypi#79 Not tainted
  [15.167487] --------------------------------------------
  [15.167733] kworker/u8:3/146 is trying to acquire lock:
  [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.167733]
  [15.167733] but task is already holding lock:
  [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs]
  [15.167733]
  [15.167733] other info that might help us debug this:
  [15.167733]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
  [15.167733]
  [15.171834]        CPU0
  [15.171834]        ----
  [15.171834]   lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
  [15.171834]   lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
  [15.171834]
  [15.171834]  *** DEADLOCK ***
  [15.171834]
  [15.171834]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
  [15.171834]
  [15.171834] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:3/146:
  [15.171834]  #0: ffff888100050938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0
  [15.171834]  raspberrypi#1: ffffc9000067be80 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->async_data_reclaim_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0
  [15.176244]  raspberrypi#2: ffff88810521e620 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: flush_space+0x335/0x600 [btrfs]
  [15.176244]  raspberrypi#3: ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs]
  [15.176244]  raspberrypi#4: ffff8881152e4b78 (btrfs-dev-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x27/0x130 [btrfs]
  [15.179641]
  [15.179641] stack backtrace:
  [15.179641] CPU: 1 PID: 146 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-dennis raspberrypi#79
  [15.179641] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
  [15.179641] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs]
  [15.179641] Call Trace:
  [15.179641]  <TASK>
  [15.179641]  dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
  [15.179641]  __lock_acquire.cold+0x217/0x2b2
  [15.179641]  lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  __mutex_lock+0x8e/0x970
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40
  [15.183838]  ? btrfs_get_alloc_profile+0x106/0x230 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_reserve_extent+0x131/0x260 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb5/0x3b0 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  __btrfs_cow_block+0x138/0x600 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_cow_block+0x10f/0x230 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_search_slot+0x55f/0xbc0 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130
  [15.187601]  btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x2d/0x60 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x2b3/0x560 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  __btrfs_end_transaction+0x36/0x2a0 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  flush_space+0x374/0x600 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  [15.192037]  ? btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x49/0x180 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  ? lock_release+0x131/0x2b0
  [15.192037]  btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x70/0x180 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  process_one_work+0x24c/0x5a0
  [15.192037]  worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0

Fixes: a85f05e ("btrfs: zoned: avoid chunk allocation if active block group has enough space")
CC: [email protected] # 5.16+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
herrnst pushed a commit to herrnst/linux-raspberrypi that referenced this issue Apr 14, 2022
…e_zone

commit 0b9e667 upstream.

btrfs_can_activate_zone() can be called with the device_list_mutex already
held, which will lead to a deadlock:

insert_dev_extents() // Takes device_list_mutex
`-> insert_dev_extent()
 `-> btrfs_insert_empty_item()
  `-> btrfs_insert_empty_items()
   `-> btrfs_search_slot()
    `-> btrfs_cow_block()
     `-> __btrfs_cow_block()
      `-> btrfs_alloc_tree_block()
       `-> btrfs_reserve_extent()
        `-> find_free_extent()
         `-> find_free_extent_update_loop()
          `-> can_allocate_chunk()
           `-> btrfs_can_activate_zone() // Takes device_list_mutex again

Instead of using the RCU on fs_devices->device_list we
can use fs_devices->alloc_list, protected by the chunk_mutex to traverse
the list of active devices.

We are in the chunk allocation thread. The newer chunk allocation
happens from the devices in the fs_device->alloc_list protected by the
chunk_mutex.

  btrfs_create_chunk()
    lockdep_assert_held(&info->chunk_mutex);
    gather_device_info
      list_for_each_entry(device, &fs_devices->alloc_list, dev_alloc_list)

Also, a device that reappears after the mount won't join the alloc_list
yet and, it will be in the dev_list, which we don't want to consider in
the context of the chunk alloc.

  [15.166572] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  [15.167117] 5.17.0-rc6-dennis raspberrypi#79 Not tainted
  [15.167487] --------------------------------------------
  [15.167733] kworker/u8:3/146 is trying to acquire lock:
  [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.167733]
  [15.167733] but task is already holding lock:
  [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs]
  [15.167733]
  [15.167733] other info that might help us debug this:
  [15.167733]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
  [15.167733]
  [15.171834]        CPU0
  [15.171834]        ----
  [15.171834]   lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
  [15.171834]   lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
  [15.171834]
  [15.171834]  *** DEADLOCK ***
  [15.171834]
  [15.171834]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
  [15.171834]
  [15.171834] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:3/146:
  [15.171834]  #0: ffff888100050938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0
  [15.171834]  raspberrypi#1: ffffc9000067be80 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->async_data_reclaim_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0
  [15.176244]  raspberrypi#2: ffff88810521e620 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: flush_space+0x335/0x600 [btrfs]
  [15.176244]  raspberrypi#3: ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs]
  [15.176244]  raspberrypi#4: ffff8881152e4b78 (btrfs-dev-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x27/0x130 [btrfs]
  [15.179641]
  [15.179641] stack backtrace:
  [15.179641] CPU: 1 PID: 146 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-dennis raspberrypi#79
  [15.179641] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
  [15.179641] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs]
  [15.179641] Call Trace:
  [15.179641]  <TASK>
  [15.179641]  dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
  [15.179641]  __lock_acquire.cold+0x217/0x2b2
  [15.179641]  lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  __mutex_lock+0x8e/0x970
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40
  [15.183838]  ? btrfs_get_alloc_profile+0x106/0x230 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_reserve_extent+0x131/0x260 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb5/0x3b0 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  __btrfs_cow_block+0x138/0x600 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_cow_block+0x10f/0x230 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_search_slot+0x55f/0xbc0 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130
  [15.187601]  btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x2d/0x60 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x2b3/0x560 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  __btrfs_end_transaction+0x36/0x2a0 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  flush_space+0x374/0x600 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  [15.192037]  ? btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x49/0x180 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  ? lock_release+0x131/0x2b0
  [15.192037]  btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x70/0x180 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  process_one_work+0x24c/0x5a0
  [15.192037]  worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0

Fixes: a85f05e ("btrfs: zoned: avoid chunk allocation if active block group has enough space")
CC: [email protected] # 5.16+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 19, 2022
…e_zone

commit 0b9e667 upstream.

btrfs_can_activate_zone() can be called with the device_list_mutex already
held, which will lead to a deadlock:

insert_dev_extents() // Takes device_list_mutex
`-> insert_dev_extent()
 `-> btrfs_insert_empty_item()
  `-> btrfs_insert_empty_items()
   `-> btrfs_search_slot()
    `-> btrfs_cow_block()
     `-> __btrfs_cow_block()
      `-> btrfs_alloc_tree_block()
       `-> btrfs_reserve_extent()
        `-> find_free_extent()
         `-> find_free_extent_update_loop()
          `-> can_allocate_chunk()
           `-> btrfs_can_activate_zone() // Takes device_list_mutex again

Instead of using the RCU on fs_devices->device_list we
can use fs_devices->alloc_list, protected by the chunk_mutex to traverse
the list of active devices.

We are in the chunk allocation thread. The newer chunk allocation
happens from the devices in the fs_device->alloc_list protected by the
chunk_mutex.

  btrfs_create_chunk()
    lockdep_assert_held(&info->chunk_mutex);
    gather_device_info
      list_for_each_entry(device, &fs_devices->alloc_list, dev_alloc_list)

Also, a device that reappears after the mount won't join the alloc_list
yet and, it will be in the dev_list, which we don't want to consider in
the context of the chunk alloc.

  [15.166572] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  [15.167117] 5.17.0-rc6-dennis #79 Not tainted
  [15.167487] --------------------------------------------
  [15.167733] kworker/u8:3/146 is trying to acquire lock:
  [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.167733]
  [15.167733] but task is already holding lock:
  [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs]
  [15.167733]
  [15.167733] other info that might help us debug this:
  [15.167733]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
  [15.167733]
  [15.171834]        CPU0
  [15.171834]        ----
  [15.171834]   lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
  [15.171834]   lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
  [15.171834]
  [15.171834]  *** DEADLOCK ***
  [15.171834]
  [15.171834]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
  [15.171834]
  [15.171834] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:3/146:
  [15.171834]  #0: ffff888100050938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0
  [15.171834]  #1: ffffc9000067be80 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->async_data_reclaim_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0
  [15.176244]  #2: ffff88810521e620 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: flush_space+0x335/0x600 [btrfs]
  [15.176244]  #3: ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs]
  [15.176244]  #4: ffff8881152e4b78 (btrfs-dev-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x27/0x130 [btrfs]
  [15.179641]
  [15.179641] stack backtrace:
  [15.179641] CPU: 1 PID: 146 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-dennis #79
  [15.179641] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
  [15.179641] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs]
  [15.179641] Call Trace:
  [15.179641]  <TASK>
  [15.179641]  dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
  [15.179641]  __lock_acquire.cold+0x217/0x2b2
  [15.179641]  lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  __mutex_lock+0x8e/0x970
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130
  [15.183838]  ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs]
  [15.183838]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40
  [15.183838]  ? btrfs_get_alloc_profile+0x106/0x230 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_reserve_extent+0x131/0x260 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb5/0x3b0 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  __btrfs_cow_block+0x138/0x600 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_cow_block+0x10f/0x230 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_search_slot+0x55f/0xbc0 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130
  [15.187601]  btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x2d/0x60 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x2b3/0x560 [btrfs]
  [15.187601]  __btrfs_end_transaction+0x36/0x2a0 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  flush_space+0x374/0x600 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  [15.192037]  ? btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x49/0x180 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  ? lock_release+0x131/0x2b0
  [15.192037]  btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x70/0x180 [btrfs]
  [15.192037]  process_one_work+0x24c/0x5a0
  [15.192037]  worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0

Fixes: a85f05e ("btrfs: zoned: avoid chunk allocation if active block group has enough space")
CC: [email protected] # 5.16+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Boos4721 pushed a commit to Boos4721/raspi-linux-k5.10 that referenced this issue Jun 10, 2022
[ Upstream commit 3fed9e5 ]

If a compat process tries to execute an unknown system call above the
__ARM_NR_COMPAT_END number, the kernel sends a SIGILL signal to the
offending process. Information about the error is printed to dmesg in
compat_arm_syscall() -> arm64_notify_die() -> arm64_force_sig_fault() ->
arm64_show_signal().

arm64_show_signal() interprets a non-zero value for
current->thread.fault_code as an exception syndrome and displays the
message associated with the ESR_ELx.EC field (bits 31:26).
current->thread.fault_code is set in compat_arm_syscall() ->
arm64_notify_die() with the bad syscall number instead of a valid ESR_ELx
value. This means that the ESR_ELx.EC field has the value that the user set
for the syscall number and the kernel can end up printing bogus exception
messages*. For example, for the syscall number 0x68000000, which evaluates
to ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x1A (ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC) the kernel prints this error:

[   18.349161] syscall[300]: unhandled exception: ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB, ESR 0x68000000, Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[   18.350639] CPU: 2 PID: 300 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 raspberrypi#79
[   18.351249] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]

which is misleading, as the bad compat syscall has nothing to do with
pointer authentication.

Stop arm64_show_signal() from printing exception syndrome information by
having compat_arm_syscall() set the ESR_ELx value to 0, as it has no
meaning for an invalid system call number. The example above now becomes:

[   19.935275] syscall[301]: unhandled exception: Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[   19.936124] CPU: 1 PID: 301 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00005-g7e08006d4102 raspberrypi#80
[   19.936894] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]

which although shows less information because the syscall number,
wrongfully advertised as the ESR value, is missing, it is better than
showing plainly wrong information. The syscall number can be easily
obtained with strace.

*A 32-bit value above or equal to 0x8000_0000 is interpreted as a negative
integer in compat_arm_syscal() and the condition scno < __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END
evaluates to true; the syscall will exit to userspace in this case with the
ENOSYS error code instead of arm64_notify_die() being called.

Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 14, 2022
[ Upstream commit 3fed9e5 ]

If a compat process tries to execute an unknown system call above the
__ARM_NR_COMPAT_END number, the kernel sends a SIGILL signal to the
offending process. Information about the error is printed to dmesg in
compat_arm_syscall() -> arm64_notify_die() -> arm64_force_sig_fault() ->
arm64_show_signal().

arm64_show_signal() interprets a non-zero value for
current->thread.fault_code as an exception syndrome and displays the
message associated with the ESR_ELx.EC field (bits 31:26).
current->thread.fault_code is set in compat_arm_syscall() ->
arm64_notify_die() with the bad syscall number instead of a valid ESR_ELx
value. This means that the ESR_ELx.EC field has the value that the user set
for the syscall number and the kernel can end up printing bogus exception
messages*. For example, for the syscall number 0x68000000, which evaluates
to ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x1A (ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC) the kernel prints this error:

[   18.349161] syscall[300]: unhandled exception: ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB, ESR 0x68000000, Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[   18.350639] CPU: 2 PID: 300 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #79
[   18.351249] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]

which is misleading, as the bad compat syscall has nothing to do with
pointer authentication.

Stop arm64_show_signal() from printing exception syndrome information by
having compat_arm_syscall() set the ESR_ELx value to 0, as it has no
meaning for an invalid system call number. The example above now becomes:

[   19.935275] syscall[301]: unhandled exception: Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[   19.936124] CPU: 1 PID: 301 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00005-g7e08006d4102 #80
[   19.936894] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]

which although shows less information because the syscall number,
wrongfully advertised as the ESR value, is missing, it is better than
showing plainly wrong information. The syscall number can be easily
obtained with strace.

*A 32-bit value above or equal to 0x8000_0000 is interpreted as a negative
integer in compat_arm_syscal() and the condition scno < __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END
evaluates to true; the syscall will exit to userspace in this case with the
ENOSYS error code instead of arm64_notify_die() being called.

Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 17, 2022
[ Upstream commit 3fed9e5 ]

If a compat process tries to execute an unknown system call above the
__ARM_NR_COMPAT_END number, the kernel sends a SIGILL signal to the
offending process. Information about the error is printed to dmesg in
compat_arm_syscall() -> arm64_notify_die() -> arm64_force_sig_fault() ->
arm64_show_signal().

arm64_show_signal() interprets a non-zero value for
current->thread.fault_code as an exception syndrome and displays the
message associated with the ESR_ELx.EC field (bits 31:26).
current->thread.fault_code is set in compat_arm_syscall() ->
arm64_notify_die() with the bad syscall number instead of a valid ESR_ELx
value. This means that the ESR_ELx.EC field has the value that the user set
for the syscall number and the kernel can end up printing bogus exception
messages*. For example, for the syscall number 0x68000000, which evaluates
to ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x1A (ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC) the kernel prints this error:

[   18.349161] syscall[300]: unhandled exception: ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB, ESR 0x68000000, Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[   18.350639] CPU: 2 PID: 300 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #79
[   18.351249] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]

which is misleading, as the bad compat syscall has nothing to do with
pointer authentication.

Stop arm64_show_signal() from printing exception syndrome information by
having compat_arm_syscall() set the ESR_ELx value to 0, as it has no
meaning for an invalid system call number. The example above now becomes:

[   19.935275] syscall[301]: unhandled exception: Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[   19.936124] CPU: 1 PID: 301 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00005-g7e08006d4102 #80
[   19.936894] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]

which although shows less information because the syscall number,
wrongfully advertised as the ESR value, is missing, it is better than
showing plainly wrong information. The syscall number can be easily
obtained with strace.

*A 32-bit value above or equal to 0x8000_0000 is interpreted as a negative
integer in compat_arm_syscal() and the condition scno < __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END
evaluates to true; the syscall will exit to userspace in this case with the
ENOSYS error code instead of arm64_notify_die() being called.

Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
sigmaris pushed a commit to sigmaris/linux that referenced this issue Jun 23, 2022
[ Upstream commit 3fed9e5 ]

If a compat process tries to execute an unknown system call above the
__ARM_NR_COMPAT_END number, the kernel sends a SIGILL signal to the
offending process. Information about the error is printed to dmesg in
compat_arm_syscall() -> arm64_notify_die() -> arm64_force_sig_fault() ->
arm64_show_signal().

arm64_show_signal() interprets a non-zero value for
current->thread.fault_code as an exception syndrome and displays the
message associated with the ESR_ELx.EC field (bits 31:26).
current->thread.fault_code is set in compat_arm_syscall() ->
arm64_notify_die() with the bad syscall number instead of a valid ESR_ELx
value. This means that the ESR_ELx.EC field has the value that the user set
for the syscall number and the kernel can end up printing bogus exception
messages*. For example, for the syscall number 0x68000000, which evaluates
to ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x1A (ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC) the kernel prints this error:

[   18.349161] syscall[300]: unhandled exception: ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB, ESR 0x68000000, Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[   18.350639] CPU: 2 PID: 300 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 raspberrypi#79
[   18.351249] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]

which is misleading, as the bad compat syscall has nothing to do with
pointer authentication.

Stop arm64_show_signal() from printing exception syndrome information by
having compat_arm_syscall() set the ESR_ELx value to 0, as it has no
meaning for an invalid system call number. The example above now becomes:

[   19.935275] syscall[301]: unhandled exception: Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[   19.936124] CPU: 1 PID: 301 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00005-g7e08006d4102 raspberrypi#80
[   19.936894] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]

which although shows less information because the syscall number,
wrongfully advertised as the ESR value, is missing, it is better than
showing plainly wrong information. The syscall number can be easily
obtained with strace.

*A 32-bit value above or equal to 0x8000_0000 is interpreted as a negative
integer in compat_arm_syscal() and the condition scno < __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END
evaluates to true; the syscall will exit to userspace in this case with the
ENOSYS error code instead of arm64_notify_die() being called.

Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
matthiakl pushed a commit to matthiakl/linux that referenced this issue Jun 24, 2022
[ Upstream commit 3fed9e5 ]

If a compat process tries to execute an unknown system call above the
__ARM_NR_COMPAT_END number, the kernel sends a SIGILL signal to the
offending process. Information about the error is printed to dmesg in
compat_arm_syscall() -> arm64_notify_die() -> arm64_force_sig_fault() ->
arm64_show_signal().

arm64_show_signal() interprets a non-zero value for
current->thread.fault_code as an exception syndrome and displays the
message associated with the ESR_ELx.EC field (bits 31:26).
current->thread.fault_code is set in compat_arm_syscall() ->
arm64_notify_die() with the bad syscall number instead of a valid ESR_ELx
value. This means that the ESR_ELx.EC field has the value that the user set
for the syscall number and the kernel can end up printing bogus exception
messages*. For example, for the syscall number 0x68000000, which evaluates
to ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x1A (ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC) the kernel prints this error:

[   18.349161] syscall[300]: unhandled exception: ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB, ESR 0x68000000, Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[   18.350639] CPU: 2 PID: 300 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 raspberrypi#79
[   18.351249] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]

which is misleading, as the bad compat syscall has nothing to do with
pointer authentication.

Stop arm64_show_signal() from printing exception syndrome information by
having compat_arm_syscall() set the ESR_ELx value to 0, as it has no
meaning for an invalid system call number. The example above now becomes:

[   19.935275] syscall[301]: unhandled exception: Oops - bad compat syscall(2) in syscall[10000+50000]
[   19.936124] CPU: 1 PID: 301 Comm: syscall Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00005-g7e08006d4102 raspberrypi#80
[   19.936894] Hardware name: Pine64 RockPro64 v2.0 (DT)
[..]

which although shows less information because the syscall number,
wrongfully advertised as the ESR value, is missing, it is better than
showing plainly wrong information. The syscall number can be easily
obtained with strace.

*A 32-bit value above or equal to 0x8000_0000 is interpreted as a negative
integer in compat_arm_syscal() and the condition scno < __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END
evaluates to true; the syscall will exit to userspace in this case with the
ENOSYS error code instead of arm64_notify_die() being called.

Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 3, 2023
…einit_dcmds()'

[ Upstream commit 683b972 ]

This patch fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug in brcmfmac that occurs
when ptr which is NULL pointer passed as an argument of strlcpy() in
brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds(). This happens when the driver passes a firmware
version string that does not contain a space " ", making strrchr()
return a null pointer. This patch adds a null pointer check.

Found by a modified version of syzkaller.

KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 0 PID: 1983 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.14.0+ #79
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1a/0x90
Code: 23 ff ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 b8 00 00 00 00
00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 55 48 89 fd 48 c1 ea 03 53 48 83 ec 08 <0f> b6 04
02 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 04 84 c0 75 48 80 7d 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90002bfedd8 EFLAGS: 00010296
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200057fdc1 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000020 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000039 R09: ffffed1023549801
R10: ffff88811aa4c007 R11: ffffed1023549800 R12: ffff88800bc68d6c
R13: ffffc90002bfef08 R14: ffff88800bc6bc7c R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020546180 CR3: 0000000117ff1000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0x9f2/0xc40
 ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0
 ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260
 ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0
 brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40
 ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1703/0x1dd0
 ? kmemdup+0x43/0x50
 brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690
 ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470
 usb_probe_interface+0x2aa/0x760
 ? usb_probe_device+0x250/0x250
 really_probe+0x205/0xb70
 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130
 __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0
 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130
 driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150
 __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0
 bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0
 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x30/0x30
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x46/0x160
 __device_attach+0x23f/0x3a0
 ? device_bind_driver+0xd0/0xd0
 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x287/0x14b0
 bus_probe_device+0x1da/0x290
 device_add+0xb7b/0x1eb0
 ? wait_for_completion+0x290/0x290
 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x5a0/0x5a0
 usb_set_configuration+0xf59/0x16f0
 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x82/0xa0
 usb_probe_device+0xbb/0x250
 ? usb_suspend+0x590/0x590
 really_probe+0x205/0xb70
 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130
 __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0
 ? usb_generic_driver_match+0x75/0x90
 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x130/0x130
 driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150
 __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0
 bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0
 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x30/0x30
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50
 __device_attach+0x23f/0x3a0
 ? device_bind_driver+0xd0/0xd0
 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x287/0x14b0
 bus_probe_device+0x1da/0x290
 device_add+0xb7b/0x1eb0
 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x5a0/0x5a0
 ? kfree+0x14a/0x6b0
 ? __usb_get_extra_descriptor+0x116/0x160
 usb_new_device.cold+0x49c/0x1029
 ? hub_disconnect+0x450/0x450
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 hub_event+0x248b/0x31c9
 ? usb_port_suspend.cold+0x139/0x139
 ? check_irq_usage+0x861/0xf20
 ? drain_workqueue+0x280/0x360
 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1460
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x330/0x330
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 worker_thread+0x95/0xe00
 ? __kthread_parkme+0x115/0x1e0
 ? process_one_work+0x1460/0x1460
 kthread+0x3a1/0x480
 ? set_kthread_struct+0x120/0x120
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Modulesdd linked in:
---[ end trace c112c68924ddd800 ]---
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1a/0x90
Code: 23 ff ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 b8 00 00 00 00
00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 55 48 89 fd 48 c1 ea 03 53 48 83 ec 08 <0f> b6 04
02 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 04 84 c0 75 48 80 7d 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90002bfedd8 EFLAGS: 00010296
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff9200057fdc1 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000020 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000039 R09: ffffed1023549801
R10: ffff88811aa4c007 R11: ffffed1023549800 R12: ffff88800bc68d6c
R13: ffffc90002bfef08 R14: ffff88800bc6bc7c R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020546180 CR3: 0000000117ff1000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: disabled

Reported-by: Dokyung Song <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jisoo Jang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jisoo Jang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 13, 2023
[ Upstream commit ae15ace ]

We try to build affinity mask via create_affinity_masks()
unconditionally which may lead several issues:

- the affinity mask is not used for parent without affinity support
  (only VDUSE support the affinity now)
- the logic of create_affinity_masks() might not work for devices
  other than block. For example it's not rare in the networking device
  where the number of queues could exceed the number of CPUs. Such
  case breaks the current affinity logic which is based on
  group_cpus_evenly() who assumes the number of CPUs are not less than
  the number of groups. This can trigger a warning[1]:

	if (ret >= 0)
		WARN_ON(nr_present + nr_others < numgrps);

Fixing this by only build the affinity masks only when

- Driver passes affinity descriptor, driver like virtio-blk can make
  sure to limit the number of queues when it exceeds the number of CPUs
- Parent support affinity setting config ops

This help to avoid the warning. More optimizations could be done on
top.

[1]
[  682.146655] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 1550 at lib/group_cpus.c:400 group_cpus_evenly+0x1aa/0x1c0
[  682.146668] CPU: 6 PID: 1550 Comm: vdpa Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5jason+ #79
[  682.146671] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  682.146673] RIP: 0010:group_cpus_evenly+0x1aa/0x1c0
[  682.146676] Code: 4c 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc e8 1b c4 74 ff 48 89 ef e8 13 ac 98 ff 4c 89 e7 45 31 e4 e8 08 ac 98 ff eb c2 <0f> 0b eb b6 e8 fd 05 c3 00 45 31 e4 eb e5 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
[  682.146679] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000215f498 EFLAGS: 00010293
[  682.146682] RAX: 000000000001f1e0 RBX: 0000000000000041 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  682.146684] RDX: ffff888109922058 RSI: 0000000000000041 RDI: 0000000000000030
[  682.146686] RBP: ffff888109922058 R08: ffffc9000215f498 R09: ffffc9000215f4a0
[  682.146687] R10: 00000000000198d0 R11: 0000000000000030 R12: ffff888107e02800
[  682.146689] R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 0000000000000030 R15: 0000000000000041
[  682.146692] FS:  00007fef52315740(0000) GS:ffff888237380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  682.146695] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  682.146696] CR2: 00007fef52509000 CR3: 0000000110dbc004 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[  682.146698] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  682.146700] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  682.146701] Call Trace:
[  682.146703]  <TASK>
[  682.146705]  ? __warn+0x7b/0x130
[  682.146709]  ? group_cpus_evenly+0x1aa/0x1c0
[  682.146712]  ? report_bug+0x1c8/0x1e0
[  682.146717]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[  682.146721]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[  682.146723]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[  682.146727]  ? group_cpus_evenly+0x1aa/0x1c0
[  682.146729]  ? group_cpus_evenly+0x15c/0x1c0
[  682.146731]  create_affinity_masks+0xaf/0x1a0
[  682.146735]  virtio_vdpa_find_vqs+0x83/0x1d0
[  682.146738]  ? __pfx_default_calc_sets+0x10/0x10
[  682.146742]  virtnet_find_vqs+0x1f0/0x370
[  682.146747]  virtnet_probe+0x501/0xcd0
[  682.146749]  ? vp_modern_get_status+0x12/0x20
[  682.146751]  ? get_cap_addr.isra.0+0x10/0xc0
[  682.146754]  virtio_dev_probe+0x1af/0x260
[  682.146759]  really_probe+0x1a5/0x410

Fixes: 3dad568 ("virtio-vdpa: Support interrupt affinity spreading mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 13, 2023
[ Upstream commit ae15ace ]

We try to build affinity mask via create_affinity_masks()
unconditionally which may lead several issues:

- the affinity mask is not used for parent without affinity support
  (only VDUSE support the affinity now)
- the logic of create_affinity_masks() might not work for devices
  other than block. For example it's not rare in the networking device
  where the number of queues could exceed the number of CPUs. Such
  case breaks the current affinity logic which is based on
  group_cpus_evenly() who assumes the number of CPUs are not less than
  the number of groups. This can trigger a warning[1]:

	if (ret >= 0)
		WARN_ON(nr_present + nr_others < numgrps);

Fixing this by only build the affinity masks only when

- Driver passes affinity descriptor, driver like virtio-blk can make
  sure to limit the number of queues when it exceeds the number of CPUs
- Parent support affinity setting config ops

This help to avoid the warning. More optimizations could be done on
top.

[1]
[  682.146655] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 1550 at lib/group_cpus.c:400 group_cpus_evenly+0x1aa/0x1c0
[  682.146668] CPU: 6 PID: 1550 Comm: vdpa Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5jason+ #79
[  682.146671] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  682.146673] RIP: 0010:group_cpus_evenly+0x1aa/0x1c0
[  682.146676] Code: 4c 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc e8 1b c4 74 ff 48 89 ef e8 13 ac 98 ff 4c 89 e7 45 31 e4 e8 08 ac 98 ff eb c2 <0f> 0b eb b6 e8 fd 05 c3 00 45 31 e4 eb e5 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
[  682.146679] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000215f498 EFLAGS: 00010293
[  682.146682] RAX: 000000000001f1e0 RBX: 0000000000000041 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  682.146684] RDX: ffff888109922058 RSI: 0000000000000041 RDI: 0000000000000030
[  682.146686] RBP: ffff888109922058 R08: ffffc9000215f498 R09: ffffc9000215f4a0
[  682.146687] R10: 00000000000198d0 R11: 0000000000000030 R12: ffff888107e02800
[  682.146689] R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 0000000000000030 R15: 0000000000000041
[  682.146692] FS:  00007fef52315740(0000) GS:ffff888237380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  682.146695] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  682.146696] CR2: 00007fef52509000 CR3: 0000000110dbc004 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[  682.146698] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  682.146700] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  682.146701] Call Trace:
[  682.146703]  <TASK>
[  682.146705]  ? __warn+0x7b/0x130
[  682.146709]  ? group_cpus_evenly+0x1aa/0x1c0
[  682.146712]  ? report_bug+0x1c8/0x1e0
[  682.146717]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[  682.146721]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[  682.146723]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[  682.146727]  ? group_cpus_evenly+0x1aa/0x1c0
[  682.146729]  ? group_cpus_evenly+0x15c/0x1c0
[  682.146731]  create_affinity_masks+0xaf/0x1a0
[  682.146735]  virtio_vdpa_find_vqs+0x83/0x1d0
[  682.146738]  ? __pfx_default_calc_sets+0x10/0x10
[  682.146742]  virtnet_find_vqs+0x1f0/0x370
[  682.146747]  virtnet_probe+0x501/0xcd0
[  682.146749]  ? vp_modern_get_status+0x12/0x20
[  682.146751]  ? get_cap_addr.isra.0+0x10/0xc0
[  682.146754]  virtio_dev_probe+0x1af/0x260
[  682.146759]  really_probe+0x1a5/0x410

Fixes: 3dad568 ("virtio-vdpa: Support interrupt affinity spreading mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
0lxb pushed a commit to 0lxb/rpi_linux that referenced this issue Jan 30, 2024
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 5, 2024
commit 667574e upstream.

When tries to demote 1G hugetlb folios, a lockdep warning is observed:

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.10.0-rc6-00452-ga4d0275fa660-dirty #79 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bash/710 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8f0a7850 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0x244/0x460

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f0a6f48 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0xae/0x460

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&h->resize_lock);
  lock(&h->resize_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

4 locks held by bash/710:
 #0: ffff8f118439c3f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 #1: ffff8f11893b9e88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0
 #2: ffff8f1183dc4428 (kn->active#98){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0
 #3: ffffffff8f0a6f48 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0xae/0x460

stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 710 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc6-00452-ga4d0275fa660-dirty #79
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
 __lock_acquire+0x10f2/0x1ca0
 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x2d0
 __mutex_lock+0x6d/0x400
 demote_store+0x244/0x460
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
 vfs_write+0x380/0x540
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa61db14887
RSP: 002b:00007ffc56c48358 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007fa61db14887
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000055a030050220 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000055a030050220 R08: 00007fa61dbd1460 R09: 000000007fffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: 00007fa61dc1b780 R14: 00007fa61dc17600 R15: 00007fa61dc16a00
 </TASK>

Lockdep considers this an AA deadlock because the different resize_lock
mutexes reside in the same lockdep class, but this is a false positive.
Place them in distinct classes to avoid these warnings.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 8531fc6 ("hugetlb: add hugetlb demote page support")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
popcornmix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 5, 2024
commit 667574e upstream.

When tries to demote 1G hugetlb folios, a lockdep warning is observed:

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.10.0-rc6-00452-ga4d0275fa660-dirty #79 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bash/710 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8f0a7850 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0x244/0x460

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f0a6f48 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0xae/0x460

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&h->resize_lock);
  lock(&h->resize_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

4 locks held by bash/710:
 #0: ffff8f118439c3f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 #1: ffff8f11893b9e88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0
 #2: ffff8f1183dc4428 (kn->active#98){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0
 #3: ffffffff8f0a6f48 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0xae/0x460

stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 710 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc6-00452-ga4d0275fa660-dirty #79
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
 __lock_acquire+0x10f2/0x1ca0
 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x2d0
 __mutex_lock+0x6d/0x400
 demote_store+0x244/0x460
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
 vfs_write+0x380/0x540
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa61db14887
RSP: 002b:00007ffc56c48358 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007fa61db14887
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000055a030050220 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000055a030050220 R08: 00007fa61dbd1460 R09: 000000007fffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: 00007fa61dc1b780 R14: 00007fa61dc17600 R15: 00007fa61dc16a00
 </TASK>

Lockdep considers this an AA deadlock because the different resize_lock
mutexes reside in the same lockdep class, but this is a false positive.
Place them in distinct classes to avoid these warnings.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 8531fc6 ("hugetlb: add hugetlb demote page support")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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