Merge pull request #2059 from wpaulino/broadcast-missing-anchors-event

Queue BackgroundEvent to force close channels upon ChannelManager::read

lightning-persister/src/lib.rs

@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ mod tests {
 	use bitcoin::{Txid, TxMerkleNode};
 	use lightning::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus;
 	use lightning::chain::chainmonitor::Persist;
+	use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
 	use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
 	use lightning::{check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_added_monitors};
 	use lightning::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ mod tests {
 		check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 
 		// Make sure everything is persisted as expected after close.
-		check_persisted_data!(11);
+		check_persisted_data!(CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
 	}
 
 	// Test that if the persister's path to channel data is read-only, writing a

lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

@@ -69,34 +69,36 @@ use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 #[must_use]
 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 	pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
 	/// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
 	/// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
-	/// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
+	/// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
 	///
 	/// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
 	/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
 	/// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
 	///
-	/// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
-	/// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
-	/// its docs for more details.
+	/// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
+	/// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
+	/// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
+	/// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
+	/// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
 	///
 	/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
 	pub update_id: u64,
 }
 
-/// If:
-///    (1) a channel has been force closed and
-///    (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
-///        this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
-/// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
-/// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
-/// force-close.
+/// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
+///
+///	(1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
+///	(2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
+///		allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
+///		commitment transaction.
+///
+/// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
 
 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
@@ -488,8 +490,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
 
 );
 
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 	LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
 		commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
@@ -1201,17 +1202,6 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 			payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
 	}
 
-	pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
-		&self,
-		broadcaster: &B,
-		logger: &L,
-	) where
-		B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
-		L::Target: Logger,
-	{
-		self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
-	}
-
 	/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
 	/// itself.
 	///
@@ -2265,14 +2255,22 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	{
 		log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
 			log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
-		// ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
-		// preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
-		// like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
-		// access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
+		// ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
+		// broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
+		// is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
+		// sentinel value instead.
+		//
+		// The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
+		// thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
+		// them as well.
 		if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
 			assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
 			match updates.updates[0] {
-				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
+				// We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
+				// provide a preimage at this point.
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
+					debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
 				_ => {
 					log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
 					panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
@@ -2364,6 +2362,13 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				},
 			}
 		}
+
+		// If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
+		// need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
+		if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
+			return Ok(());
+		}
+
 		self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
 
 		if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {

lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ use crate::ln::chan_utils;
 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
-use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
@@ -6081,7 +6081,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
 			// monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
 			// See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
 			if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
-				self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+				self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
 				Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 					update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
 					updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],

lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs

@@ -7354,6 +7354,7 @@ where
 		let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
 		let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
 		let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
+		let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
 		for _ in 0..channel_count {
 			let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
 				&args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
@@ -7383,9 +7384,11 @@ where
 					log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
 					log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
 						log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
-					let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
+					let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
+					if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
+						pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
+					}
 					failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
-					monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
 					channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
 						channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
 						user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
@@ -7450,10 +7453,13 @@ where
 			}
 		}
 
-		for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
+		for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
 			if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
-				log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
-				monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
+				let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+					update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
+					updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
+				};
+				pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -7506,10 +7512,17 @@ where
 		}
 
 		let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-		let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
 		for _ in 0..background_event_count {
 			match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
-				0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
+				0 => {
+					let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
+					if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
+						let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
+						*pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
+					}).is_none() {
+						pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
+					}
+				}
 				_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 			}
 		}
@@ -7884,7 +7897,7 @@ where
 			per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
 
 			pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
-			pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
+			pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
 			total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
 			persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
 

lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

@@ -1855,15 +1855,18 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
 	let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
 	let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
 
+	// Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
+	let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
+
 	// Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
 	let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
 	let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
 	let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
 	let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
 
-	// Serialize Bob with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state at this
-	// point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction.
-	let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
+	// Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
+	// at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
+	// present.
 	let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
 	let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
 
@@ -1893,30 +1896,26 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Bob force closes by broadcasting his revoked state for each channel.
-	nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_a.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
-	check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
-	check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
-	check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
-	let revoked_commitment_a = {
-		let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
-		assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
-		let revoked_commitment = txn.pop().unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(revoked_commitment.output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
-		check_spends!(revoked_commitment, chan_a.3);
-		revoked_commitment
-	};
-	nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_b.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
-	check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
-	check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
-	check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
-	let revoked_commitment_b = {
-		let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
-		assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
-		let revoked_commitment = txn.pop().unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(revoked_commitment.output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
-		check_spends!(revoked_commitment, chan_b.3);
-		revoked_commitment
+	// Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
+	// broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
+	// the HTLCs still pending.
+	nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+	check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
+	check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
+	let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
+		let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+		assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+		assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
+		assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
+		if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
+			check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
+			check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
+			(txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
+		} else {
+			check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
+			check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
+			(txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
+		}
 	};
 
 	// Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.

lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs

@@ -335,9 +335,15 @@ fn do_retry_with_no_persist(confirm_before_reload: bool) {
 	check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
 	assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 	assert!(nodes[0].node.has_pending_payments());
-	let as_broadcasted_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
-	assert_eq!(as_broadcasted_txn.len(), 1);
-	assert_eq!(as_broadcasted_txn[0], as_commitment_tx);
+	nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+	if !confirm_before_reload {
+		let as_broadcasted_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+		assert_eq!(as_broadcasted_txn.len(), 1);
+		assert_eq!(as_broadcasted_txn[0], as_commitment_tx);
+	} else {
+		assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+	}
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 
 	nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 	nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
@@ -500,9 +506,11 @@ fn do_test_completed_payment_not_retryable_on_reload(use_dust: bool) {
 	// On reload, the ChannelManager should realize it is stale compared to the ChannelMonitor and
 	// force-close the channel.
 	check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
+	nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 	assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 	assert!(nodes[0].node.has_pending_payments());
 	assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 
 	nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
 	assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
@@ -2795,6 +2803,7 @@ fn do_no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload(persist_manager_with_payment: bool) {
 	if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] { assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); } else { panic!(); }
 	// Note that we don't get a PaymentPathSuccessful here as we leave the HTLC pending to avoid
 	// the double-claim that would otherwise appear at the end of this test.
+	nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 	let as_broadcasted_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 	assert_eq!(as_broadcasted_txn.len(), 1);