Add test for aggregated revoked HTLC claim on anchors channel

lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

@@ -19,13 +19,19 @@ use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
 use crate::ln::channel;
 #[cfg(anchors)]
 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId};
 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
 #[cfg(anchors)]
 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
 #[cfg(anchors)]
 use crate::util::events::BumpTransactionEvent;
 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::util::test_utils;
 
 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
@@ -1749,7 +1755,7 @@ fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
 
 	let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 	// Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
-	// best block is being updated prior to the confirmed transactions.
+	// best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
 	match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
 		ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
 			assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
@@ -1816,3 +1822,228 @@ fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
 	// Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
 	nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 }
+
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+#[test]
+fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
+	// Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
+	// multiple HTLCs in a single transaction via the success path from a revoked commitment.
+	let secp = Secp256k1::new();
+	let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+	// Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
+	chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+	let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
+	anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+	anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
+
+	let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
+	let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
+	let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager<
+		&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
+		&test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
+		&test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger,
+	>;
+
+	let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+	let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 10_000_000, 1_000_000).2;
+
+	// Route two payments from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
+	let (payment_preimage_a, payment_hash_a, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000);
+	let (payment_preimage_b, payment_hash_b, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000);
+
+	// Serialize Bob with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state at this
+	// point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction.
+	let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
+	let bob_serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
+
+	// Bob claims both HTLCs...
+	claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_a);
+	claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_b);
+
+	// ...and sends one back such that he has a motive to broadcast his revoked state.
+	send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
+
+	// Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
+	reload_node!(nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor], bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized);
+	get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+		&payment_hash_a, &payment_preimage_a, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
+		&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+	);
+	get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+		&payment_hash_b, &payment_preimage_b, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
+		&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+	);
+
+	// Bob force closes by broadcasting his revoked state.
+	nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	{
+		let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+		assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+		let revoked_commitment = txn.pop().unwrap();
+		assert_eq!(revoked_commitment.output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
+	}
+
+	// Bob should now receive an event to bump his revoked commitment transaction's fee.
+	assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+	let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+	assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+	let (revoked_commitment, anchor_tx) = match &events[0] {
+		Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. })  => {
+			let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
+				version: 2,
+				lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+				input: vec![
+					TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() },
+					TxIn { ..Default::default() },
+				],
+				output: vec![TxOut {
+					value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+					script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+				}],
+			};
+			let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+				anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
+			);
+			let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap();
+			anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
+				&signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
+			);
+			(commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
+		},
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	};
+
+	for node in &nodes {
+		mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment, &anchor_tx]);
+		check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
+		check_closed_broadcast!(node, true);
+	}
+	check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+	check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+
+	// Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitment, and attempts to claim all of the
+	// revoked outputs.
+	{
+		let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+		assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+		let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+		// TODO: to_self claim must be separate from HTLC claims
+		assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
+		assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), 1);
+		check_spends!(tx, revoked_commitment);
+	}
+
+	// Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
+	// through the success path.
+	assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+	let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+	// Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
+	// best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
+	match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
+		ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+			assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+			if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
+			else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+
+		},
+		_ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 1),
+	};
+	let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
+		version: 2,
+		lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+		input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], // Fee input
+		output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
+			value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+			script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
+		}]
+	};
+	match &events[0] {
+		Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, .. }) => {
+			assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
+			for htlc_descriptor in htlc_descriptors {
+				assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
+				let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+					htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
+				);
+				let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
+				htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
+				htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
+			}
+			for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in htlc_descriptors.iter().enumerate() {
+				let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
+				let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
+					htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
+				);
+				let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
+				let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
+				let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
+				htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
+			}
+		},
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	}
+
+	for node in &nodes {
+		mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
+	}
+
+	// Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
+	// the second level instead.
+	let (revoked_to_self_claim, revoked_htlc_claim) = {
+		let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+		assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+
+		let revoked_to_self_claim = txn.pop().unwrap();
+		assert_eq!(revoked_to_self_claim.input.len(), 1);
+		assert_eq!(revoked_to_self_claim.output.len(), 1);
+		check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim, revoked_commitment);
+
+		let revoked_htlc_claim = txn.pop().unwrap();
+		assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim.input.len(), 2);
+		assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim.output.len(), 1);
+		check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
+
+		(revoked_to_self_claim, revoked_htlc_claim)
+	};
+	for node in &nodes {
+		mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_to_self_claim, &revoked_htlc_claim]);
+	}
+
+
+	// Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
+	// been reached.
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+	assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+	assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+	// Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+
+	assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+	let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+	for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
+		if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event {
+			assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+			let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
+				&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, &Secp256k1::new(),
+			).unwrap();
+			check_spends!(spend_tx, if idx == 0 { &revoked_to_self_claim } else { &revoked_htlc_claim });
+		} else {
+			panic!("unexpected event");
+		}
+	}
+
+	assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+	assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+	assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).is_empty());
+	// TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
+	// This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
+	// balances to claim.
+	assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 3);
+}