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Fix ACL check on health endpoint #17424

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May 24, 2023
Merged

Fix ACL check on health endpoint #17424

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f854fcc
Fix ACL check on health endpoint
hashi-derek May 22, 2023
aa577f1
Add documentation.
hashi-derek May 22, 2023
c23054f
Apply documentation suggestions
hashi-derek May 24, 2023
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3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions .changelog/17424.txt
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
```release-note:breaking-change
api: The `/v1/health/connect/` and `/v1/health/ingress/` endpoints will now immediately return 403 "Permission Denied" errors whenever a token with insufficent `service:read` permissions is provided. Prior to this change, the endpoints would simply return a success code with an empty result list when this occurred.
```
19 changes: 8 additions & 11 deletions agent/consul/health_endpoint.go
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Expand Up @@ -226,6 +226,14 @@ func (h *Health) ServiceNodes(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *struc
return err
}

// If we're doing a connect or ingress query, we need read access to the service
// we're trying to find proxies for, so check that.
if args.Connect || args.Ingress {
if authz.ServiceRead(args.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}

filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(args.Filter, nil, reply.Nodes)
if err != nil {
return err
Expand All @@ -247,17 +255,6 @@ func (h *Health) ServiceNodes(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *struc
return err
}

// If we're doing a connect or ingress query, we need read access to the service
// we're trying to find proxies for, so check that.
if args.Connect || args.Ingress {
// TODO(acl-error-enhancements) Look for ways to percolate this information up to give any feedback to the user.
if authz.ServiceRead(args.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
// Return the index here so that the agent cache does not infinitely loop.
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
}

resolvedNodes := nodes
if args.MergeCentralConfig {
for _, node := range resolvedNodes {
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7 changes: 3 additions & 4 deletions agent/consul/health_endpoint_test.go
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Expand Up @@ -1125,9 +1125,8 @@ node "foo" {
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: token},
}
var resp structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes
assert.Nil(t, msgpackrpc.CallWithCodec(codec, "Health.ServiceNodes", &req, &resp))
assert.ErrorContains(t, msgpackrpc.CallWithCodec(codec, "Health.ServiceNodes", &req, &resp), "Permission denied")
assert.Len(t, resp.Nodes, 0)
assert.Greater(t, resp.Index, uint64(0))

// List w/ token. This should work since we're requesting "foo", but should
// also only contain the proxies with names that adhere to our ACL.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1465,7 +1464,7 @@ func TestHealth_ServiceNodes_Ingress_ACL(t *testing.T) {
ServiceName: "db",
Ingress: true,
}
require.Nil(t, msgpackrpc.CallWithCodec(codec, "Health.ServiceNodes", &req, &out2))
require.ErrorContains(t, msgpackrpc.CallWithCodec(codec, "Health.ServiceNodes", &req, &out2), "Permission denied")
require.Len(t, out2.Nodes, 0)

// Requesting a service that is not covered by the token's policy
Expand All @@ -1475,7 +1474,7 @@ func TestHealth_ServiceNodes_Ingress_ACL(t *testing.T) {
Ingress: true,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: token.SecretID},
}
require.Nil(t, msgpackrpc.CallWithCodec(codec, "Health.ServiceNodes", &req, &out2))
require.ErrorContains(t, msgpackrpc.CallWithCodec(codec, "Health.ServiceNodes", &req, &out2), "Permission denied")
require.Len(t, out2.Nodes, 0)

// Requesting service covered by the token's policy
Expand Down
14 changes: 14 additions & 0 deletions website/content/docs/upgrading/upgrade-specific.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -16,6 +16,20 @@ upgrade flow.

## Consul 1.16.x

#### API health endpoints return different status code

Consul versions 1.16.0+ will now return an error 403 "Permission denied" status
whenever the `/v1/health/connect/` and `/v1/health/ingress/` endpoints are
queried with insufficient ACL `service:read` privileges.

In Consul versions prior to 1.16.0, the service health API would not explicitly
return an error whenever a token with invalid permissions was given. It would
instead return an empty list with a success status code.

Ensure that all of your applications can handle this new API behavior properly
before upgrading. No change is necessary if you do not have a custom application
that is querying this API directly.

#### Remove deprecated service-defaults peer upstream override behavior

When configuring a service defaults configuration entry, the [`UpstreamConfig.Overrides` configuration](/consul/docs/connect/config-entries/service-defaults#upstreamconfig-overrides)
Expand Down