GitHub - guillp/jwskate: A Pythonic implementation of the JOSE / JSON Web Crypto related RFCs (JWS, JWK, JWA, JWT, JWE)

A Pythonic implementation of the JOSE set of IETF specifications: Json Web Signature, Keys, Algorithms, Tokens and Encryption (RFC7515 to 7519), hence the name JWSKATE, and their extensions ECDH Signatures (RFC8037), JWK Thumbprints (RFC7638), and JWK Thumbprint URI (RFC9278), with respects to JWT Best Current Practices (RFC8725).

Free software: MIT
Repository: https://github.com/guillp/jwskate/
Documentation: https://guillp.github.io/jwskate/

Here is a quick usage example: generating a private RSA key, signing some data, then validating that signature with the matching public key:

from jwskate import Jwk

# Let's generate a random private key, to use with alg 'RS256'.
# Based on that alg, jwskate knows it must be an RSA key.
# RSA keys can be of any size, so let's pass the requested key size as parameter
rsa_private_jwk = Jwk.generate(alg="RS256", key_size=2048)

data = b"Signing is easy!"  # we will sign this
signature = rsa_private_jwk.sign(data)  # done!

print(signature)
# b'-\xe89\x81\xc4\xb9.G\x11\xa6\x93/dm\xf0\xc8\x0f\xd....'

# now extract the public key, and verify the signature with it
rsa_public_jwk = rsa_private_jwk.public_jwk()
assert rsa_public_jwk.verify(data, signature)

# let's see what a `Jwk` looks like:
from collections import UserDict

assert isinstance(rsa_private_jwk, UserDict)  # Jwk are UserDicts

print(rsa_private_jwk.with_usage_parameters())

The result of this print will look like this (with the random parts abbreviated to ... for display purposes only):

{'kty': 'RSA',
 'n': '...',
 'e': 'AQAB',
 'd': '...',
 'p': '...',
 'q': '...',
 'dp': '...',
 'dq': '...',
 'qi': '...',
 'alg': 'RS256',
 'kid': '...',
 'use': 'sig',
 'key_ops': ['sign']}

Now let's sign a JWT containing arbitrary claims, this time using an Elliptic Curve (EC) key:

from jwskate import Jwk, Jwt, InvalidSignature

# This time let's try to use the "ES256" alg, which is an ECDSA signature alg.
# Let's specify an arbitrary Key ID (kid).
private_jwk = Jwk.generate(alg="ES256", kid="my_key")
# Note that the appropriate key type and curve are determined automatically, based only on the `alg` value
print(private_jwk)
# {'kty': 'EC', 'crv': 'P-256', 'x': 'Ppe...', 'y': '9Si...', 'd': 'g09...', 'alg': 'ES256'}
assert private_jwk.kty == "EC"
assert private_jwk.crv == "P-256"
assert private_jwk.alg == "ES256"
# this is a private key and 'ES256' is a signature alg, so 'use' and 'key_ops' can also be deduced:
assert private_jwk.use == "sig"
assert private_jwk.key_ops == ("sign",)

# here are the claims to sign in a JWT:
claims = {"sub": "some_sub", "claim1": "value1"}

jwt = Jwt.sign(claims, private_jwk)
# that's it! we have a signed JWT.

# let's see what this looks like
assert isinstance(jwt, Jwt)  # Jwt are objects
print(jwt)  # they can be serialized to string with the `__str__` method
# eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJzb21lX3N1YiIsImNsYWltMSI6InZhbHVlMSJ9.SBQIlGlFdwoEMViWUFsBmCsXShtOq4lnp3Im5ZVh1PFCGJFdW-dTG9qJjlFSAA_BkM5PF9u38PL7Ai9cC2_DJw
assert jwt.claims == claims  # claims can be accessed as a `dict`
assert jwt.headers == {"typ": "JWT", "alg": "ES256", "kid": "my_key"}  # headers too
assert jwt.sub == "some_sub"  # individual claims can be accessed as attributes
assert jwt["claim1"] == "value1"  # or as `dict` items (with "subscription")
assert jwt.alg == "ES256"  # alg and kid headers are also accessible as attributes
assert jwt.kid == private_jwk.kid
# notice that alg and kid are automatically set with appropriate values taken from our private jwk
assert isinstance(jwt.signature, bytes)  # signature is accessible too

# verifying the jwt signature is as easy as:
assert jwt.verify_signature(private_jwk.public_jwk())
# or, if you want an exception to be raised if the signature is invalid:
try:
    jwt.verify(private_jwk.public_jwk())
except InvalidSignature:
    print("Invalid signature!")  # this will not be printed, since the signature is valid
# since our jwk contains an 'alg' parameter (here 'ES256'), the signature is automatically verified using that alg
# you could also specify an alg manually, useful for keys with no "alg" hint:
assert jwt.verify_signature(private_jwk.public_jwk(), alg="ES256")
# note that jwskate will only trust the alg(s) you provide as parameter, either part of the JWK
# or with `alg` or `algs` params, and will ignore the 'alg' that is set in the JWT, for security reasons.

For most applications, you will often sign with the same key and issuer, and with a pre-determined token lifetime. So you can create a JwtSigner object to simplify this for you:

from jwskate import Jwk, JwtSigner

private_jwk = Jwk.generate(alg="ES256")
signer = JwtSigner(issuer="https://myissuer.com", key=private_jwk, default_lifetime=60)  # those values are pre-determined
jwt = signer.sign(  # so you only have to specify the variable claims when signing tokens
    subject="some_sub",
    audience="some_aud",
    extra_claims={"custom_claim1": "value1", "custom_claim2": "value2"},
)

print(jwt.claims)

The generated JWT will include the standardized claims (iss, aud, sub, iat, exp and jti), together with the extra_claims provided to .sign():

{
  'custom_claim1': 'value1',
  'custom_claim2': 'value2',
  'iss': 'https://myissuer.com',
  'aud': 'some_aud',
  'sub': 'some_sub',
  'iat': 1648823184,
  'exp': 1648823244,
  'jti': '3b400e27-c111-4013-84e0-714acd76bf3a'
}

Features

Simple, Clean, Pythonic interface
Convenience wrappers around cryptography for all algorithms described in JWA
Json Web Keys (JWK) loading, dumping and generation
Arbitrary data signature and verification using Json Web Keys
Json Web Signatures (JWS) signing and verification
Json Web Encryption (JWE) encryption and decryption
Json Web Tokens (JWT) signing, verification and validation
100% type annotated, verified with mypy --strict
nearly 100% code coverage
Relies on cryptography for all cryptographic operations
Relies on BinaPy for binary data manipulations

Supported Token Types

Token Type	Support
Json Web Signature (JWS)	☑ Compact ☑ JSON Flat ☑ JSON General
Json Web Encryption (JWE)	☑ Compact ☐ JSON Flat ☐ JSON General
Json Web Tokens (JWT)	☑ Signed ☑ Signed and Encrypted

Supported Signature algorithms

Signature Alg	Description	Key Type	Reference	Note
`HS256`	HMAC using SHA-256	`oct`	RFC7518, Section 3.2
`HS384`	HMAC using SHA-384	`oct`	RFC7518, Section 3.2
`HS512`	HMAC using SHA-512	`oct`	RFC7518, Section 3.2
`RS256`	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256	`RSA`	RFC7518, Section 3.3
`RS384`	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-384	`RSA`	RFC7518, Section 3.3
`RS512`	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-512	`RSA`	RFC7518, Section 3.3
`PS256`	RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256	`RSA`	RFC7518, Section 3.5
`PS384`	RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with SHA-384	`RSA`	RFC7518, Section 3.5
`PS512`	RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with SHA-512	`RSA`	RFC7518, Section 3.5
`ES256`	ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256	`EC`	RFC7518, Section 3.4
`ES384`	ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384	`EC`	RFC7518, Section 3.4
`ES512`	ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512	`EC`	RFC7518, Section 3.4
`ES256K`	ECDSA using secp256k1 curve and SHA-256	`EC`	RFC8812, Section 3.2
`EdDSA`	EdDSA signature algorithms	`OKP`	RFC8037, Section 3.1	Ed2219 and Ed448 are supported
`HS1`	HMAC using SHA-1	`oct`	https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI	Validation Only
`RS1`	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-1	`RSA`	https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI	Validation Only
`none`	No digital signature or MAC performed		RFC7518, Section 3.6	Not usable by mistake

Supported Encryption algorithms

Signature Alg	Description	Reference
`A128CBC-HS256`	AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm	RFC7518, Section 5.2.3
`A192CBC-HS384`	AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption algorithm	RFC7518, Section 5.2.4
`A256CBC-HS512`	AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm	RFC7518, Section 5.2.5
`A128GCM`	AES GCM using 128-bit key	RFC7518, Section 5.3
`A192GCM`	AES GCM using 192-bit key	RFC7518, Section 5.3
`A256GCM`	AES GCM using 256-bit key	RFC7518, Section 5.3

Supported Key Management algorithms

Signature Alg	Description	Key Type	Reference	Note
`RSA1_5`	RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5	`RSA`	RFC7518, Section 4.2	Unwrap Only
`RSA-OAEP`	RSAES OAEP using default parameters	`RSA`	RFC7518, Section 4.3
`RSA-OAEP-256`	RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256	`RSA`	RFC7518, Section 4.3
`RSA-OAEP-384`	RSA-OAEP using SHA-384 and MGF1 with SHA-384	`RSA`	https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI
`RSA-OAEP-512`	RSA-OAEP using SHA-512 and MGF1 with SHA-512	`RSA`	https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI
`A128KW`	AES Key Wrap using 128-bit key	`oct`	RFC7518, Section 4.4
`A192KW`	AES Key Wrap using 192-bit key	`oct`	RFC7518, Section 4.4
`A256KW`	AES Key Wrap using 256-bit key	`oct`	RFC7518, Section 4.4
`A128GCMKW`	Key wrapping with AES GCM using 128-bit key	`oct`	RFC7518, Section 4.7
`A192GCMKW`	Key wrapping with AES GCM using 192-bit key	`oct`	RFC7518, Section 4.7
`A256GCMKW`	Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256-bit key	`oct`	RFC7518, Section 4.7
`dir`	Direct use of a shared symmetric key	`oct`	RFC7518, Section 4.5
`ECDH-ES`	ECDH-ES using Concat KDF	`EC`	RFC7518, Section 4.6
`ECDH-ES+A128KW`	ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A128KW" wrapping	`EC`	RFC7518, Section 4.6
`ECDH-ES+A192KW`	ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A192KW" wrapping	`EC`	RFC7518, Section 4.6
`ECDH-ES+A256KW`	ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and "A256KW" wrapping	`EC`	RFC7518, Section 4.6
`PBES2-HS256+A128KW`	PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" wrapping	`password`	RFC7518, Section 4.8
`PBES2-HS384+A192KW`	PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" wrapping	`password`	RFC7518, Section 4.8
`PBES2-HS512+A256KW`	PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" wrapping	`password`	RFC7518, Section 4.8

Supported Elliptic Curves

Curve	Description	Key Type	Usage	Reference
`P-256`	P-256 Curve	`EC`	signature, encryption	RFC7518, Section 6.2.1.1
`P-384`	P-384 Curve	`EC`	signature, encryption	RFC7518, Section 6.2.1.1
`P-521`	P-521 Curve	`EC`	signature, encryption	RFC7518, Section 6.2.1.1
`secp256k1`	SECG secp256k1 curve	`EC`	signature, encryption	RFC8812, Section 3.1
`Ed25519`	Ed25519 signature algorithm key pairs	`OKP`	signature	RFC8037, Section 3.1
`Ed448`	Ed448 signature algorithm key pairs	`OKP`	signature	RFC8037, Section 3.1
`X25519`	X25519 function key pairs	`OKP`	encryption	RFC8037, Section 3.2
`X448`	X448 function key pairs	`OKP`	encryption	RFC8037, Section 3.2

Why a new lib?

There are already multiple modules implementing JOSE and Json Web Crypto related specifications in Python. However, I have been dissatisfied by all of them so far, so I decided to come up with my own module.

Not to say that those are bad libs (I actually use jwcrypto myself for jwskate unit tests), but they either don't support some important features, lack documentation, or more generally have APIs that don't feel easy-enough, Pythonic-enough to use. See Design below for some of the design decisions that lead to jwskate.

Design

Tokens are objects

Since JSON Web Tokens (JWT) are more and more used, JWT generation and validation must be as easy to do as possible. The Jwt class wraps around a JWT value to allow easy access to its headers, claims and signature, and exposes methods to easily verify the signature.

from jwskate import Jwt

jwt = Jwt(
    "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c"
)
assert jwt.headers == {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}

assert jwt.claims == {"sub": "1234567890", "name": "John Doe", "iat": 1516239022}

assert (
    jwt.signature
    == b"I\xf9J\xc7\x04IH\xc7\x8a(]\x90O\x87\xf0\xa4\xc7\x89\x7f~\x8f:N\xb2%_\xdau\x0b,\xc3\x97"
)

Jwt instances always represent a syntactically valid JWT. If you try to initialize one with a malformed value, you will get a InvalidJwt exception, with an helpful error message:

jwt = Jwt(
    "eyJhbGci-malformedheader.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c"
)
# jwskate.jwt.base.InvalidJwt: Invalid JWT header: it must be a Base64URL-encoded JSON object

Jwt may be objects, but they are easy to serialize into their representation. Use either str() or bytes() depending on what type of value you need, or the value attribute:

jwt = Jwt(
    "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c"
)
str(jwt)
# 'eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c'
bytes(jwt)
# b'eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c'
assert jwt.value == bytes(jwt)

The same is true for JWS and JWE tokens.

Headers are auto-generated

When signing a JWS, JWE or JWT, the headers alg, kid and typ are autogenerated by default:

alg: the signature or key-management alg
kid: if the signature or key-management key has a kid, this will automatically be included in the headers.
typ: will have value "JWT" by default.

You may add your own custom headers using the extra_headers parameter, and/or set a custom typ header with the parameter of the same name:

from jwskate import SymmetricJwk, Jwt

jwk = SymmetricJwk.from_bytes(b"T0t4llyR@nd0M", kid="symmetric_key1")
jwt = Jwt.sign(
    claims={"my": "claims"},
    key=jwk,
    alg="HS256",
    typ="CustomJWT",
    extra_headers={"custom_header": "custom_value"},
)
print(jwt)
# eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImN1c3RvbV9oZWFkZXIiOiJjdXN0b21fdmFsdWUiLCJ0eXAiOiJDdXN0b21KV1QiLCJraWQiOiJzeW1tZXRyaWNfa2V5MSJ9.eyJteSI6ImNsYWltcyJ9.ZqCp8Crq-mdCXLoy5NiEdPTSUlIFEjrzexA6mKHrMAc
print(jwt.headers)
# {'alg': 'HS256', 'custom_header': 'custom_value', 'typ': 'CustomJWT', 'kid': 'symmetric_key1'}

If, for testing purposes, you need to fully control which headers are included in the JWT, even if they are inconsistent, you can use Jwt.sign_arbitrary():

from jwskate import SymmetricJwk, Jwt

jwk = SymmetricJwk.from_bytes(b"T0t4llyR@nd0M", kid="symmetric_key1")
jwt = Jwt.sign_arbitrary(
    headers={
        "custom_header": "custom_value",
        "typ": "WeirdJWT",
        "kid": "R@nd0m_KID",
        "alg": "WeirdAlg",
    },
    claims={"my": "claims"},
    key=jwk,
    alg="HS256",
)
print(jwt)
# eyJjdXN0b21faGVhZGVyIjoiY3VzdG9tX3ZhbHVlIiwidHlwIjoiV2VpcmRKV1QiLCJraWQiOiJSQG5kMG1fS0lEIiwiYWxnIjoiV2VpcmRBbGcifQ.eyJteSI6ImNsYWltcyJ9.bcTFqCSiVIbyJhxClgsBDIyhbvLXTOXOV55QGqo2mhw
print(jwt.headers)  # you asked for inconsistent headers, you have them:
# {'custom_header': 'custom_value', 'typ': 'WeirdJWT', 'kid': 'R@nd0m_KID', 'alg': 'WeirdAlg'}

`Jwk` as thin wrapper around `cryptography` keys

Jwk keys are just thin wrappers around keys from the cryptography module, or, in the case of symmetric keys, around bytes. But, unlike cryptography keys, they present a consistent interface for signature creation/verification, key management, and encryption/decryption, regardless of the algorithm:

For signature generation and verification, use Jwk.sign() and Jwk.verify() respectively
For content encryption using a Key-Management alg and a symmetric Content-Encryption Key (CEK):
- use Jwk.sender_key() to generate and wrap or otherwise derive a Content Encryption Key
- use Jwk.encrypt() on that CEK to encrypt your data
For decryption on the recipient side:
- use Jwk.recipient_key() to unwrap or otherwise derive the CEK
- use Jwk.decrypt() on that CEK to decrypt the encrypted data

Here is an example usage of signature and verification:

from jwskate import Jwk, SignatureAlgs

# I'll use a symmetric key for this example, but the same applies to asymmetric keys
sig_key = Jwk.generate(alg=SignatureAlgs.HS256, kid="example_signature_key")  # symmetric key

# use `Jwk.sign()` and `Jwk.verify()` to sign and verify data
data = b"Something to sign"
signature = sig_key.sign(data)
if not sig_key.verify(data, signature[:-7] + b"altered"):
    print("Invalid signature!")

Here is an example of data encryption using a Key-Management alg and a Content-Encryption Key. This example uses a Symmetric Key, but the interface is the same with private/public keys (excepted that encryption must be done with the public key).

from jwskate import Jwk, EncryptionAlgs, KeyManagementAlgs
# generate a suitabe key
key_mgmt_key = Jwk.generate(alg=KeyManagementAlgs.A256KW, kid="example_key_management_key")
# First, choose your symmetric encryption alg
enc = EncryptionAlgs.A256GCM
# Use `Jwk.sender_key()` and `Jwk.recipient_key()` to generate or otherwise derive the CEK
# This will return a 3-tuple with the clear-text CEK, the wrapped CEK and extra headers to include in the token, if any
cek, wrapped_cek, headers = key_mgmt_key.sender_key(enc=enc)
# use the clear-text CEK to encrypt your data
secret_message = b"Encryption is easy!"
ciphertext, iv, tag = cek.encrypt(secret_message, enc=enc)
# you may also include Additional Authentication Data (AAD) with the `aad` parameter to `cek.encrypt()` above
# send the ciphertext, the wrapped CEK, IV, tag, AAD (if any) and extra headers to the recipient

recipient_cek = key_mgmt_key.recipient_key(wrapped_cek, enc=enc, **headers)
assert recipient_cek == cek  # the CEK is the same as the one we used to encrypt the data
cleartext = recipient_cek.decrypt(ciphertext, iv=iv, tag=tag, enc=enc) # if there is AAD, you must also include it here
assert cleartext == secret_message

All of the above is much easier if you use a JWE to encrypt your data:

from jwskate import Jwk, JweCompact, EncryptionAlgs, KeyManagementAlgs

key = Jwk.generate(alg=KeyManagementAlgs.A256GCMKW)
jwe = JweCompact.encrypt(b"This is a secret message", key=key, enc=EncryptionAlgs.A256CBC_HS512)
print(jwe)

# the resulting JWE contains everything the recipient needs to be able to decrypt your message, excepted the key of course!
assert jwe.alg == "A256GCMKW" # key-management alg is part of the headers
assert jwe.enc == "A256CBC-HS512" # as well as content-encryption alg
assert isinstance(jwe.ciphertext, bytes) # the encrypted data
assert isinstance(jwe.wrapped_cek, bytes) # the CEK, if is it encrypted (empty if it is otherwise derived)
assert isinstance(jwe.initialization_vector, bytes) # the IV used for encryption
assert isinstance(jwe.authentication_tag, bytes) # the authentication tag
assert isinstance(jwe.additional_authenticated_data) # theJWE header part is used as AAD

# on recipient side, decryption is as easy as:
assert jwe.decrypt(key) == b"This is a secret message"

The Jwk layer is so thin, that everywhere a key is required as parameter, you may pass either:

a Jwk instance,
or a Mapping (typically a dict) representing the JWK key,
a raw cryptography key instance, or a bytes if it is a symmetric key, but in that case, you must specify the alg to use, since that is not part of the key.

As long as the provided key is suitable for the chosen algorithm, any of the above will work. Here is an example of encrypting JWE tokens with raw cryptography keys:

from jwskate import JweCompact
secret_message = b"my_very_secret_message"

# symmetric encryption with A128GCMKW and a 128 bit `bytes` key
aes_key = b"very_secret_key!"
jwe = JweCompact.encrypt(secret_message, key=aes_key, alg="A128GCMKW", enc="A128GCM")
assert jwe.decrypt(key=aes_key) == secret_message

# or, for asymmetric encryption with ECDH-ES+A256KW and a raw `cryptography` key (e.g. X25519):
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.x25519 import X25519PrivateKey
eckey = X25519PrivateKey.generate()

jwe = JweCompact.encrypt(secret_message, key=eckey.public_key(), alg="ECDH-ES+A256KW", enc="A256GCM")
assert jwe.decrypt(key=eckey) == secret_message

`Jwk` are `UserDict` instances

JWK are specified as JSON objects, which are parsed as dict in Python. The Jwk class in jwskate is actually a UserDict subclass, which is very similar to a standard dict. So you can use it exactly like you would use a dict: you can access its members, dump it back as JSON, etc. The same is true for Signed or Encrypted Json Web tokens in JSON format. However, you cannot change the key cryptographic materials, since that would lead to unusable keys.

Unfortunately, UserDict is not natively serializable with the default JSON dump. To workaround that, you may either use Jwk.to_json() / JwkSet.to_json() to get a JSON-serialized string, or Jwk.to_dict() / JwkSet.to_dict() to get a standard dict, that is serializable by the standard json module.

JWA Wrappers

You can use cryptography to do the cryptographic operations that are described in JWA, but since cryptography is a general purpose library, its usage is not straightforward and gives you plenty of options to carefully select and combine, leaving room for mistakes, errors and confusion. It also has a quite inconsistent API to handle the different key types and algorithms. To work around this, jwskate comes with a set of consistent wrappers that implement the exact JWA specifications, with minimum risk of mistakes.

Here is an example of using raw JWA wrappers:

from jwskate import A256KW, A256GCM  # pick any key-management and content-encryption algs

# on sender side, you have a message to encrypt and a pre-shared key with the recipient
secret_message = b"This is a secret message"

shared_key = A256KW.generate_key() # let's generate a suitable pre-shared key for this example, using this helper
a256kw = A256KW(shared_key) # you can initialize a JWA wrapper with a key of your choice this way

a256gcm = A256GCM.with_random_key() # or you can initialize them with a randomly generated key, as a one-liner
iv = A256GCM.generate_iv() # helper method for generating Initialisation Vectors of the appropriate size
ciphertext, tag = a256gcm.encrypt(secret_message, iv=iv) # use the Content-Encryption JWA wrapper to encrypt your message

wrapped_cek = a256kw.wrap_key(a256gcm.key) # and/or use the Key-Management JWA wrapper to wrap the CEK

# on recipient side, you receive ciphertext, iv, tag and wrapped_cek,
# and you are supposed to know the shared_key and algorithms to use
cek = A256KW(shared_key).unwrap_key(wrapped_cek) # so you can unwrap the CEK
cleartext = A256GCM(cek).decrypt(ciphertext, iv=iv, auth_tag=tag) # and decrypt the ciphertext and validating the tag

assert cleartext == secret_message

Safe Signature Verification

As advised in JWT Best Practices $3.1:

For every signature verification method in jwskate, the expected signature(s) algorithm(s) must be specified. That is to avoid a security flaw where your application accepts tokens with a weaker encryption scheme than what your security policy mandates; or even worse, where it accepts unsigned tokens, or tokens that are symmetrically signed with an improperly used public key, leaving your application exposed to exploitation by attackers.

To specify which signature algorithms are accepted, each signature verification method accepts, in order of preference:

an alg parameter which contains the expected algorithm, or an algs parameter which contains a list of acceptable algorithms
the alg parameter from the signature verification Jwk, if present. This alg is the algorithm intended for use with that key.

Note that you cannot use alg and algs at the same time. If your Jwk contains an alg parameter, and you provide an alg or algs which does not match that value, a Warning will be emitted.

TODO

Complete/enhance/proof-read documentation
Better exceptions (create dedicated exception classes, better messages, etc.)
Support for JWE in JSON format
Better tests
Support for Selective-Disclosure JWT

Credits

All cryptographic operations are handled by cryptography.

Name		Name	Last commit message	Last commit date
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.github		.github
docs		docs
jwskate		jwskate
tests		tests
.editorconfig		.editorconfig
.gitattributes		.gitattributes
.gitignore		.gitignore
.pre-commit-config.yaml		.pre-commit-config.yaml
AUTHORS.md		AUTHORS.md
CONTRIBUTING.md		CONTRIBUTING.md
HISTORY.md		HISTORY.md
LICENSE		LICENSE
README.md		README.md
mkdocs.yml		mkdocs.yml
pyproject.toml		pyproject.toml
uv.lock		uv.lock

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Features

Supported Token Types

Supported Signature algorithms

Supported Encryption algorithms

Supported Key Management algorithms

Supported Elliptic Curves

Why a new lib?

Design

Tokens are objects

Headers are auto-generated

Jwk as thin wrapper around cryptography keys

Jwk are UserDict instances

JWA Wrappers

Safe Signature Verification

TODO

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`Jwk` as thin wrapper around `cryptography` keys

`Jwk` are `UserDict` instances

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