-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 8.3k
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
[Security Solution] Identify and exclude 24H2+ hotpatch extension pages from stomp detection #192490
[Security Solution] Identify and exclude 24H2+ hotpatch extension pages from stomp detection #192490
Conversation
Pinging @elastic/security-defend-workflows (Team:Defend Workflows) |
💛 Build succeeded, but was flaky
Failed CI StepsMetrics [docs]Async chunks
History
To update your PR or re-run it, just comment with: |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
LGTM 👍
Would suggest that the PR title include something like 'add policy advanced option` just to give us here in kibana some quick context 😄
💔 All backports failed
Manual backportTo create the backport manually run:
Questions ?Please refer to the Backport tool documentation |
💚 All backports created successfully
Note: Successful backport PRs will be merged automatically after passing CI. Questions ?Please refer to the Backport tool documentation |
…mp detection (elastic#192490) ## Release Note Defend 8.15.2 will improve support for [Windows call stack module stomp detection](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/upping-the-ante-detecting-in-memory-threats-with-kernel-call-stacks) in Windows 11 24H2. ## Description Windows 11 24H2 adds hotpatch support, a great feature that enables the installation of many security updates without a system reboot. To implement hotpatching, Microsoft is changing the layout of executable images in memory, appending new "extension pages" to the end of every hotpatchable mapped image in memory. These pages are `PAGE_EXECUTE_READ`.  Microsoft describes the change in some detail [here](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-os-platform-blog/hotpatching-on-windows/ba-p/2959541). Here's a [third-party analysis of the change](https://ynwarcs.github.io/Win11-24H2-CFG) showing how it breaks x64debug.  Unfortunately, this change affects our module stomp detection feature, which views these executable pages as patched/stomped. We are fixing this in 8.15.2. This PR lets users opt out of the change, reverting to the old behavior. ### Checklist Delete any items that are not applicable to this PR. - [x] Any text added follows [EUI's writing guidelines](https://elastic.github.io/eui/#/guidelines/writing), uses sentence case text and includes [i18n support](https://github.com/elastic/kibana/blob/main/packages/kbn-i18n/README.md) ### For maintainers - [ ] This was checked for breaking API changes and was [labeled appropriately](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/master/contributing.html#kibana-release-notes-process) (cherry picked from commit ca0d60c) # Conflicts: # x-pack/plugins/security_solution/public/management/pages/policy/models/advanced_policy_schema.ts
…rom stomp detection (#192490) (#192638) # Backport This will backport the following commits from `main` to `8.15`: - [[Defend] Identify and exclude 24H2+ hotpatch extension pages from stomp detection (#192490)](#192490) <!--- Backport version: 8.9.8 --> ### Questions ? Please refer to the [Backport tool documentation](https://github.com/sqren/backport) <!--BACKPORT [{"author":{"name":"Gabriel Landau","email":"[email protected]"},"sourceCommit":{"committedDate":"2024-09-11T19:25:43Z","message":"[Defend] Identify and exclude 24H2+ hotpatch extension pages from stomp detection (#192490)\n\n## Release Note\r\nDefend 8.15.2 will improve support for [Windows call stack module stomp\r\ndetection](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/upping-the-ante-detecting-in-memory-threats-with-kernel-call-stacks)\r\nin Windows 11 24H2.\r\n\r\n## Description\r\nWindows 11 24H2 adds hotpatch support, a great feature that enables the\r\ninstallation of many security updates without a system reboot. To\r\nimplement hotpatching, Microsoft is changing the layout of executable\r\nimages in memory, appending new \"extension pages\" to the end of every\r\nhotpatchable mapped image in memory. These pages are\r\n`PAGE_EXECUTE_READ`.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nMicrosoft describes the change in some detail\r\n[here](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-os-platform-blog/hotpatching-on-windows/ba-p/2959541).\r\nHere's a [third-party analysis of the\r\nchange](https://ynwarcs.github.io/Win11-24H2-CFG) showing how it breaks\r\nx64debug.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nUnfortunately, this change affects our module stomp detection feature,\r\nwhich views these executable pages as patched/stomped. We are fixing\r\nthis in 8.15.2. This PR lets users opt out of the change, reverting to\r\nthe old behavior.\r\n\r\n### Checklist\r\n\r\nDelete any items that are not applicable to this PR.\r\n\r\n- [x] Any text added follows [EUI's writing\r\nguidelines](https://elastic.github.io/eui/#/guidelines/writing), uses\r\nsentence case text and includes [i18n\r\nsupport](https://github.com/elastic/kibana/blob/main/packages/kbn-i18n/README.md)\r\n\r\n### For maintainers\r\n\r\n- [ ] This was checked for breaking API changes and was [labeled\r\nappropriately](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/master/contributing.html#kibana-release-notes-process)","sha":"ca0d60cb042c6a46afee2297ac2715092917670f","branchLabelMapping":{"^v8.16.0$":"main","^v(\\d+).(\\d+).\\d+$":"$1.$2"}},"sourcePullRequest":{"labels":["release_note:enhancement","Team:Defend Workflows","v8.16.0","v8.15.2"],"number":192490,"url":"https://github.com/elastic/kibana/pull/192490","mergeCommit":{"message":"[Defend] Identify and exclude 24H2+ hotpatch extension pages from stomp detection (#192490)\n\n## Release Note\r\nDefend 8.15.2 will improve support for [Windows call stack module stomp\r\ndetection](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/upping-the-ante-detecting-in-memory-threats-with-kernel-call-stacks)\r\nin Windows 11 24H2.\r\n\r\n## Description\r\nWindows 11 24H2 adds hotpatch support, a great feature that enables the\r\ninstallation of many security updates without a system reboot. To\r\nimplement hotpatching, Microsoft is changing the layout of executable\r\nimages in memory, appending new \"extension pages\" to the end of every\r\nhotpatchable mapped image in memory. These pages are\r\n`PAGE_EXECUTE_READ`.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nMicrosoft describes the change in some detail\r\n[here](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-os-platform-blog/hotpatching-on-windows/ba-p/2959541).\r\nHere's a [third-party analysis of the\r\nchange](https://ynwarcs.github.io/Win11-24H2-CFG) showing how it breaks\r\nx64debug.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nUnfortunately, this change affects our module stomp detection feature,\r\nwhich views these executable pages as patched/stomped. We are fixing\r\nthis in 8.15.2. This PR lets users opt out of the change, reverting to\r\nthe old behavior.\r\n\r\n### Checklist\r\n\r\nDelete any items that are not applicable to this PR.\r\n\r\n- [x] Any text added follows [EUI's writing\r\nguidelines](https://elastic.github.io/eui/#/guidelines/writing), uses\r\nsentence case text and includes [i18n\r\nsupport](https://github.com/elastic/kibana/blob/main/packages/kbn-i18n/README.md)\r\n\r\n### For maintainers\r\n\r\n- [ ] This was checked for breaking API changes and was [labeled\r\nappropriately](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/master/contributing.html#kibana-release-notes-process)","sha":"ca0d60cb042c6a46afee2297ac2715092917670f"}},"sourceBranch":"main","suggestedTargetBranches":["8.15"],"targetPullRequestStates":[{"branch":"main","label":"v8.16.0","labelRegex":"^v8.16.0$","isSourceBranch":true,"state":"MERGED","url":"https://github.com/elastic/kibana/pull/192490","number":192490,"mergeCommit":{"message":"[Defend] Identify and exclude 24H2+ hotpatch extension pages from stomp detection (#192490)\n\n## Release Note\r\nDefend 8.15.2 will improve support for [Windows call stack module stomp\r\ndetection](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/upping-the-ante-detecting-in-memory-threats-with-kernel-call-stacks)\r\nin Windows 11 24H2.\r\n\r\n## Description\r\nWindows 11 24H2 adds hotpatch support, a great feature that enables the\r\ninstallation of many security updates without a system reboot. To\r\nimplement hotpatching, Microsoft is changing the layout of executable\r\nimages in memory, appending new \"extension pages\" to the end of every\r\nhotpatchable mapped image in memory. These pages are\r\n`PAGE_EXECUTE_READ`.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nMicrosoft describes the change in some detail\r\n[here](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-os-platform-blog/hotpatching-on-windows/ba-p/2959541).\r\nHere's a [third-party analysis of the\r\nchange](https://ynwarcs.github.io/Win11-24H2-CFG) showing how it breaks\r\nx64debug.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nUnfortunately, this change affects our module stomp detection feature,\r\nwhich views these executable pages as patched/stomped. We are fixing\r\nthis in 8.15.2. This PR lets users opt out of the change, reverting to\r\nthe old behavior.\r\n\r\n### Checklist\r\n\r\nDelete any items that are not applicable to this PR.\r\n\r\n- [x] Any text added follows [EUI's writing\r\nguidelines](https://elastic.github.io/eui/#/guidelines/writing), uses\r\nsentence case text and includes [i18n\r\nsupport](https://github.com/elastic/kibana/blob/main/packages/kbn-i18n/README.md)\r\n\r\n### For maintainers\r\n\r\n- [ ] This was checked for breaking API changes and was [labeled\r\nappropriately](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/kibana/master/contributing.html#kibana-release-notes-process)","sha":"ca0d60cb042c6a46afee2297ac2715092917670f"}},{"branch":"8.15","label":"v8.15.2","labelRegex":"^v(\\d+).(\\d+).\\d+$","isSourceBranch":false,"state":"NOT_CREATED"}]}] BACKPORT-->
Release Note
Defend 8.15.2 will improve support for Windows call stack module stomp detection in Windows 11 24H2.
Description
Windows 11 24H2 adds hotpatch support, a great feature that enables the installation of many security updates without a system reboot. To implement hotpatching, Microsoft is changing the layout of executable images in memory, appending new "extension pages" to the end of every hotpatchable mapped image in memory. These pages are
PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
.Microsoft describes the change in some detail here. Here's a third-party analysis of the change showing how it breaks x64debug.
Unfortunately, this change affects our module stomp detection feature, which views these executable pages as patched/stomped. We are fixing this in 8.15.2. This PR lets users opt out of the change, reverting to the old behavior.
Checklist
Delete any items that are not applicable to this PR.
For maintainers