Final corrections /3

_posts/newsletter/2022-04-01-April_2022.md

@@ -185,13 +185,13 @@ He then says that to "also add the additional metadata that we have on the Bitco
 *Disclosure and Personal Note: In January 2018, about seven months before the [beta launch](https://twitter.com/wasabiwallet/status/1024631198423965696) of Wasabi, my podcast co-host and I started a short-form video series called "zkSNACKS," a food-related twist on zk-SNARKs, which stands for "[Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge](https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks/)." I had come up with that name sometime leading up to the publication of the [first episode](https://youtu.be/ike8Tex442M). We are called "Block Digest," we care about privacy, and we can be snarky as hell, so it was perfect wordplay. We published three episodes in the series in total. At the [Building on Bitcoin](https://building-on-bitcoin.com/) conference in July, Nopara [gave us a shout-out](https://twitter.com/parallelind/status/1014085264204029953) and [attributed credit to us](https://youtu.be/QiySI4-MWww?t=1576) for the name of [his new company](https://zksnacks.com/) that would manage development of Wasabi. This was news to my co-host and I as much as to everyone else; we had not been asked or told beforehand. At the time, I would say that I felt proud of this inadvertent branding contribution. However, recent events have now soured the memory and association.*
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-*One of the valuable side-effects of a socio-political environment that supports freedom of association, where there are little to no inherent legal consequences for engaging non-violently (or not) with others, is that you can more easily see and understand the character of those around you based on their choices. You may still be the recipient or deliverer of 'soft' judgement and consequences for who you include or exclude, and the basis on which you made that determination (ex. gender, race, sexuality, religion, political orientation, etc), but either way your preferences are more honest and visible to everyone around you. They can in turn make an informed decision about whether to include or exclude you, depending on what they believe your preferences reveal about your character.*
+*One of the valuable side-effects of a socio-political environment that supports freedom of association, where there are little to no inherent legal consequences for engaging non-violently with others, is that you can more easily see and understand the character of those around you based on their choices. You may still be the recipient or deliverer of 'soft' judgement and consequences for who you include or exclude, and the basis on which you made that determination (ex. gender, race, sexuality, religion, political orientation, etc), but either way your preferences are more honest and visible to everyone around you. They can in turn make an informed decision about whether to include or exclude you, depending on what they believe your preferences reveal about your character.*
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-*It is very true that the operators of the Wasabi coordinator are not required to accept any and every UTXO for CoinJoins. I haven't seen anyone argue that they are. Indeed, disassociating from (real or perceived) malicious actors, network nodes, or users who may abuse your time, space, and resources to your detriment or that of your community is a valid reason to limit or close the connection. Even if your reason is wrong or misplaced, whether according to your own standard or someone else's, you can still (largely) do so anyway. In recent years we have even seen the cost of rapid mass-disassociation, often socially compelled and coerced, including in [financial ways](https://einzelgaengerinmotte.files.wordpress.com/2020/12/financial-cancel-culture.pdf).*
+*It is very true that the operators of the Wasabi coordinator are not required to accept any and every UTXO for CoinJoins. I haven't seen anyone argue that they are. Indeed, disassociating from (real or perceived) malicious actors, network nodes, or users who may abuse your time, space, and resources to your detriment or that of your community is a valid reason to limit or close the connection. Even if your reason is wrong or misplaced, whether according to your own standard or someone else's, you can still (largely) do so anyway. In recent years we have even seen the result of rapid mass-disassociation, often socially compelled and coerced, including in [financial ways](https://einzelgaengerinmotte.files.wordpress.com/2020/12/financial-cancel-culture.pdf).*
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-*Readers of this newsletter should know that I have included material many times on the fallibility of blockchain surveillance tools, including in this very issue. The foundation of their business model is mapping association: address to address, coin to entity, entity to identity, and then identity to crime. For that last step to resemble a just due-process of any kind, preceding steps should follow the same rigorous and transparent standard of evidence, no? However, most of the people who have been and will be affected by blockchain surveillance purveyors have committed no crime and are not under any formal or informal suspicion of committing a crime. They are blocked and suspended because anyone who actually takes their privacy seriously is considered "risky," where **risk is measured not by crime but merely the degree of visibility and obedience** (or, sadly, [their personal power to pay their profile away](https://enegnei.github.io/This-Month-In-Bitcoin-Privacy/July_2020/#july-7th---chainalysis-and-the-boiling-frog)). Meanwhile, the risks inherent to mandatory sharing of sensitive personal information for millions of ordinary people are witnessed daily and largely ignored.*
+*Readers should know that I have included material many times on the fallibility of blockchain surveillance tools, including in this newsletter. The foundation of their business model is mapping association: address to address, coin to entity, entity to identity, and then identity to crime. For that last step to resemble a just due-process of any kind, preceding steps should follow the same rigorous and transparent standard of evidence, no? However, most of the people who have been and will be affected by blockchain surveillance purveyors have committed no crime and are not under any formal or informal suspicion of committing a crime. They are blocked and suspended because anyone who actually takes their privacy seriously is considered "risky," where **risk is measured not by crime but merely the degree of visibility and obedience** (or, sadly, [their personal power to pay their profile away](https://enegnei.github.io/This-Month-In-Bitcoin-Privacy/July_2020/#july-7th---chainalysis-and-the-boiling-frog)). Meanwhile, the risks inherent to mandatory sharing of sensitive personal information for millions of ordinary people are witnessed daily and largely ignored.*
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 > The legal fungibility of banknotes — their homogeneity, or the characteristic of being interchangeable with others of equal denomination — was determined through common law in 18th century Scotland (see Reid, 2013). In 1749, a court considered the case of two £20 notes which had gone missing in
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ that the history of an individual banknote — which I analogise to its identity
 >
 > — "[The Identity, Fungibility, and Anonymity of Money](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3211011)" by Alastair Berg (2019)
 
-*It was understood centuries ago that ascribing criminality to the current holder of fiat currency based on that particular coin or bill's illicit provenance is a dangerous move that can erode economic efficiency and the value of that currency system over time. How is it then not obvious that states which feel threatened by the adoption of non-state decentralised money would have an interest in enforcing a different standard for the legal fungibility of bitcoin? By accepting the involvement of blockchain surveillance, you are not only providing them with tacit approval that their methods are effective at the task they claim to do, but also supporting the state's goal: degradation of legal fungibility.*
+*It was understood centuries ago that ascribing criminality to the current holder of fiat currency based on that particular coin or bill's alleged illicit provenance is a dangerous move that can erode economic efficiency and the value of that currency system over time. How is it then not obvious that states which feel threatened by the adoption of non-state decentralised money would have an interest in enforcing a different standard for the legal fungibility of bitcoin? By accepting the involvement of blockchain surveillance, you are not only providing them with tacit approval that their methods are effective at the task they claim to do, but also supporting the state's goal: degradation of legal fungibility.*
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 *In August 2013, the encrypted email service provider Lavabit was abruptly shut down after being served with a pen register order requiring the disclosure of information about a single customer's account. The founder, Lardar Levison, wrote: "[I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become complicit in crimes against the American people or walk away from nearly ten years of hard work by shutting down Lavabit](https://web.archive.org/web/20130809031439/https://lavabit.com/)." For years, Levison was "[forbidden... under threat of contempt and possibly jail time, from identifying who the government was investigating](https://www.wired.com/2016/03/government-error-just-revealed-snowden-target-lavabit-case/)." Through a redaction error by the government, it was revealed that the account belonged to [NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden](https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/nsa-surveillance-program-outed-by-edward-snowden-ruled-illegal-161787/).*