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authenticate connection IDs #2567
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Codecov Report
@@ Coverage Diff @@
## master #2567 +/- ##
==========================================
- Coverage 86.25% 86.25% -0.00%
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Files 122 122
Lines 9645 9717 +72
==========================================
+ Hits 8319 8381 +62
- Misses 988 997 +9
- Partials 338 339 +1
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return | ||
// check the initial_source_connection_id | ||
if !params.InitialSourceConnectionID.Equal(s.handshakeDestConnID) { | ||
return qerr.NewError(qerr.TransportParameterError, fmt.Sprintf("expected initial_source_connection_id to equal %s, is %s", s.handshakeDestConnID, params.InitialSourceConnectionID)) |
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Could exposing the expected id leak info to an attacker?
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Not really. The connection ID has already been used on the Initial packet, so it's known to a MITM.
Fixes #2529.