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A common attack pattern in new blockchain involves an attacker identifying and exploiting a token inflation bug. The attacker mints a large number of tokens and then attempts to dump them on the market.
In response to this pattern, web3 protocols are now commonly performing real-time monitoring and alerting of the tokens in circulation. In an emergency condition prior to full decentralization of the protocol, they can exercise emergency admin powers to halt the blockchain until the vulnerability is fixed.
Smaller protocols written in smart contracts have also discussed the idea of instituting an invariant check in the protocol, such that significant deviations from the expected number of tokens in circulation will trigger an automatic halting of the protocol. This is more commonly discussed in projects involving defi trades rather than L1 blockchains.
We should investigate at a minimum what it would take to implement monitoring/alerting on this front and consider the pros/cons of an invariant trigger, as well.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
A common attack pattern in new blockchain involves an attacker identifying and exploiting a token inflation bug. The attacker mints a large number of tokens and then attempts to dump them on the market.
In response to this pattern, web3 protocols are now commonly performing real-time monitoring and alerting of the tokens in circulation. In an emergency condition prior to full decentralization of the protocol, they can exercise emergency admin powers to halt the blockchain until the vulnerability is fixed.
Smaller protocols written in smart contracts have also discussed the idea of instituting an invariant check in the protocol, such that significant deviations from the expected number of tokens in circulation will trigger an automatic halting of the protocol. This is more commonly discussed in projects involving defi trades rather than L1 blockchains.
We should investigate at a minimum what it would take to implement monitoring/alerting on this front and consider the pros/cons of an invariant trigger, as well.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: