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<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset='UTF-8'>
<meta name='author' content='Shwe Zan Aung, C.A.F. Rhys Davids'>
<title></title>
</head>
<body>
<article id='kv1.1' lang='en'>
<header>
<ul>
<li class='division'>Points of Controversy</li>
</ul>
<h1>1.1 Of the Existence of a Personal Entity</h1>
</header>
<p class='namo'>Honour to the Exalted One Arahant Buddha Supreme</p>
<p><span class='add'>Controverted Point</span><a class='pc' id='pc8' href='#pc8'></a>: That the “person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.</p>
<h2>The Eight Refutations</h2>
<h3>The First Refutation</h3>
<h4>The Fivefold Affirmative Presentation</h4>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.1' href='#pts-cs1.1.1'>PTS cs 1.1.1</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes<a class='pc' id='pc9' href='#pc9'></a>.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the person known <em>in the same way</em> as a real and ultimate fact is known?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Acknowledge your refutation: </p>
<ol type="I">
<li>If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say, the person is known in the same way as <span class='add'>any other</span> real and ultimate fact <span class='add'>is known</span>.</li>
<li>That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that we ought to say, “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”, but (2) we ought not to say, the person is known in the same way as <span class='add'>any other</span> real and ultimate fact <span class='add'>is known</span>.</li>
<li>If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted.</li>
<li>In affirming the former statement (1), while</li>
<li>denying the latter (2), you are wrong.</li>
</ol>
<h4>The Fourfold Rejoinder</h4>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.2' href='#pts-cs1.1.2'>PTS cs 1.1.2</a><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is the “person” not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> No, it is not known.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is it unknown in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is <span class='add'>known</span>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Acknowledge the rejoinder: (1) If the person be not <a class='pc' id='pc10' href='#pc10'></a> known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say: not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known. (2) That which you say here is wrong, namely, that (1) we ought to say “the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”, and (2) we ought not to say: “not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known”.</p>
<p>If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted either.</p>
<p>In affirming (2), while denying (1), you are wrong.</p>
<h4>The Fourfold Refutation</h4>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.3' href='#pts-cs1.1.3'>PTS cs 1.1.3</a><span class='add'>Puggalavādin (continues):</span> But if you imagine we ought to affirm that (1) the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but we ought not also to affirm that (2) the “person” is not known in the same way as <span class='add'>any</span> real and ultimate fact <span class='add'>is known</span>, then you, who have actually assented to the very proposition contained in that negative question, must certainly be refuted in the following manner: let us then refute you, for you are well refuted! </p>
<ol type="I">
<li>If (1) the “person” is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should have said <span class='add'>as well</span> that (2) the “person” is not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.</li>
<li>What you affirm is false, namely, that the former statement (1) should be affirmed, but that the latter (2) should not be affirmed.</li>
</ol>
<p>If the latter statement (2) is not to be affirmed, then neither truly can the former (1) be affirmed.</p>
<p>That which you say here—(1) should be affirmed, but not (2); this statement of yours is wrong.</p>
<h4>The Fourfold Application<a class='pc' id='pc11' href='#pc11'></a></h4>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.4' href='#pts-cs1.1.4'>PTS cs 1.1.4</a><span class='add'>Puggalavādin (continues):</span> If this be a faulty refutation, look at the parallel procedure in your own argument (<a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.1'>PTS CS 1.1.1</a>). Thus, according to us (1) was true (the person is known, etc.); but (2) was not true (… known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted. <span class='add'>You say</span> you have refuted us; anyway we are not well refuted. Your argument ran that if we affirmed (1), we must also affirm (2); that if we did not admit the truth of (2), neither could we admit the truth of (1); that we were wrong in assenting to (1), while denying (2).</p>
<h4>The Fourfold Conclusion</h4>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.5' href='#pts-cs1.1.5'>PTS cs 1.1.5</a><span class='add'>Puggalavādin (continues):</span> Nay (I repeat), we are not to be refuted thus, </p>
<ol type="I">
<li>namely, that my proposition compels me to assent to your “known in the same way”, etc.; </li>
<li>your pronouncement that my proposition (1) coupled with my rejection (2) is wrong;</li>
<li>that if I reject (2), I must also reject (1); </li>
<li>that I must affirm both or none. </li>
</ol>
<p>This refutation of yours is badly done. I maintain, on the other hand, that my rejoinder was well done, and that my sequel to the argument was well done.</p>
<h3>The Second Refutation</h3>
<h4>The Fivefold Adverse Controversy</h4>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.6' href='#pts-cs1.1.6'>PTS cs 1.1.6</a><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> No, it is not known …<span class='pe'><em>continue as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.1'>PTS CS 1.1.1</a>, reversing the speakers, and substituting</em> “not known” <em>for</em> “known”.</span></p>
<h4>The Fourfold Rejoinder</h4>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc12' href='#pc12'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.7' href='#pts-cs1.1.7'>PTS cs 1.1.7</a>Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes …<span class='pe'><em>continue as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.2'>PTS CS 1.1.2</a>, reversing the speakers, and substituting</em> “known” <em>for</em> “not known”.</span></p>
<h4>The Fourfold Refutation</h4>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.8' href='#pts-cs1.1.8'>PTS cs 1.1.8</a>But if you imagine we ought to affirm that “the person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but that we ought not to affirm as well that the person is known in the same way as <span class='add'>any other</span> real and ultimate fact <span class='add'>is known</span>, etc.…<span class='pe'><em>continue as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.3'>PTS CS 1.1.3</a>, reversing the speakers, and substituting</em> “known” <em>for</em> “not known”.</span></p>
<h4>The Fourfold Application</h4>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin (continues):</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.9' href='#pts-cs1.1.9'>PTS cs 1.1.9</a>If this be a faulty refutation, look at the parallel procedure in your own argument (<a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.6'>PTS CS 1.1.6</a>). Thus, according to us (a) was true (a soul is not known, etc.); but (b) was not true (… not known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted, etc.</p>
<h4>The Fourfold Conclusion.</h4>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin: (continues):</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.10' href='#pts-cs1.1.10'>PTS cs 1.1.10</a>Nay, I repeat, we are not to be refuted as you claim to have refuted us … wherefore your refutation was ill done, etc.</p>
<h3>The Third Refutation</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.11' href='#pts-cs1.1.11'>PTS cs 1.1.11</a>Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc13' href='#pc13'></a>It is.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the person known <em>everywhere</em> in that sense?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Acknowledge the refutation: If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you ought to admit that the person is known in that sense everywhere. You are wrong to admit the one proposition (A) and deny the other (C). If (C) is false, (A) is also false.</p>
<h3>The Fourth Refutation</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.12' href='#pts-cs1.1.12'>PTS cs 1.1.12</a>Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> It is.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the person known <span class='add'>always</span> in that sense?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … <span class='pe'><em>continue as above, substituting</em> “always” <em>for</em> “everywhere”.</span></p>
<h3>The Fifth Refutation</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.13' href='#pts-cs1.1.13'>PTS cs 1.1.13</a>Is the person known … <span class='pe'><em>as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.11'>PTS CS 1.1.11</a></em></span> …<em>in everything</em> in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? <span class='pe'><em>continue as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.11'>PTS CS 1.1.11</a>, substituting</em> “in everything” <em>for</em> “everywhere”.</span></p>
<h3>The Sixth Refutation</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc14' href='#pc14'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.14' href='#pts-cs1.1.14'>PTS cs 1.1.14</a>Is the person <em>not</em> known … <span class='pe'><em>otherwise as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.11'>PTS CS 1.1.11</a></em></span> … everywhere in that sense? … <span class='pe'><em>substituting</em> “not known” <em>for</em> “known”.</span></p>
<h3>The Seventh Refutation</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.15' href='#pts-cs1.1.15'>PTS cs 1.1.15</a>Is the person <em>not</em> known … always in that sense? …</p>
<h3>The Eighth Refutation</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.16' href='#pts-cs1.1.16'>PTS cs 1.1.16</a>Is the person not known … in everything that sense? …</p>
<h2>Comparative Inquiry</h2>
<h3>Comparison with other Realities, simply treated</h3>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.17' href='#pts-cs1.1.17'>PTS cs 1.1.17</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, and is material quality also known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is material quality one thing and the person another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Acknowledge the refutation: If the person and material quality be each known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that they are distinct things. You are wrong to <a class='pc' id='pc15' href='#pc15'></a> admit the former proposition and not the latter. If the latter cannot be admitted, neither should the former be affirmed. To say that the person and material quality are both known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, but that they are not mutually distinct things, is false.</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>The same form of controversy is then pursued concerning fifty-five other real and ultimate facts, or aspects of them, namely:</em></span></p>
<ul>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.18' href='#pts-cs1.1.18'>PTS cs 1.1.18</a> feeling</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.19' href='#pts-cs1.1.19'>PTS cs 1.1.19</a> perception & & the other aggregates</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.20' href='#pts-cs1.1.20'>PTS cs 1.1.20</a> coefficients (<i>sankhāras</i>)</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.21' href='#pts-cs1.1.21'>PTS cs 1.1.21</a> consciousness</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.22' href='#pts-cs1.1.22'>PTS cs 1.1.22</a> the organ of sight</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.23' href='#pts-cs1.1.23'>PTS cs 1.1.23</a> the organ of hearing</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.24' href='#pts-cs1.1.24'>PTS cs 1.1.24</a> the organ of smell</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.25' href='#pts-cs1.1.25'>PTS cs 1.1.25</a> the organ of taste</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.26' href='#pts-cs1.1.26'>PTS cs 1.1.26</a> the organ of touch</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.27' href='#pts-cs1.1.27'>PTS cs 1.1.27</a> visible object</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.28' href='#pts-cs1.1.28'>PTS cs 1.1.28</a> sound</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.29' href='#pts-cs1.1.29'>PTS cs 1.1.29</a> odour</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.30' href='#pts-cs1.1.30'>PTS cs 1.1.30</a> taste</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.31' href='#pts-cs1.1.31'>PTS cs 1.1.31</a> tangible object</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.32' href='#pts-cs1.1.32'>PTS cs 1.1.32</a> mind (<i>sensus communis</i>)</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.33' href='#pts-cs1.1.33'>PTS cs 1.1.33</a> cognizable object</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.34' href='#pts-cs1.1.34'>PTS cs 1.1.34</a> eye as subjective element</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.35-38' href='#pts-cs1.1.35-38'>PTS cs 1.1.35–38</a> ear, nose, tongue, body as subjective element</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.39-43' href='#pts-cs1.1.39-43'>PTS cs 1.1.39–43</a> sights, sounds, odours, tastes, touches as objective element</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.44-48' href='#pts-cs1.1.44-48'>PTS cs 1.1.44–48</a> visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile cognition as subjective element</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.49' href='#pts-cs1.1.49'>PTS cs 1.1.49</a> mind as subjective element</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.50' href='#pts-cs1.1.50'>PTS cs 1.1.50</a> mind-cognizing as subjective element</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.51' href='#pts-cs1.1.51'>PTS cs 1.1.51</a> cognizables as objective element</li>
<li><a class='pc' id='pc16' href='#pc16'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.52-57' href='#pts-cs1.1.52-57'>PTS cs 1.1.52–57</a> the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind as controlling power</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.58-60' href='#pts-cs1.1.58-60'>PTS cs 1.1.58–60</a> female sex, male sex, life as controlling power</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.61-65' href='#pts-cs1.1.61-65'>PTS cs 1.1.61–65</a> pleasure, pain, joy, grief, hedonic indifference as controlling power</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.66-70' href='#pts-cs1.1.66-70'>PTS cs 1.1.66–70</a> the controlling powers: faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding</li>
<li><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.71-73' href='#pts-cs1.1.71-73'>PTS cs 1.1.71–73</a>the controlling powers <span class='add'>known as</span> (i.) the thought, “I shall come to know the unknown”, (ii.) the coming to know, (iii.) the having known</li>
</ul>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.74' href='#pts-cs1.1.74'>PTS cs 1.1.74</a><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> It is not.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Did the Exalted One say: “There is the person who works for his own good”? And is material quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is material quality one thing and the person another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot be truly said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Acknowledge this rejoinder: If the Exalted One said: “There is the person who works for his own good”, and if material quality be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that material quality and the person are two distinct things. You are wrong in admitting the truth of the former statement while you deny that of the latter. If material quality and person are not two distinct facts, then neither can you also say that the Exalted One predicated anything concerning a “person”. Your position is false.</p>
<p><a class='pc' id='pc17' href='#pc17'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.75-129' href='#pts-cs1.1.75-129'>PTS cs 1.1.75–129</a><span class='pe'><em>The controversy is now repeated with the successive substitution of each of the real and ultimate facts named in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.18'>PTS CS 1.1.18</a>–<a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.71-73'>PTS CS 1.1.73</a> for</em> “material quality”.</span></p>
<h3>Comparison with other Realities continued by Way of Analogy</h3>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.130' href='#pts-cs1.1.130'>PTS cs 1.1.130</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Material quality is (you have admitted) known as a real and ultimate fact. Feeling, too, is known as such. Now, is material quality one thing and feeling another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the person known also in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, as material quality is known?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then, is material quality one thing, person another thing?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Acknowledge the refutation: If material quality and feeling are both known as real and ultimate facts, and yet are two different things, then analogously, if the person and material quality are both known as real and ultimate facts, they, good sir, can equally be two different things. Your position in admitting the first pair of propositions, but not the second pair, is false. If you cannot admit the second pair, neither should you have admitted the first pair. Your position is false.</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.131-133' href='#pts-cs1.1.131-133'>PTS cs 1.1.131–133</a><span class='pe'><em>The same argument is then applied to the case of each of the other three</em> khandhas, <em>substituted for</em> feeling.</span></p>
<p><span class='pe'><em>The <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.134' href='#pts-cs1.1.134'>PTS cs 1.1.134</a> permutations of the five aggregates (<em>khandhas</em>) are proceeded with as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.130'>PTS CS 1.1.130</a>, <em>thus:</em></em></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Material quality and feeling</li>
<li>the person and material quality</li>
</ul>
<p><span class='add'><em>are replaced by</em>:</span></p>
<ul>
<li>feeling and perception</li>
<li>The person and feeling</li>
</ul>
<p><span class='add'><em>next by</em>:</span></p>
<ul>
<li>feeling and the coefficients</li>
<li>the person and feeling</li>
</ul>
<p><span class='add'><em>next by</em>:</span></p>
<ul>
<li>feeling and consciousness</li>
<li>the person and feeling</li>
</ul>
<p><span class='add'><em>after which</em> perception, <a class='pc' id='pc18' href='#pc18'></a> coefficients, <em>and</em> consciousness <em>in their turn replace</em> feeling.</span></p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.135' href='#pts-cs1.1.135'>PTS cs 1.1.135</a><span class='add'><em>Next each of the</em> 12 Āyatanas, <em>the</em> 18 Dhātus, <em>and the</em> 22 Indriyas <em>is used in turn to illustrate the analogy, thus:</em></span></p>
<ul>
<li>organ of sight and organ of hearing</li>
<li>the person and organ of sight</li>
</ul>
<p><span class='add'><em>etc. is the first grouping in the Āyatana-analogies, the last grouping in the Indriya-analogies being:</em></span></p>
<ul>
<li>the controlling power of “one who has come to know,” and that of “the coming to know,”</li>
<li>the person and the controlling power of “one who has come to know.”</li>
</ul>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.136' href='#pts-cs1.1.136'>PTS cs 1.1.136</a>Material quality is known <span class='add'>you have admitted</span> in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Is material quality one thing, feeling another thing?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the person who works for his own good”? And is material quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <span class='add'>Well then, </span> is material quality one thing, the person another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Acknowledge the rejoinder: If material quality and feeling are known as real, ultimate facts, and are different things, then why are not “the person”—a term used by the Exalted One—and material quality also two different things? Your position is false. You admit the truth of the first pair of propositions, but not that of the analogous second pair. If you deny the truth of the second pair, you should not admit the truth of the analogous first pair.</p>
<p><span class='pe'><em>The discourse may be completed as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.3'>PTS CS 1.1.3</a>–<a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.6'>PTS CS 1.1.6</a>.</em></span></p>
<p><a class='pc' id='pc19' href='#pc19'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.137' href='#pts-cs1.1.137'>PTS cs 1.1.137</a><span class='add'><em>The “wheel” (<i>cakka</i>) of all the other ultimate facts—other khandhas, āyatanas, etc.—now revolves about this quotation, as it revolved in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.131'>PTS CS 1.1.131</a>–<a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.135'>PTS CS 1.1.135</a>.</em></span></p>
<h3><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.138' href='#pts-cs1.1.138'>PTS cs 1.1.138</a>Comparison by the Fourfold Method</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> (i.) Is material quality the person?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Acknowledge the refutation: If the former proposition is true, you should also, good sir, have admitted the latter. If you cannot affirm that material quality is the person, neither should you have admitted that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Your position is false.</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.139' href='#pts-cs1.1.139'>PTS cs 1.1.139</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> You admit the former proposition, (ii.) Now, is the person <span class='add'>known as being</span> in material quality? (iii.) Is it known as being apart from material quality? (iv.) Is material quality known as being in the person?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Acknowledge the refutation: If the person is indeed known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good sir, you should also have admitted one of these other three propositions. Your position is false. If you cannot admit any one of those three propositions <span class='add'>as to where or how the person is known</span>, then indeed, good sir, you should not assent to the original proposition—that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.140-141' href='#pts-cs1.1.140-141'>PTS cs 1.1.140–141</a><span class='add'><em>The “wheel” is then turned for all the remaining</em> “real and ultimate facts” <em>in relation to</em> “person”… is <a class='pc' id='pc20' href='#pc20'></a> feeling the person? … is the person … in feeling? … apart from feeling? … is feeling … in the person? … is the organ of sight the person? … <em>and so on</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.142' href='#pts-cs1.1.142'>PTS cs 1.1.142</a>Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> It is not so known.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> (i.) Is material quality the person?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Acknowledge the rejoinder: If the person is not so known as you state, then you should have admitted that material quality and person are the same. If you cannot admit the latter proposition, neither can you assert the former … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.143' href='#pts-cs1.1.143'>PTS cs 1.1.143</a>Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> It is not so known.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> (ii.) Is the person known as being in material quality? (iii.) Or as being apart from material quality? (iv.) Or is material quality known as being in the person?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Acknowledge the rejoinder: If the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good sir, you should admit that it is known <span class='add'>in association with material quality</span> as advanced in the other propositions. If one of these cannot be admitted, neither should you have asserted the first proposition.</p>
<p><span class='pe'><em>This and the preceding paragraph may be completed as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.3'>PTS CS 1.1.3</a>–<a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.6'>PTS CS 1.1.6</a>.</em></span></p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.144-145' href='#pts-cs1.1.144-145'>PTS cs 1.1.144–145</a><span class='pe'><em>The “wheel” is then turned as indicated in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.140'>PTS CS 1.1.140</a>–<a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.141'>PTS CS 1.1.141</a>.</em></span></p>
<h3>Associated Characteristics</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc21' href='#pc21'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.146' href='#pts-cs1.1.146'>PTS cs 1.1.146</a>Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is “the person” related, or is it absolute? Is “the person” conditioned, or is it unconditioned? Is it eternal? or is it temporal? Has it external features? or is it without any?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about it … <span class='pe'><em>Continue as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.1'>PTS CS 1.1.1</a>:</em></span> “Acknowledge the refutation”, etc.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.147' href='#pts-cs1.1.147'>PTS cs 1.1.147</a>Is “the person” unknown in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> It is.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the person who works for his own good” …?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is the person related, or is it absolute? conditioned or unconditioned? eternal or temporal? with the marks or without them?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about it.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Acknowledge, etc.… <span class='pe'><em>complete as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.2'>PTS CS 1.1.2</a> and in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.3'>PTS CS 1.1.3</a>–<a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.6'>PTS CS 1.1.6</a></em>.</span></p>
<h3>To clear the Meaning of the Terms</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc22' href='#pc22'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.148' href='#pts-cs1.1.148'>PTS cs 1.1.148</a>Is “the person” known, and conversely, is that which is known the person? </p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> The person is known. Conversely, of that which is known some is “person”, some is not “person”.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Do you admit this with respect to the subject also: of that which is person, is some known and some not known?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. <span class='pe'><em>continue as before</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.149' href='#pts-cs1.1.149'>PTS cs 1.1.149</a>Does “person” mean a reality and conversely?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> “Person” is a reality. Conversely, reality means in part person, in part not person.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Do you admit this with respect to the subject also: that “person means in part reality, in part non-reality”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.150' href='#pts-cs1.1.150'>PTS cs 1.1.150</a>Does the person exist, and conversely?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> The person exists. Conversely, of the existent some is person, some is not person.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Of the person is some existent, some non-existent?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.151' href='#pts-cs1.1.151'>PTS cs 1.1.151</a>Query repeated with an equivalent major term.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.152' href='#pts-cs1.1.152'>PTS cs 1.1.152</a>Is person something that is, and conversely?</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>Reply similar to the foregoing.</em></span> </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc23' href='#pc23'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.153' href='#pts-cs1.1.153'>PTS cs 1.1.153</a>Does the person exist, and conversely, is that which exists <span class='add'>not all</span> person?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Can you substitute “not exist(s)” for “exist(s)”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> No …</p>
<h3>Inquiry into Term-or-Concept</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.154' href='#pts-cs1.1.154'>PTS cs 1.1.154</a>Is one who has material quality in the sphere of matter a “person”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire “a person”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Are those who have material qualities in the sphere of matter “persons”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Are those who experience desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire “persons”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc24' href='#pc24'></a>Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is one who is without material qualities in the sphere of the Immaterial a “person”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire a person?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Are those who have no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere “persons”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Are those who experience sense-desires in the sphere of of sense-desire “persons”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.155' href='#pts-cs1.1.155'>PTS cs 1.1.155</a>According to you one who has material qualities in the sphere of matter is a “person”; one who has no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere is a “person”: does anyone deceasing from the Rūpa sphere get reborn in the Immaterial sphere?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the “person” who had material qualities <span class='add'>then</span> annihilated, and does the person with no material qualities come into being?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be admitted. </p>
<p><span class='pe'><em>Queries repeated, substituting</em> “being” <em>for</em> “person”.</span></p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.156' href='#pts-cs1.1.156'>PTS cs 1.1.156</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Applying the terms “physical frame” and “body” indiscriminately to our body, are these identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc25' href='#pc25'></a>Are the terms “personal entity”, or “soul”, as applied without distinction to the individual, identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is “physical frame” different from “personal entity” (or “individual”)?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is “soul” one thing, “body” another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Acknowledge the refutation: If there be this identity and coincidence between “physical frame” and “body”; and if there be this identity and coincidence between “individual” (or personal entity) and “soul”; if, further, “physical frame” is different from “individual” (or personal entity), then indeed, good sir, it should also have been admitted that “soul” is different from “body”.</p>
<p>You are wrong in</p>
<ol>
<li>admitting the identity between “physical frame” and “body”, </li>
<li>admitting the identity between “personal entity” and “soul”, </li>
<li>admitting the difference between “physical frame” and “personal entity”, while</li>
<li>you deny the difference between “body” and “soul”.</li>
</ol>
<p>If you cannot admit (4), neither should you have admitted (1), (2), (3). You cannot admit (1), (2), (3), while denying (4).</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.157' href='#pts-cs1.1.157'>PTS cs 1.1.157</a><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Are the terms “physical frame” and “body” applied to body without distinction of meaning, identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the individual <span class='add'>or person</span> who works for his own good”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc26' href='#pc26'></a>Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is “physical frame” one thing, “individual” (or “personal entity”) another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Acknowledge my rejoinder: If there be this identity and coincidence between “physical frame” and “body” and if it was said by the Exalted One “There is the individual, etc.”… then indeed, good sir, it should also have been admitted that “physical frame” is one thing and “individual” or “personal entity” another. You are wrong in admitting the first two propositions and denying the third. If you cannot admit the third, neither should you have admitted the first two … <span class='pe'><em>complete the discourse as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.3'>PTS CS 1.1.3</a>–<a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.6'>PTS CS 1.1.6</a></em>.</span></p>
<h3>Examination continued by way of Rebirth</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.158' href='#pts-cs1.1.158'>PTS cs 1.1.158</a>Does (a person or) soul run on (or transmigrate) from this world to another and from another world to this?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p>% Dialogues, i. 46 f. points to Annihilationists.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is it the identical soul who transmigrates from this world to another and from another world to this?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot be truly said … <span class='pe'><em>complete as above</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then is it a different soul who transmigrates …</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … <span class='pe'><em>complete as above</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then is it both the identical and also a different soul who transmigrates …?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc27' href='#pc27'></a>Then is it neither the identical soul, nor yet a different soul who transmigrates …?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is it the identical, a different, both identical and also different, neither identical, nor different soul who transmigrates …?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.159' href='#pts-cs1.1.159'>PTS cs 1.1.159</a>Then is it wrong to say, “The soul transmigrates from this world to another world, and from another world to this”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Was it not said by the Exalted One: </p>
<blockquote class='gatha'>
<p>“When he hath run from birth to birth<br>
Seven times and reached the last, that soul<br>
Endmaker shall become of ill,<br>
By wearing every fetter down”?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Then surely the soul does transmigrate from this world to another world and from another world to this. Again <span class='add'>(repeating his first question)</span> was it not said by the Exalted One: </p>
<p>“Without a known beginning, O <i>bhikkhus</i>, is the way of life ever renewed; unrevealed is the origin of souls (lit. beings) who, shrouded in ignorance and bound by the fetters of natural desire, run on transmigrating”.</p>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Then surely the soul does transmigrate as was said.</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.160' href='#pts-cs1.1.160'>PTS cs 1.1.160</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Does the soul transmigrate from this world, etc.?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Does the identical soul so transmigrate?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc28' href='#pc28'></a>Nay, that cannot truly be said … <span class='pe'><em>complete as usual</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there any soul who after being human becomes a <i>deva</i>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the identical man the <i>deva</i>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … <span class='pe'><em>complete as usual</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <span class='add'>I repeat</span>, is the identical man the <i>deva</i>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Now you are wrong to admit as true that, having been man he becomes <i>deva</i>, or having been <i>deva</i> he becomes man, and again that, having become man, a <i>deva</i> is different from a human being, <span class='add'>and yet</span> that this identical soul transmigrates …</p>
<p>Surely if the identical soul, without <span class='add'>becoming</span> different, transmigrates when deceasing hence to another world, there will then be no dying; destruction of life will cease to take place. There is action (<i>karma</i>); there is action's effect; there is the result of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the very same <span class='add'>person</span> transmigrates—this is wrong.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.161' href='#pts-cs1.1.161'>PTS cs 1.1.161</a>Does the self-same soul transmigrate from this world to another, from another world to this?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc29' href='#pc29'></a>Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there anyone who, having been human, becomes a Yakkha, a Peta, an inmate of purgatory, a beast, for example a camel, an ox, a mule, a pig, a buffalo?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Does the self-same human become anyone of these, say, a buffalo?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … <span class='pe'><em>complete the refutation as usual</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <span class='add'>I repeat</span> is the self-same human the buffalo?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <span class='add'>But all this, namely, that</span> having been man, he becomes a buffalo, or having been buffalo he becomes man, again, that having become a man, he is quite different from the buffalo, and yet that the self-same soul goes on transmigrating, is wrong … <span class='pe'><em>complete as usual</em>.</span></p>
<p>Surely if the identical soul, when deceasing from this world and being reborn in another, is nowise different, then there will be no dying, nor will taking life be possible. There is action; there is action's effect; there is the result of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the identical person transmigrates—this is wrong.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.162' href='#pts-cs1.1.162'>PTS cs 1.1.162</a>You say that the identical soul transmigrates. Is there anyone who having been a noble becomes a brahmin?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the noble in question the very same as the brahmin in question?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … <span class='pe'><em>complete the discourse</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there anyone who, having been noble, becomes reborn in the middle, or in the lower class?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the noble in question the very same as the person so reborn?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='pe'><em>The other alternatives, substituting “brahmin”, etc., in turn for “noble”, are treated similarly</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc30' href='#pc30'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.163' href='#pts-cs1.1.163'>PTS cs 1.1.163</a>You say that the identical soul transmigrates … Is then one who has had hand or foot cut off, or hand and foot, or ear or nose, or both cut off, or finger or thumb cut off, or who is hamstrung, the same as he was before? Or is one whose fingers are bent or webbed the same as he was before? Or is one afflicted with leprosy, skin disease, dry leprosy, consumption, epilepsy, the same as he was before? Or is <span class='add'>one who has become</span> a camel, ox, mule, pig, buffalo, the same as he was before?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.164' href='#pts-cs1.1.164'>PTS cs 1.1.164</a>Is it wrong to say: “The identical soul transmigrates from this world to another, etc.”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> But is not one who has “attained the stream” (i.e., the first path towards salvation), when he is deceasing from the world of men, and is reborn in the world of <i>deva</i>s, a stream-winner there also?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> But if this man, reborn as <i>deva</i>, is a stream-winner also in that world, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say: “The identical soul transmigrates from this world to another”…</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Assuming that one who has attained the stream, when deceasing from the world of men, is reborn in the world of <i>devas</i>, does the identical soul transmigrate from this world to another and from another world to this in just that manner?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is such a stream-winner, when reborn in <i>deva</i>-world, a man there also?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … <span class='pe'><em>complete the “refutation”</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.165' href='#pts-cs1.1.165'>PTS cs 1.1.165</a>Does the identical soul transmigrate from this world to another, etc.?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc31' href='#pc31'></a>Is the transmigrator not different, still present?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat, is the transmigrator not different, still present?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> If he has lost a hand, a foot,… if he is diseased … if he is an animal … is he the same as before?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … <span class='pe'><em>complete</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.166' href='#pts-cs1.1.166'>PTS cs 1.1.166</a>Does the identical soul transmigrate? …</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Does he transmigrate with his corporeal qualities?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <span class='add'>Think again I</span> Does he transmigrate with these?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Are soul and body the same?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said …</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Does he transmigrate with feeling, with perception, with mental coefficients, with consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Think again … does he transmigrate with consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is soul the same as body?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.167' href='#pts-cs1.1.167'>PTS cs 1.1.167</a>If, as you say, the identical soul transmigrates,… does he transmigrate without corporeal qualities, without feeling, perception, mental coefficients, without consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc32' href='#pc32'></a>Think again … without corporeal qualities … without consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is then the soul one thing, the body another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.168' href='#pts-cs1.1.168'>PTS cs 1.1.168</a>If, as you say, the identical soul transmigrates,… do the material qualities transmigrate?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Think again … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But is this soul (x) the same as this body (x)?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Does feeling … or perception … or do mental coefficients … or does consciousness transmigrate?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Think again … does consciousness transmigrate?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But is this soul (x) the same as this body (x)?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.169' href='#pts-cs1.1.169'>PTS cs 1.1.169</a>Then, the identical soul, according to you, transmigrating … does none of the above-named five aggregates transmigrate?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Think again … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes, they do.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is, then, soul one thing, body another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<blockquote class='gatha'><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.170' href='#pts-cs1.1.170'>PTS cs 1.1.170</a>
<p>At dissolution of each aggregate.<br>
If then the “person” doth disintegrate,<br>
Lo! by the Buddha shunned, the Nihilistic creed.<br>
At dissolution of each aggregate.<br>
If then the “soul” doth not disintegrate.<br>
Eternal, like <i>Nibbāna</i>, were the soul indeed.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Derivatives</h2>
<h3>Examination Continued by Way of Derivative Concepts</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc33' href='#pc33'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.171' href='#pts-cs1.1.171'>PTS cs 1.1.171</a>Is the concept of soul derived from the corporeal qualities?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Are material qualities impermanent, conditioned, do they happen through a cause? Are they liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But has soul also any or all of these qualities? </p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.172' href='#pts-cs1.1.172'>PTS cs 1.1.172</a>Or is the concept of soul derived from feeling, from perception, from mental coefficients, from consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes (<span class='add'>to each “aggregate” in succession</span>).</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is any mental aggregate impermanent, conditioned? does it happen through a cause? is it liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But has soul also any or all of these qualities?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.173' href='#pts-cs1.1.173'>PTS cs 1.1.173</a>You said that the concept of soul is derived from material qualities. Is the concept of blue-green soul derived from blue-green material qualities?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Or is the concept of yellow, red, white, visible, invisible, resisting, or unresisting soul derived from corresponding material qualities, respectively?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.174' href='#pts-cs1.1.174'>PTS cs 1.1.174</a>Is the concept of soul derived from feeling?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc34' href='#pc34'></a>Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the concept of good soul derived from good feeling?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Now, does feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result, and such as conveys happiness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> No.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But does “good soul” entail result or fruit of like nature with the above?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.175' href='#pts-cs1.1.175'>PTS cs 1.1.175</a>If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is the concept of bad soul derived from bad feeling?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Now does bad feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is undesirable, unpleasing, spotted, an unhappy result, and such as conveys unhappiness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But does bad soul entail result or fruit of like nature to the above?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.176' href='#pts-cs1.1.176'>PTS cs 1.1.176</a>If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is the concept of indeterminate soul—one to be termed neither good nor bad—derived from indeterminate feeling?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the concept <span class='add'>I repeat</span> of an ethically indeterminate soul derived from an ethically indeterminate feeling?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc35' href='#pc35'></a>Is indeterminate feeling impermanent, conditioned? Does it happen through a cause? Is it liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Has an ethically indeterminate soul any or all of these qualities?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.177' href='#pts-cs1.1.177'>PTS cs 1.1.177</a>Is the concept of soul derived from any of the other three aggregates: perception, mental coefficients, consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <span class='add'>Taking the last</span>: is the concept of good soul derived from good consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Now does good consciousness entail result or fruit—fruit that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result, such as conveys happiness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> And does a good soul also entail the like?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.178' href='#pts-cs1.1.178'>PTS cs 1.1.178</a>You say that the concept of soul is derived from consciousness—is the concept of bad soul derived from bad consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <span class='add'>I repeat</span> is the concept of bad soul derived from bad consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Now does bad consciousness entail result or fruit, fruit that is undesirable, etc. (the reverse of what is entailed by good consciousness)?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> And does a bad soul also entail the like?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.179' href='#pts-cs1.1.179'>PTS cs 1.1.179</a>Again, since you admit that the concept of soul is derived from any or all of the aggregates, <span class='add'>e.g.</span>, conscious<a class='pc' id='pc36' href='#pc36'></a>ness, is the concept of an ethically indeterminate soul derived from indeterminate consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But is the ethically indeterminate soul impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish … to change?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.180' href='#pts-cs1.1.180'>PTS cs 1.1.180</a>Ought it to be said that a soul who sees is derived from sight (or eye)?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Ought it to be said that, when sight (or eye) ceases, the seeing soul ceases? </p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>The pair of queries is applied, with like replies, to the other four senses, and also to the</em> <i>sensus communis</i>, <i>mano</i>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.181' href='#pts-cs1.1.181'>PTS cs 1.1.181</a>Ought it to be said that a soul of wrong views is derived from wrong views?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Ought it to be said that when the wrong views cease to exist, the soul having wrong views ceases to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said …</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Ought it, again, to be said that when any other parts of the Wrong Eightfold Path cease to exist, the soul, said by you to be derived from that part, ceases to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.182' href='#pts-cs1.1.182'>PTS cs 1.1.182</a>Similarly, ought it to be said that a soul of right views, or right aspiration, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right concentration, is derived from the corresponding part <span class='add'>of the Eightfold Path</span>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc37' href='#pc37'></a>Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Ought it, again, to be said that when the given part ceases, the soul so derived ceases?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.183' href='#pts-cs1.1.183'>PTS cs 1.1.183</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the concept of soul derived from material qualities and feeling?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then could the concept of a double soul be derived from the pair of aggregates?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Or could the concept of a double soul be derived from material quality coupled with any of the other three aggregates … or the concept of five souls be derived from all five aggregates?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.184' href='#pts-cs1.1.184'>PTS cs 1.1.184</a>Is the concept of soul derived from the organs of sight (eye) and hearing (ear)?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then could the concept “two souls” be derived from the two organs? … <span class='pe'><em>and so on as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.183'>PTS CS 1.1.183</a>, to include all the twelve āyatanas—i.e., organs and objects of sense and the organ and object of sense co-ordination,</em> <i>mano</i>, <i>dhammā.</i></span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.185' href='#pts-cs1.1.185'>PTS cs 1.1.185</a>Is the concept of soul derived from the elements of sight (or eye) and hearing (or ear)?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Could the concept of a double soul be derived from these two?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the concept of soul derived from the element of sight and any other of the eighteen elements?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc38' href='#pc38'></a>Could the concept of eighteen souls be derived from the eighteen elements?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot be truly said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.186' href='#pts-cs1.1.186'>PTS cs 1.1.186</a>Is the concept of soul derived from the controlling powers—eye and ear?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Could the concept of a double soul be derived from these two?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Could the concept of soul be derived from the controlling power, eye, and from any other of the twenty-two controlling powers?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Could the concept of twenty-two souls be derived from these?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.187' href='#pts-cs1.1.187'>PTS cs 1.1.187</a>Is the concept of one soul derived from the becoming of one aggregate?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Could the concept of four souls be derived from the becoming of the four (mental) aggregates?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Or again, by your assenting to the former question, could the concept of five souls be derived from the becoming of the five aggregates (mental and bodily)?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.188' href='#pts-cs1.1.188'>PTS cs 1.1.188</a>Is there only one soul in the becoming of one aggregate?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then are five souls in the becoming of all five aggregates?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc39' href='#pc39'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.189' href='#pts-cs1.1.189'>PTS cs 1.1.189</a>Is the concept of soul derived from material qualities just as the idea of shadow is derived from a tree? And just as the idea of its shadow is derived from the tree, and both tree and shadow are impermanent, is it even so that the concept of soul is derived from material qualities, both soul and material qualities being impermanent?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Are material qualities one thing and the concept of soul derived therefrom another, in the same way as the tree is one thing, and the idea of shadow derived from it another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.190' href='#pts-cs1.1.190'>PTS cs 1.1.190</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the concept of soul derived from material qualities just as the notion “villager” is derived from village? And if that is so, is material quality one thing, soul another, just as village is one thing, villager another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.191' href='#pts-cs1.1.191'>PTS cs 1.1.191</a>Or—just as a kingdom is one thing, a king another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.192' href='#pts-cs1.1.192'>PTS cs 1.1.192</a>A jail is not a jailer, but a jailer is he who has the jail. Is it just so with material qualities and one who has them? And accordingly, just as the jail is one thing, the jailer another, are not material qualities one thing, and one who has them another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<h2>Consciousness</h2>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.193' href='#pts-cs1.1.193'>PTS cs 1.1.193</a>Is there the notion of soul to each <span class='add'>moment of</span> consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc40' href='#pc40'></a>Does the soul undergo birth, decay, death, disease and rebirth in each <span class='add'>moment of</span> consciousness?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.194' href='#pts-cs1.1.194'>PTS cs 1.1.194</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> When the second <span class='add'>moment of</span> consciousness in a process of thought arises, is it wrong to say: “It is the same, or something different”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes. </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then, when the second moment arises, is it not also wrong to say: “It is a boy” or “it is a girl”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> It may be so said.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Now acknowledge the refutation: If at the second moment of consciousness it could not be said, “It is the same or something different”, then indeed, good sir, neither can it be said, at that moment, that “It is a boy, or a girl”. What you say, namely, that the former may not, the latter may be affirmed, is false. If the former proposition may not be affirmed, the second cannot be affirmed. Your rejecting the one and accepting the other is wrong.</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.195' href='#pts-cs1.1.195'>PTS cs 1.1.195</a>According to you it is wrong to say, when the second moment of consciousness arises, “It is the same or something different”. Can it not then, at such a moment, be said: “It is male or female, layman or religious, man or <i>deva</i>”.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes, it can be … <span class='pe'><em>complete as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.194'>PTS CS 1.1.194</a></em>.</span></p>
<h2>The Five Senses</h2>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.196' href='#pts-cs1.1.196'>PTS cs 1.1.196</a>Is it wrong to say: “The soul or person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes, it is wrong.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc41' href='#pc41'></a>Is it not the case that when someone sees something by means of something, a certain “he” sees a certain “it” by a certain “means”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> But if that is so, then surely it should be said that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses. Again:</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is it not the case that when someone knows something by means of something, a certain “he” knows a certain “it” by a certain “means”? If so, then surely it may be said that the person is known in a real and ultimate sense.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.197' href='#pts-cs1.1.197'>PTS cs 1.1.197</a>Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is it not the case that when someone does not see something by means of something, a certain “he” does not see a certain “it” by a certain “means”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then it is equally the case that the person is not known in a real and ultimate sense.</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses and cognition generally.</em></span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.198' href='#pts-cs1.1.198'>PTS cs 1.1.198</a>Is it wrong to say the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Was it not said by the Exalted One: </p>
<p>“O <i>bhikkhus</i>, I see beings deceasing and being reborn by the purified vision of the eye celestial, surpassing that of men. I discern beings in spheres sublime or base, fair or frightful, of happy or woeful <a class='pc' id='pc42' href='#pc42'></a> doom, faring according to their actions”?</p>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Surely then the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.199' href='#pts-cs1.1.199'>PTS cs 1.1.199</a>Granting that the Exalted One said that which is quoted, is that a reason for affirming that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Does the Exalted One, by the purified vision of the eye celestial surpassing that of man, see visible objects, and does he also see the person or soul? </p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> He sees visible objects.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Are visible objects the person? Do they end one life and reappear? Do they fare according to <i>Karma</i>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my former question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> He does see the person or soul.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is then the soul visible object? Is it object of sight, objective element of sight, blue, green, yellow, red, white? Is it cognizable by sight? Does it impinge on the eye? Does it enter the avenue of sight?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my former question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> He does see both.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Are both then visible objects? Both objective element of sight? Are both blue, green, yellow, red, white? Are both cognizable by sight? Do both impinge <a class='pc' id='pc43' href='#pc43'></a> on the eye? Do both enter the avenue of sight? Do both disappear, reappear in rebirths, faring according to <i>Karma</i>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<h2>Ethical Goodness</h2>
<h3>Examination continued by Reference to Human Action, called also “The Section on Ethical Goodness”</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.200' href='#pts-cs1.1.200'>PTS cs 1.1.200</a>Are ethically good and bad actions known <span class='add'>to exist</span>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Are both the doer of ethically good and bad deeds, and he who causes them to be done known <span class='add'>to exist</span>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … <span class='add'><em>complete in the usual way, viz., that the former admission involves acceptance of what is denied</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.201' href='#pts-cs1.1.201'>PTS cs 1.1.201</a>Admitting that ethically good and bad deeds are known <span class='add'>to exist</span>, do you assert that the doer and the instigator are also known <span class='add'>to exist</span>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then is he who made the doer, or inspired the instigator, known <span class='add'>to exist</span>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I ask you again.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But if the one be thus maker, etc., of the other, is there then no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life renewed, no final <i>Nibbāna</i> without residual stuff of life?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc44' href='#pc44'></a>Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> If good and bad deeds are known <span class='add'>to take place</span>, is the doer, is the instigator, of those deeds known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the person or soul known to exist, and his maker or inspirer also?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question: if good and bad deeds … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then is <i>Nibbāna</i> <span class='add'>also</span> known to exist, and the maker and the maker's maker as well?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then, again, if these things be as you say, is the earth known to exist, and its maker and <span class='add'>his</span> maker also?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Or the ocean?—or Sineru, chief of mountains?—or water?—or fire?—or air?—or grass, brush, and forest? and the maker of each and his maker also?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Again, if good and bad deeds being known to exist, doer and instigator are also known to exist, are those deeds one thing, and doer and instigator quite another thing?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.202' href='#pts-cs1.1.202'>PTS cs 1.1.202</a>Is the effect of ethically good and bad deeds known to take place? </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is one who experiences the effect of such deeds known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.203' href='#pts-cs1.1.203'>PTS cs 1.1.203</a>Admitting that both these propositions are true, is one who enjoys the first-named person known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat the question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc45' href='#pc45'></a>Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life renewed, no final <i>Nibbāna</i> without residual stuff of life?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Again, admitting both those propositions to be true, does the person exist, and the enjoyer of that person also exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Again, admitting both those propositions to be true, is <i>Nibbāna</i> known to exist, and one who experiences it also?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Or again, is the earth, the ocean, Sineru chief of mountains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and forest, known to exist, and one who experiences any of them known also to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Or <span class='add'>finally</span> is the result of ethically good and bad deeds one thing and he who experiences those results another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.204' href='#pts-cs1.1.204'>PTS cs 1.1.204</a><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is celestial happiness known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is one who is experiencing celestial happiness known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.205' href='#pts-cs1.1.205'>PTS cs 1.1.205</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Assuming both propositions to be true, is one who enjoys that experiencer known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc46' href='#pc46'></a>I repeat the question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life, no final <i>Nibbāna</i> without residual stuff of life?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Again, assuming both those propositions to be true, is the person known to exist and the enjoyer of the person also?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Again, assuming that celestial happiness and those enjoying it are both known to exist, is <i>Nibbāna</i> known, and one enjoying it known also to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Or again, assuming as before, are the earth, the ocean, Sineru chief of mountains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and forest known to exist and those enjoying them?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Or again, assuming as before, is celestial happiness one thing, the enjoyer another thing?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.206' href='#pts-cs1.1.206'>PTS cs 1.1.206</a>Is human happiness known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is the enjoyer of human happiness known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.207' href='#pts-cs1.1.207'>PTS cs 1.1.207</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is both human happiness and the enjoyer of it known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is one who enjoys the enjoyer known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life, no final <i>Nibbāna</i> without residual stuff of life?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='pe'><em>The dialogue is then completed, as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.205'>PTS CS 1.1.205</a>, on celestial happiness.</em></span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc47' href='#pc47'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.208' href='#pts-cs1.1.208'>PTS cs 1.1.208</a>Is the misery of the lower planes known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is the experiencer of that misery known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.209' href='#pts-cs1.1.209'>PTS cs 1.1.209</a>Do you admit both these propositions?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the enjoyer of the sufferer of that misery known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, etc.? <span class='pe'><em>complete in full as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.205'>PTS CS 1.1.205</a>, <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.207'>PTS CS 1.1.207</a></em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.210-211' href='#pts-cs1.1.210-211'>PTS cs 1.1.210–211</a>Is the misery of purgatory known? <span class='pe'><em>Complete as in <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.204'>PTS CS 1.1.204</a>, <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.205'>PTS CS 1.1.205</a>, <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.207'>PTS CS 1.1.207</a>.</em></span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.212' href='#pts-cs1.1.212'>PTS cs 1.1.212</a>Are ethically good and bad acts (<i>karma</i>s) known to exist? And the doer of them also? And the instigator also? And the enjoyer of the effect—is he also known to exist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is he who does the acts the same as he who experiences the effect?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then, are happiness and misery self-caused?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then, admitting you still assent to my first propositions, is the doer a different <span class='add'>person</span> from the enjoyer <span class='add'>of the effect</span>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc48' href='#pc48'></a>Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then, are happiness and misery caused by another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Admitting you still assent to the first propositions, does the same and another do the deeds, does the same and another enjoy (the results)? </p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then is happiness and is misery both self-caused and produced by another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Admitting that you still assent to the first propositions, does neither the same <span class='add'>person</span> both do the deeds and experience the results, nor one <span class='add'>person</span> do the deeds and another experience the results?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes, neither the same, nor two different persons.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then are happiness and misery not self-causing nor caused by something else?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Admitting, finally, that you still assent to the first propositions, namely, that ethically good and bad actions; as well as the doer of them, and the instigator of the doer, are known to exist, <span class='add'>I have now asked you four further questions:</span></p>
<ol>
<li>Is he who does the act the same as he who experiences the effect?</li>
<li>Are doer and experiencer two different persons?</li>
<li>Are they the same and also different persons?</li>
<li>Are they neither the same nor different persons?</li>
</ol>
<p><span class='add'>You have answered to each:</span> No. <span class='add'>I have then repeated <a class='pc' id='pc49' href='#pc49'></a> the question. You have then said</span>: Yes. I have then put four questions:</p>
<ol>
<li>Are happiness and misery self-caused?</li>
<li>Are they the work of another?</li>
<li>Are they both one and the other?</li>
<li>Are they, arising through a cause, self-caused, or the work of another?</li>
</ol>
<p><span class='add'>And you have replied</span>: No … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.213' href='#pts-cs1.1.213'>PTS cs 1.1.213</a>Is there such a thing as <i>karma</i> (action taking effect)?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is there such a thing as a maker of <i>karma</i>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.214' href='#pts-cs1.1.214'>PTS cs 1.1.214</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there such a thing as both <i>karma</i> and the maker of <i>karma</i>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there a maker of that maker?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat the question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then if the one and the other exist, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting of the cycle of life, no final <i>Nibbāna</i> without residual stuff of life?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Again, since you assent to both the first propositions, is there both a person and a maker of the person?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Or … is there both <i>Nibbāna</i> and a maker thereof? … or the earth, ocean, Sineru, water, fire, air, grass, brush and forest, and the maker thereof?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> … Or is <i>karma</i> one thing, the maker of it another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.215' href='#pts-cs1.1.215'>PTS cs 1.1.215</a>Is there such a thing as result of action?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is there such a thing as an enjoyer of the result?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said …</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc50' href='#pc50'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.216' href='#pts-cs1.1.216'>PTS cs 1.1.216</a>Do you maintain then that there are both results and enjoyer thereof?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there an enjoyer of that enjoyer?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then, if this and that be so, is there no making an end of ill, no … etc. <span class='pe'><em>complete in full similarly to <a class='cr' href='#pts-cs1.1.214'>PTS CS 1.1.214</a>, and ending:</em></span></p>
<p>You are maintaining that there is both result and enjoyer thereof, is then result one thing, and the enjoyer of it another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … <span class='pe'><em>complete as usual</em>.</span></p>
<h2>Supernormal Power</h2>
<h3>Examination into “Soul” continued by reference to Superintellectual Power</h3>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.217' href='#pts-cs1.1.217'>PTS cs 1.1.217</a>Is it wrong to say “the person <span class='add'>or soul</span> is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Have there not been those who could transform themselves by magic potency?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> If that be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person <span class='add'>or soul</span> is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”. Again, have there not been those who could hear sounds by the element of celestial hearing,… or know the mind of another, or remember previous lives, <a class='pc' id='pc51' href='#pc51'></a> or see visible objects by the celestial eye, or realize the destruction of the “intoxicants”? </p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> If these things be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.218' href='#pts-cs1.1.218'>PTS cs 1.1.218</a>Granting that there have been those who could transform themselves by magic potency, is it for that reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> When one has through magic potency transformed himself, was he then the personal entity, and not when not so transforming himself?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>This question is asked, and so answered, in the case of the other five modes of Superintellectual faculty named above.</em></span></p>
<h2>Appeal to the Suttas</h2>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.219' href='#pts-cs1.1.219'>PTS cs 1.1.219</a>Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is there not <span class='add'>one whom we call</span> mother?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”. Again, is there not <span class='add'>one whom we call</span> father, are there not brothers, sisters, nobles, brahmins, merchants, serfs, householders, religious, <i>devas</i>, humans?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known”, etc.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc52' href='#pc52'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.220' href='#pts-cs1.1.220'>PTS cs 1.1.220</a>Granting there are mothers, fathers, etc., is it for this reason that you insist thus respecting the personal entity?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there anyone who, not having been a mother, becomes a mother?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there anyone who, not having been a personal entity, becomes one?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>This pair of questions is then put concerning</em> “father”, “brother”…<i>“deva”</i>, “human”, <em>and answered as above.</em></span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Granting the existence of a mother, is it for this reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there anyone who, having been a mother, is no longer a mother?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there anyone who, having been a personal entity, is no longer one?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>This last pair of questions is then put with respect to</em> “father” <em>and the rest, and answered as above</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.221' href='#pts-cs1.1.221'>PTS cs 1.1.221</a>Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is there no such thing as a “stream-winner” (or one who has entered the first stage of the way to salvation)?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> If there be such a thing, then indeed, good sir, it is right to assent to the original proposition. Again, is there no such thing as a “once-returner”, a “no-returner”, an arahant, one who is freed in both ways, one who is <a class='pc' id='pc53' href='#pc53'></a> emancipated by understanding, one who has the testimony within himself, one who has arrived at right views, one who is emancipated by faith, one who marches along with wisdom, one who marches along with faith?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Then surely, good sir, it is right to affirm the first proposition.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.222' href='#pts-cs1.1.222'>PTS cs 1.1.222</a>Granted that there is such a thing as a “stream-winner”, is it for that reason that the “person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there anyone who, not having been a stream-winner, is one now?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there anyone who, not having been a “person”, is one now?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Again, granted that there is such an one as a stream-winner, and that this is the reason for your affirmation as to the personal entity, is there anyone who having been a stream-winner, is so no longer?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there anyone who, not having been a person, is one now?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>These questions are now put regarding the other designations, and are answered similarly.</em></span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.223' href='#pts-cs1.1.223'>PTS cs 1.1.223</a>If <span class='add'>as you say</span> it be wrong to assert “the person is known, etc., …” are there not <span class='add'>the accepted terms of</span> “the Four Pairs of men”, “the Eight Individuals”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc54' href='#pc54'></a>Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> But if that be so, surely it is right to speak of the “person” as known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.224' href='#pts-cs1.1.224'>PTS cs 1.1.224</a>Granting that there are the Four, the Eight, is it <em>for this reason</em> you assert the first proposition?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Do the Four, the Eight, appear because of the Buddha's appearing?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Does the “person” appear because of the Buddha's appearing?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat the question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then at the Buddha's final <i>Nibbāna</i>, is the “person” annihilated, so that no personal entity exists?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.225' href='#pts-cs1.1.225'>PTS cs 1.1.225</a>The person <span class='add'>you say</span> is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact—is the person conditioned?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the person unconditioned?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is he neither?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc55' href='#pc55'></a>Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Apart from the conditioned or the unconditioned, is there another, a third alternative?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> I repeat my question.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But was it not said by the Exalted One:</p>
<p>“There are, <i>bhikkhus</i>, these two irreducible categories—what are the two? The irreducible category of the conditioned, the irreducible category of the unconditioned. These are the two”?</p>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Hence it is surely wrong to say that apart from the conditioned and the unconditioned, there is another, a third alternative.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin (<span class='add'>continues</span>): </span><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.226' href='#pts-cs1.1.226'>PTS cs 1.1.226</a>You say that the person is neither conditioned nor unconditioned? Are then the conditioned, the unconditioned, the person, entirely different things?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said …</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Are the aggregates conditioned, <i>Nibbāna</i> unconditioned, the person neither conditioned nor unconditioned?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then are the aggregates, <i>Nibbāna</i>, and the person, three entirely different things?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>The last two questions are then applied to each aggregate taken separately</em>: material qualities, feeling, perception, mental coefficients, consciousness).</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.227' href='#pts-cs1.1.227'>PTS cs 1.1.227</a>Is the genesis of the person apparent, and its passing away also, and is its duration distinctively apparent?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <span class='add'>Then</span> is the person conditioned?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> It was said by the Exalted One:</p>
<p>“<i>Bhikkhus</i>, there are these three characteristics of the conditioned: of conditioned things the genesis is apparent, the passing away is apparent, the duration amidst change is apparent”.</p>
<p>Hence if these three are characteristics of the person, this is also <a class='pc' id='pc56' href='#pc56'></a> conditioned. Are these three characteristics <span class='add'>not</span> apparent in the person?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> No, they are not apparent.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then is the person unconditioned?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> It was said by the Exalted One: </p>
<p>“<i>Bhikkhus</i>, there are these three characteristics of the unconditioned: of unconditioned things, <i>bhikkhus</i>, the genesis is not apparent, the passing away is not apparent, the duration amidst change is not apparent”.</p>
<p>Now if all these <span class='add'>as you say</span> do not characterize the <span class='add'>notion of</span> “person”, the person is unconditioned.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.228' href='#pts-cs1.1.228'>PTS cs 1.1.228</a>The person who has attained final <i>Nibbāna</i>, does he exist in the Goal, or does he not exist therein?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> He exists in the Goal.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is then the person who has finally attained eternal?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is the person who has attained final <i>Nibbāna</i> and does not exist in the Goal annihilated?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> On what does the person depend in order to persist?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> He persists through dependence on coming-to-be.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is <span class='add'>the state of</span> coming-to-be impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc57' href='#pc57'></a>Is the person also impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.229' href='#pts-cs1.1.229'>PTS cs 1.1.229</a>Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Is there no one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling, knows that he is feeling it?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Surely, if that be so, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”… and if he, on feeling painful feeling, knows that he is feeling it—you admit this?—it is right to say “the person is known”, etc. So also for neutral feeling.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.230' href='#pts-cs1.1.230'>PTS cs 1.1.230</a>I note what you affirm. Now is it <em>for this reason</em> that you maintain the person to be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then is one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling, knows he is feeling it, a personal entity, and is one who, on that occasion, does not know, <em>not</em> a personal entity?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> You deny this also in the case of painful and neutral feeling?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But you maintain, <em>because of this self-awareness</em>, that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is then pleasurable feeling one thing and the self-conscious enjoyer another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'><em>Same query and answer in the case of painful and neutral feelings</em>.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc58' href='#pc58'></a><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.231' href='#pts-cs1.1.231'>PTS cs 1.1.231</a>You deny that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact: Is there then no one who may be occupied in contemplating the <span class='add'>concept of</span> body with respect to his physical frame?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> … or in contemplating <span class='add'>the concept of</span> feeling, or consciousness, or certain mental properties with respect to these in himself, respectively?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Then surely, good sir, it is right to say as I do with respect to the person.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.232' href='#pts-cs1.1.232'>PTS cs 1.1.232</a>Granting the carrying out by anyone of the four applications in mindfulness, is it <em>for this reason</em> that you say as you do with respect to the personal entity?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Then is anyone when so engaged a person, and not, when he is not so engaged?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.233' href='#pts-cs1.1.233'>PTS cs 1.1.233</a>Or again, granting <span class='add'>as above</span>… is “body” one thing, the contemplator another? and so for “feeling”, etc.?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.234' href='#pts-cs1.1.234'>PTS cs 1.1.234</a>Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Was it not said by the Exalted One:</p>
<blockquote class='gatha'>
<p>“O Mogharājan! look upon the world<br>
As void <span class='add'>of soul, and ever heedful bide.</span></p>
<p><span class='add'>Cut</span> <a class='pc' id='pc59' href='#pc59'></a> out the world's opinions as to soul.<br>
So shalt thou get past death; so an thou look,<br>
The king of death shall no more look on thee”?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Is it thus in the Suttanta?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Hence it is surely wrong to say that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.235' href='#pts-cs1.1.235'>PTS cs 1.1.235</a>Is it the person <span class='add'>or soul</span> here who “looks upon”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Does he contemplate with or without material qualities?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> With them.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is that soul the same as that body?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> But if he contemplates without material qualities, is that soul quite different from that body?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <span class='add'>I ask again</span> is it the <span class='add'>soul or</span> person who contemplates? </p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Does he contemplate when he has gone within, or does he contemplate from without <span class='add'>the organism</span>?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> He contemplates when he has gone within.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is that soul that body?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Supposing he contemplates from without, is the soul one thing, the body another?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.236' href='#pts-cs1.1.236'>PTS cs 1.1.236</a>Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Was not the Exalted One a speaker of truth, a speaker in season, a speaker of facts, a speaker of words that are right, that are not wrong, that are not ambiguous?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc60' href='#pc60'></a>Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Now it was said by the Exalted One:</p>
<p>“There is the person who works for his own good …”</p>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.237' href='#pts-cs1.1.237'>PTS cs 1.1.237</a>… again, it was said by the Exalted One:</p>
<p>“There is one person, <i>bhikkhus</i>, who, being reborn in this world, is born for the good, for the happiness of many, to show compassion on the world, for the advantage, the good, the happiness of <i>devas</i> and of men”.</p>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.238' href='#pts-cs1.1.238'>PTS cs 1.1.238</a>Granting this, and also the veracity, etc., of the Exalted One, it was said by the Exalted One: </p>
<p>“All things are without soul”.</p>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Hence surely it is wrong to say the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.</p>
<p>… <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.239' href='#pts-cs1.1.239'>PTS cs 1.1.239</a> again, it was said by the Exalted One: </p>
<p>“He does not doubt that misery arises, comes to pass, that misery ceases, passes away, nor is he perplexed thereat. And thereupon independent insight comes herein to him. Now this, Kaccāna, thus far is right views”.</p>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> <a class='pc' id='pc61' href='#pc61'></a>Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Hence surely it is wrong to say “the person is known”, etc.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.240' href='#pts-cs1.1.240'>PTS cs 1.1.240</a>… again, was it not said by Bhikkhunī Vajirā to Māra the evil One:</p>
<blockquote class='gatha'>
<p>“`Being'? What dost thou fancy by that word?<br>
'Mong false opinions, Māra, art thou strayed.<br>
This a mere bundle of formations is.<br>
Therefrom no `being' mayest thou obtain.<br>
For e'en as, when the factors are arranged,<br>
The product by the name `chariot' is known,<br>
So doth our usage covenant to say:<br>
`A being', when the aggregates are there.<br>
<p>'Tis simply Ill that riseth, simply Ill<br>
That doth persist, and then fadeth away.<br>
Nought beside Ill there is that comes to be;<br>
Nought else but Ill there is that fades away”?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.241' href='#pts-cs1.1.241'>PTS cs 1.1.241</a>… again, did not the venerable Ānanda say to the Exalted One: </p>
<p>“It is said, lord, `the world is void, the world is void'. Now in what way, lord, is it meant that the world is void”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>and did not the Exalted One reply:</span></p>
<p>“Inasmuch, Ānanda, as it is void of soul and of what belongs to soul, therefore is the world called void. And wherein, Ānanda, is it void of soul and of what belongs to soul? The eye, Ānanda, is verily void of soul and of what belongs to soul, so is visible object and the sense and contact of sight. So are the other organs, and objects of the senses, and the other senses. So is the co-ordinating organ, cognizable objects, mental consciousness and contact. All are void of soul and of what belongs to soul. And whatever pleasurable, painful, or neutral feeling <a class='pc' id='pc62' href='#pc62'></a> arises, in relation to the senses, and the sense-co-ordinating mind that too is void of soul and of what belongs to soul. It is for this, Ānanda, that the world is said to be void”?</p>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.242' href='#pts-cs1.1.242'>PTS cs 1.1.242</a><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> … again, whereas you affirm that the person is known, etc … and we know the veracity, etc., of the Exalted One, it was said by the Exalted One:</p>
<p>“<i>Bhikkhus</i>, if there were soul, should I have that which belongs to a soul? Or if there were that which belongs to soul, should I have a soul? In both cases ye would reply: `Yea, lord'. But both soul and that which belongs to soul being in very truth and for ever impossible to be known, then this that is a stage of opinion, namely: `<em>that</em> is the world, <em>that</em> is the soul, this I shall hereafter become, permanent, constant, eternal, unchangeable—so shall I abide even like unto the Eternal'—is not this, <i>bhikkhus</i>, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of fools?” “Whatever it be not, lord, it surely is, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of fools”.</p>
<p>Is the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> <a class='ref pts-cs' id='pts-cs1.1.243' href='#pts-cs1.1.243'>PTS cs 1.1.243</a>… again, it was said by the Exalted One: </p>
<p>“There are these three teachers, Seniya, to be found in the world—who are the three? There is first, Seniya, that kind of teacher who declares that there is a real, persistent soul in the life that now is, and in that which is to come; then there is the kind of teacher, Seniya, who declares that there is a real, persistent soul in the life that now is, but not a soul in a future life; lastly, there is a certain teacher who does not declare that there is a soul either in the life that now is, nor in that which is to come. The first, Seniya, of these three is called an Eternalist, the second is called an Annihilationist; the third of these, he, Seniya, is called the teacher, who is Buddha supreme. These are the three teachers to be found in the world”.</p>
<p>Is<a class='pc' id='pc63' href='#pc63'></a> the Suttanta thus?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> … again, did the Exalted One speak of “a butter-jar”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there anyone who can make a jar out of butter?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> … finally, did the Exalted One speak of an oil-jar, a honey-jar, a molasses-jar, a milk-pail, a water-pot, a cup, flask, bowl of water, a “meal provided in perpetuity”, a “constant supply of congey”?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Yes.</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Is there any supply of congey that is permanent, stable, eternal, not liable to change?</p>
<p><span class='add'>Puggalavādin:</span> Nay, that cannot truly be said … .</p>
<p><span class='add'>Theravādin:</span> Hence it is surely wrong to say “the soul is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”.</p>
<footer>
<p><cite class='book' translate='no'>The Points of Controversy</cite>, an English translation of the Pali Abhidhamma Kathāvatthu. Translated by <span class='author'>Shwe Zan Aung</span> and <span class='author'>C.A.F. Rhys Davids</span>. First published by Pali Text Society, <span class='publication-date'>1915</span>.</p>
<p>This SuttaCentral edition was prepared by <span class='editor'>Manfred Wierich</span> and <span class='editor'>Ven. Vimala</span> and proofread by <span class='editor'>Josephine Tobin</span>. Some changes were introduced:</p>
<ul>
<li>Abbreviations, i.e., those of cited works and the participants in the controversies, were expanded.</li>
<li>Cross-references were linked.</li>
<li>Some typographic changes were introduced, among others, i.e.: the phonetic symbol “ŋ” was changed to the Pāli diacritical letter “ṃ”, “ô” to “o”, single quotes to double quotes, and “:—” to “:”.</li>
<li>Letter-spacing with fixed spaces was replaced with bold font.</li>
<li>The corrigenda were merged into the text. Some could not be resolved, though.</li>
</ul>
<p>This electronic version is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial 3.0 licence (CC BY-NC 3.0) as found here: <a href='http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/'>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/</a></p>
<p>All copyright is owned by the Pali Text Society. See also the statement under http://www.palitext.com/ → Publications → Copyright Announcement. For non-commercial use only.</p>
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