Originally created 7th June 2023
Nothingness if it is supported by being, vanishes qua nothingness, and we fall back upon being. Nothingness can be nihilated only on the foundation of being; if nothingness can be given, it is neither before nor after being, nor in a general way outside of being. Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being—like a worm.
- Jean-Paul Sartre
Most of current Ontology boils down to a brute fact: there is a God, there is Mathematics, there is a Universe, there is Value, there is Mind, there is Ultimate Reality, or there is Actuality (and Potentiality).
Here I outline an alternative to the above, in order to answer the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?".
The argument hinges on 'Nothing'. Whereas philosophers have frequently spoken of Nothing in the past, like Russell I believe it is a critical mistake. Ontological Nothing cannot be, by definition, as explained by Sartre. Therefore, non-nothing must be, however specified. But without a causal specifier, it is non-nothing, without specification.
This provides a plausible theory for the most critical axiom of all, Existence.
Happily, since it is unconstrained around the Existing, it gives plenty of room for that which is existing: to be a mathematical object(s), universe(s), God(s), Mind(s), Ultimate Reality. Perhaps the same thing.
This also means the existing is uncaused/causeless. It doesn't require a prime mover or causa sui.
(Nb. Here I use the term "Actuality" more like a placeholder rather than folllowing any stricter definition of the word)
The argument is that Actuality is explained in the more basic fact of non non-Actuality. A statement of Actuality as fact by itself is unsatisfactory, because it doesn't appropriately answer the question of Why. But "non-Nothing" can be seen as correct not just in experience but also in being able to follow the absence of a contradictory How (ie. the thesis could be disproved simply by presenting an existent Nothing, but logically this cannot and will not occur). So the clarified exposition gives Actuality and also the foundational understanding of Why there is Actuality - which is rooted in the non-existence of Nothing, owing to its definitional impossibility.
There has never been Nothing, never will be Nothing, never could be Nothing. If Nothing is, then it is something not Nothing. If it is not, then it is not (Nothing). Because it could not, it did not. And because it did not, there was not Nothing. Necessarily, there was Something by the absence of Nothing, which is the inverse of Something. One may be tempted to say that the possibility "it is not (Nothing)" is itself a viable outcome (akin to an unnamed Nothing), and it is! (in a sense) But a Nothing that is not it is not unnamed Nothing, it is Something.
Although I have talked of non-Nothing, and non non-Actuality as though they may be causes of Actuality, since these have no basis anywhere the truth is they are only descriptive of the absence of alternatives to Actuality, therefore it can be said that Actuality is Causeless, and it must be asserted that this is in fact a possible, necessary even, attribute for a root axiom.
I believe Satre was too poetic when it got to the point of ontology - because his focus was more on existentialism, he poetically states "Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being—like a worm". This is problematic as an ontological argument if one agrees with Parmenides that "Nothing comes from nothing" - one still needs to pick one of the standard ontological roots then: God, Mind, Value, etc.
This problem disappears if one takes the Frege and Russell position that Nothing is only illusory and/or explanatory. If we take that position we don't agree with the coiled worm analogy (except as metaphorical around the concept). Nonetheless, the argument against Nothing by Satre is true.
I find Hegel's dialectical relationship between being and nothingness helpful as a metaphor, but only that. Due to Parmenides, Frege and Russell I think it isn't quite right to say Being is definitionally in relation to Nothing. Just that we could explain Being after the fact using the intellectual concept of negation and the intellectual concept of Nothing, and Hegel was going further than that.
In a sense one could perhaps describe this post straightforwardly as: Parmenides' Ontology, but swapping in Frege, Russell and ultimately Sartre's explanation of Nothing in place of Parmenides' one.
However doing so leads to a philosophical contribution to Metaphysical Ontology, which is to provide a logical from-principles explanation for Actuality, and at the same time giving an explanation for why this Actuality is Uncaused - without having a prime mover or being causa sui.
This philosophical argument aims to serve as part of a map, but a map is not the territory. It should be contrasted with the myriad avenues of life which give better tools for understanding and appreciating the territory, the experience of existing.
Many religions and spiritual doctrines place ultimate reality as beyond all conception, which I believe would also include these logical statements about an ontological nothing. If that is the case then this theory is totally unfounded, as one could not say one way or the other. I think this is a very valid, and maybe more sensible, philosophical position to have.
Discussions welcome!
- Parmenides argued that Nothing is impossible, but the argument is much weaker because it is based on a disqualification rooted in our subjective legibility being in some way a "cause" rather than an absolute contradiction (and impossibility) of the intrinsics. This means it is not an argument of truly causeless actuality.
- Hegel - a dialectical relationship between being and nothingness
- Gottlob Frege - "nothing" (like 0) is special, it refers to absence
- Bertrand Russell - it is an error to treat "nothing" as a subject that exists
- Jean-Paul Satre - explained the logical contradiction of Nothing. A lot of his surrounding thought has existentialism and human psychology as its reference point rather than ontology, but nonetheless this argument carries to ontological nothing.
- Thank you to Robert Lawrence Kuhn for the TV Series Closer to Truth, which gave a very good overview and introduction to the topic.
- Some philosphy has argued that asking of Nothing is meaningless, but more from the angle that a "Nothing" would require a Truth to assert it, and that presence of Truth would contradict there being Nothing, hence there is not Nothing. I don't believe this is quite the same as arguing that Nothing by its own definition is impossible to exist, and I don't think the other formulation is as helpful a foundation. For one thing, it sort of replaces Actuality as the primary axiom with some concept "Truth", which is not in the least bit helpful. But saying there is no Non-Actuality is post hoc explanatory and not relying on any concept of Truth, it merely relays the definition and leaves Actuality as the only viability, hence the question is answered: it could not have been otherwise, or better, "(this) is". Nor do I believe saying Nothing is meaningless is the best way to say that ultimate reality is beyond all conceptialisation.
- Please contact me by Discussions (link above), Issues or Pull Request